An aerial photograph of a modern building courtyard. The courtyard is paved with light-colored square tiles. Several large, circular planters are embedded in the pavement, each containing various green plants and flowers. A few people are walking through the courtyard. The overall scene is brightly lit, suggesting a sunny day.

Protecting What Matters

Campus Safety Security Assessment

Conducted on Behalf of the Los Angeles Community College District

FINAL REPORT

July 21, 2021

Confidential and Proprietary

 HILLARD HEINTZE

A Jensen Hughes Company

July 21, 2021

Dr. Francisco Rodriguez
Chancellor
Los Angeles Community College District
770 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, California 90017

Dear Dr. Rodriguez:

We are pleased to submit our final report detailing our campus safety security assessment of the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD).

Throughout our work and interaction with your staff and students, we were impressed with their willingness and commitment to maintain and improve security services on the LACCD's nine campuses and at the three satellite offices. Similarly, we found the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) Community College Bureau (CCB) personnel to be highly collaborative and your broader community members open, appreciative and helpful.

This report reflects their valuable input as well as the opportunities our team of experts identified to improve campus safety and security in the near term and over time.

This report is a confidential and proprietary work document between Hillard Heintze and the Los Angeles Community College District. Please let me know if you have any questions on this report. We place enormous value on the trust that you have extended to us in this matter.

Sincerely,
Hillard Heintze, A Jensen Hughes Company



Robert L. Davis
Senior Vice President and Practice Lead
Law Enforcement Consulting



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Introduction

Scope and Assignment

On December 22, 2020, the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD) circulated a request for qualifications seeking firms to conduct a campus safety and security assessment of the LACCD. The assessment was to include the LACCD office, nine college campuses and three satellite facilities.

In addition to the assessments, the LACCD requested a review of crime reporting, Clery Act statistics, dispatch records, security and emergency planning documents, intelligence bulletins, and policies and procedures associated with the law enforcement operations on its campuses. The LACCD further requested extensive outreach to campus community stakeholders through forums, focus groups and small group and individual interviews to evaluate their perceptions of the LACCD's safety and security operations and their needs and expectations of services.

To that end, the LACCD sought an administrative and operational assessment and staffing study of its security provider, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD). This study was to include a comparative analysis of security services at other similar community colleges. The LACCD requested a final report with findings and recommendations and subsequent assistance in creating a request for proposal for a safety and security services provider.

Actions Taken

The Hillard Heintze team performed the following tasks in support of our assessment.

1. Reviewed 10 years of data from campus safety and security service contracts, policies, procedures and training programs to analyze the scope of coverage and personnel training (e.g., dispatch data, Clery data).
2. Identified external benchmarks such as security staffing and crime statistics (e.g., local, state, U.S. Department of Justice data) to determine the LACCD's overall safety and security.
3. Reviewed LASD Community College Bureau (CCB) and LACCD incident reports and documents related to strategic plans; personnel staffing and deployment; monthly and annual reports; operations manuals; intelligence bulletins; evaluations; training records; performance statistics; and the LACCD's Board rules, policies and procedures.
4. Interviewed LASD CCB and LACCD personnel.
5. Assessed the security needs of each campus to evaluate perceptions and adequacy of campus security and safety and what is desired moving forward. We conducted on-site walkthroughs of the following sites:
 - LA City College
 - Educational Services Center



- East LA College
 - Corporate Center
 - Southgate Education Center
 - LA Harbor College
 - LA Mission College
 - LA Pierce College
 - LA Trade Technical College
 - LA Southwest College
 - LA Valley College
 - West LA College
 - Van De Kamp Innovation Center
6. Established focus groups comprised of various campus community stakeholders, including students, faculty, staff and administrators, and facilitated discussion among participants.
 7. Sought community input via a LACCD-wide campus survey on public safety to learn about faculty, staff, administrators and students' experiences with the LASD CCB and receive suggestions on policing models.
 8. Observed general patrol security, parking enforcement and investigations, and records, communications, reporting and other administrative support services.
 9. Conducted a staffing analysis to determine appropriate staffing. This analysis included a discussion of the workload and operational and safety conditions.
 10. Assessed the safety and security services training needs of each campus while considering local, state and federal guidelines.
 11. Conducted a risk, threat and vulnerability assessment to identify the range of realistic threats and vulnerabilities either present or potentially impacting campuses and satellite offices.

Interviews and Discussions

We conducted interviews or held discussions with the following individuals.

LACCD Representatives

- + Andra Hoffman, LACCD Board Trustee
- + Mike Fong, LACCD Board Trustee
- + Francisco Rodriguez, Chancellor, LACCD



- + Melinda Nish, Deputy Chancellor, LACCD
- + Ryan Cornner, Vice Chancellor, Educational Programs and Institutional Effectiveness, LACCD
- + Carmen Lidz, Vice Chancellor, Chief Information Officer, LACCD
- + Jeanette Gordon, Chief Financial Officer, LACCD
- + Jeffrey Prieto, General Counsel, LACCD
- + Rueben Smith, Vice Chancellor, Chief Facilities Executive, LACCD
- + Albert Roman, President, East Los Angeles College
- + Mary Gallagher, President, Los Angeles City College
- + Luis Dorado, Interim President, Los Angeles Harbor College
- + Monte Perez, President, Los Angeles Mission College
- + Alexis Montevirgen, President, Los Angeles Pierce College
- + Awan Seher, President, Los Angeles Southwest College
- + Katrina VanderWoude, President, Los Angeles Trade Technical College
- + Barry Gribbons, President, Los Angeles Valley College
- + James Limbaugh, President, West Los Angeles College
- + Leo Constantino, Risk Manager
- + William Ramirez, Manager of Safety and Emergency Services

Additionally, we interviewed Vice Presidents of Administrative Services, Vice Presidents of Student Services, Facilities Directors, Facilities Operations Managers, Senior Office Assistants, members of campus behavioral intervention teams and former student cadets.

LASD Personnel

We conducted multiple interviews with LASD personnel, both current and former. We spoke with LASD CCB captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and team leader deputies.



Stakeholder Focus Group Discussions

We engaged in a multi-faceted stakeholder outreach program. Our diverse team of attorneys, professors, former and current law enforcement executives, human resource professionals and project managers engaged in a comprehensive process and, in effect, interacted with thousands of people. Our outreach involved campus community forums for each of the nine college campuses, the Educational Services Center and a specific forum for students. We conducted focus group discussions with representatives from labor unions, college administrators and LASD CCB personnel. We also conducted one-on-one interviews with individuals from all segments of the LACCD security process including board members, executives, faculty, staff, administrators, campus employees, former and current LASD CCB officers, campus behavioral intervention team members, and members of the Risk Management and Legal department. Finally, we facilitated a district-wide survey that received over 7,000 respondents.

Common themes and perspectives from these interactions for each of the assessed sites are discussed in the corresponding sections below.



Key Findings

1. We commend the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD) for recognizing the need for and authorizing an objective assessment of its safety and security services.

Like many colleges and universities, the LACCD once had a proprietary police department. For nearly 20 years, however, it has contracted the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) for security services. The LACCD now recognizes the need to become more engaged in the security process to understand more about the LASD CCB's performance and assess its own long-term needs to become better informed and take a more active role.

2. The LACCD lacks the structure and infrastructure to support a different security provider at the current time.

To date, the LACCD has had little involvement in the security procedures, processes, equipment or personnel on its campuses. At the same time, the LASD CCB designs and executes security processes and their integration with the LACCD with little input from the district. Although the LACCD and campus administrators laud their interactions with LASD CCB personnel, they do not have a full understanding of the mechanics of how LASD CCB officers address their daily tasks or how the LASD CCB responds to crises and facilitates gaining additional resources when necessary.

Should LACCD choose to transition to a new security provider, we recommend that LACCD administrators first address the key findings and recommendations in this report to establish a framework of standards, practices and accountability measures to guide future security providers. A security best practice at colleges and institutions is to have a security director serve as liaison between the security provider and college administration and assume responsibility for oversight of the security operations to include security personnel. The LACCD relies on the manager of Safety and Emergency Services to function in this role. We see the value of this relationship as it relates to emergencies and crises on campus; however, it is neither sustainable nor consistent with recognized best practices.

Additionally, establishing an operations center to capture and document all campus security activity would increase visibility. Personnel in the operations center could also dispatch and monitor security technologies.



3. Most of the hundreds of people with whom we spoke, and the thousands of survey takers, supported using the LASD CCB as the security provider on campus.

Many expressed that they wanted LASD CCB officers to become more involved and engaged with the campus community; however, their approval of the LASD CCB as the campus security provider was clear. Far more people adamantly supported the LASD CCB as the security provider on campus than voiced disapproval.

4. The LACCD needs to establish a strategic security plan to govern its security process.

It appears the LACCD turned over security responsibilities to the LASD CCB without clearly communicating its expectations or establishing accountability measures. This assessment is a progressive step toward remedying this lack of communication.

We find that some of the LACCD's frustrations are rooted in decades of limited involvement in the security process. A strategic security plan would establish a new security vision, define the milestones along the path toward achieving it, and specifically how, when and who will be responsible for achieving them.

5. The process to capture information regarding LASD officers' work, response to calls for service and the disposition of those calls is often inconsistent, inaccurate and uninformative.

A significant portion of our work focused on evaluating security personnel staffing by reviewing calls for service and the tasks officers complete throughout their shifts. The raw numbers for each type of call for service and task, as well as the associated times spent on the call, provide insight into what the officers are doing, how frequently the tasks are completed, how much time is spent on those tasks, and what times and days have the highest volume of calls for service. We describe this process in detail in the Staffing Analysis section as well as in our information for each campus.

However, we determined the LASD CCB's data collection process does not leverage modern technology platforms for data collection and analysis, a deficit that renders the data's collection and usage largely incomplete. Several variables contribute to the ineffective data collection process, including the absence of a consistent or centralized dispatching process and clear procedures for documenting officer tasks and how entries are recorded. Because of this, we were unable to provide an accurate staffing analysis. By implementing a centralized dispatching function, the LASD CCB can collect the necessary data points for a complete and accurate staffing analysis in the future.



6. The LACCD recognizes its system is decentralized but acknowledges the individual needs of its nine distinct college campuses. However, opportunities for centralization and standardization exist that could serve to improve security operations.

As the largest community college district in the nation, with nine unique colleges, the LACCD's locations, environmental concerns, student demographics, educational foci and crime rates differ – sometimes significantly – across the campuses.

However, the colleges' security operations would benefit from some shared standardized policies, procedures and expectations to set high-level guidance while permitting individual college administrators the autonomy needed to address their respective campuses' needs. Standardization creates consistency, improves the efficiency of security operations, lowers the cost of service delivery, improves data quality and analysis and, over time, can significantly lower safety- and security-related risks and improve the outcomes you are targeting across the board.

7. Inconsistencies in the LACCD's performance metrics and subsequent reporting procedures regarding their focus on community engagement is not recognized in their current processes.

We heard repeatedly from participants in our outreach efforts about their desire for the LASD to adopt a more robust community-oriented policing approach. They would like the LASD CCB to focus more time and resources on campus community engagement by attending and hosting more townhall meetings, extending additional training opportunities, assisting students with directions while on campus, providing safety escorts, and conducting more frequent campus patrols. We found no evidence that the LASD CCB must document and report these activities to the LACCD administration. Instead, LACCD only receives reports from the LASD CCB about criminal activities.

8. Reporting on-campus crimes and incidents is not captured through the use of an automated report management system.

Across the LACCD, which personnel the LASD CCB notifies of such incidents is inconsistent and unclear, as is the formal reporting process. More importantly, reports do not reach all applicable stakeholders, specifically the LACCD's Office of Risk Management.



9. The LACCD's security procedures do not include appropriate notifications regarding security-related incidents to the Risk Management and Legal Departments.

We learned of higher-profile security incidents of which neither the Risk Management nor Legal department were aware, and that neither department is engaged in the security process until a financial claim or litigation occurs. Throughout the LACCD, the Risk Management Department is not integrated in preventative security measures as such attempts have been met with resistance at the campus level. The LACCD could reduce risk if the Risk Management and Legal Departments have immediate access to campus incidents so they could analyze trends and identify opportunities for risk mitigation.

10. The process of monitoring security cameras and dispatching and recording of incidents varies significantly across the campuses. The creation of a District-wide operations center would significantly benefit the LACCD and the LASD CCB.

Campus security personnel are not dispatched in a uniform manner, even within individual campuses. A deputy, security officer, senior office assistant (SOA) or student cadet may dispatch calls for service from their respective campus sheriff's stations. They record those calls in daily logs in a multitude of forms, including handwritten notes, Word documents and spreadsheets. Security personnel typically enter call information in their mobile data terminal after completing the call. However, two people may document the same call in the daily call, and the data is not reconciled.

The data points associated with calls for service are equally confusing, meaning a study regarding how calls for service are defined, as well as for their associated response times and outcomes, would help LACCD compare security-related data across its campuses more accurately. Additionally, security cameras may be monitored by security personnel, SOAs or cadets or any other entity selected at the campus level, which could create gaps in the monitoring process. Having all cameras in one central location with a formal monitoring process would minimize such gaps. Similarly, personnel inconsistently monitor alarms, such as those from a panic or intrusion detection systems on campus.

11. Given the size of the population it serves, the LACCD's Safety and Emergency Management Services is understaffed.

The LACCD serves 230,000 students across nine campuses, many in high-crime areas where violent crimes occur just outside campus boundaries. In many cases, the manager of Safety and Emergency Services (SES) receives an initial incident notification, then engages the appropriate security personnel through the resolution of the incident. In addition to incident management, the SES manager, along with LASD CCB and LACCD employees, coordinates emergency response training throughout the LACCD.



The manager is the only staff member in the SES. The LACCD implemented the position of SES manager in 2016. Although we commend the LACCD for investing in the SES program, expecting one person to provide effective service is unrealistic. Additionally, at one point the appointed SES manager took an extended leave of absence, causing the LACCD to discover it lacked a redundancy plan. The LACCD assigned the deputy chancellor the SES manager's duties for that period. The LACCD should consider hiring additional staff or rotating campus incident management team (IMT) members to temporarily assist the SEM manager to strengthen their familiarity, knowledge and broader understanding of security-related incidents across the campuses.

12. The LACCD overall and the individual colleges could benefit from a standardized on-campus approach to emergency management.

Currently, there are no standardized policies, procedures and protocols for handling on-campus, critical emergency responses for all LACCD campuses. Having such protocols in place is a best practice in today's security environment, especially for a major education institution like LACCD with various campuses and thousands of students and faculty. Whether in response to an active-shooter situation or a natural disaster such as an earthquake, having a consistent response and management plan that all campus administrators are trained to support is critical.

13. Currently, it is not clear who is responsible for managing the various security technologies implemented across the LACCD system.

For example, it is not apparent who is responsible for reviewing and assessing the condition and operability of security cameras, access control systems, alarms and lighting. Participants in many of our discussions were frustrated with the LASD CCB because some security cameras were not operational when a recording was needed. However, although the LASD CCB uses the cameras in its security operations, it is not responsible for the specifications, placement, operations or maintenance of the devices.

Similarly, the LASD CCB has little to no control or ownership of alarms, access control measures or lights, some of which have automated operational periods. In one instance, a camera on campus remained obstructed for a significant time while personnel discussed who was responsible for addressing the issue – Information Technology (IT), Facilities Department staff or the LASD CCB.



14. The campuses' security cameras and alarms are not always placed or monitored in areas that appears to have greater needs, which reduces their value and effectiveness.

Because security cameras on the campuses are not always placed in the areas where they would provide the most value and needed security, staff often have not learned that people experiencing homelessness are staying on campus or in campus buildings unless they have occupied the space for significant periods of time. More emphasis on placing the cameras and security cameras in the areas with the greatest needs would help to address such issues.

15. Policies and procedures for when and how LASD CCB officers respond to calls for service are not standardized across LACCD's many campuses and facilities, which has caused some confusion and frustration for some students and faculty members.

We learned of many situations in which a formal communications process would have alleviated frustration and increased efficiency and effectiveness. For example, many people we interviewed did not understand the roles and responsibilities of the LASD CCB officers. Several participants expressed frustration that the officers do not respond to requests for service; however, a department or district policy or procedure prevented them doing so. Developing a formal communications plan to inform the campus community of their roles and responsibilities and the rationale behind officers' responsibilities would eliminate much confusion and frustration among those requesting service. Additionally, we learned that the communication process for incidents varies from campus to campus, which increases inefficiencies regarding notifications and management of the response to a call.

We also learned of instances in which the LACCD or campus communities had certain expectations of LASD CCB officers regarding their role with security technology, but they did not communicate those expectations to the LASD CCB. Additionally, we learned from LASD CCB that there have been instances when security technologies were being upgraded, removed or replaced and the officers on campus were not notified. Better communication is necessary for the LASD CCB and the LACCD to engage in a more efficient and effective security program.



Recommendations Common to All Sites

Risk, Threat and Vulnerability Assessment Recommendations	
R.1	Increase LASD CCB security officer and deputy staffing levels in conjunction with the return of on-campus instruction and services to ensure adequate patrols of campus across all three shifts, particularly during the Early Morning shift (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.) when most crimes occur.
R.2	<p>Re-evaluate the LASD CCB's deployments to ensure maximum security coverage consistent with each site's vulnerabilities.</p> <p>For example, assign per shift, on a rotating basis, an LASD CCB officer to monitor video surveillance and alarms and to communicate any potential or actual threats to security officers in the field.</p> <p>Ensure patrol locations include buildings and spaces that are targets for criminal activity that the campuses' video surveillance or access control systems do not cover.</p>
R.3	Install an electronic patrol check-in software to record automatically the locations that LASD CCB officers inspect across the campus.
R.4	Conduct regular penetration testing of all security technology and security procedures to ensure the LASD CCB meets the LACCD's security and safety expectations and priorities.
R.5	Promote and increase the size of the Student Cadet Program to allow LASD CCB personnel to conduct more patrols throughout the campuses and inside buildings more susceptible to burglaries and unwanted intrusions.
R.6	Increase staffing to cover personnel who may miss work due to illness or vacation. Hire a full-time dispatcher to staff the LASD CCB station.
R.7	Establish a formal process to assess the needs for additional security personnel for special events. Ensure communication with LASD CCB regarding expectations for the event's security.
R.8	Establish a standard process to address the reported issue regarding homeless individuals who are not students taking advantage of the legal requirement that the colleges provide shower facilities for LACCD students.
R.9	<p>Establish a formal Emergency Management Committee composed of college administrative and LASD CCB officials.</p> <p>Draft one integrated emergency plan that denotes mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery roles and their responsibilities, as well as those of external first responders. Remove any additional or outdated plans or references to ensure awareness and continuity.</p> <p>Denote emergency alert and communications procedures and protocols for video surveillance and access control systems and radios.</p>



R.10	Task the Safety and Emergency Services manager with standardizing the emergency operation plan protocol for all LACCD facilities. Ensure the individual colleges use a template and established standards for planning, review, approval, revision, dissemination and storage. Ensure adherence to a schedule for exercises and drills, as well as a formal evaluation and notification process.
R.11	Install interior locks on all classroom doors. Annually train all faculty and staff on using manual key locks. Add an appendix to the emergency plan that lists locations of all manual door locks.
R.12	Update the LACCD's 1998 Workplace Violence Prevention Plan. Ensure current information is provided and presented in threat prevention trainings and exercises for campus staff.
R.13	Implement a consistent district-wide mass notification system for the campus communities. To build redundancy, provide a standardized process for LASD CCB personnel to communicate emergency instructions for mass notification emergency alerts. Routinely audit the contact list and make pre-scripted messages available.
R.14	Require campus and LASD CCB personnel who host or execute a training session, drill or exercise to conduct a verbal debriefing and write an after-action report summarizing the trainings' strengths and areas for improvement. Use the after-action reports to update plans and future trainings, drills and exercises.
R.15	Integrate the access control and video surveillance systems and connect them to a central monitoring station in the LASD CCB station and Facilities Department office.
R.16	Add motion detection and object algorithm functions to the video surveillance system. This would allow security personnel to monitor exterior access points and campus buildings, especially those that have experienced burglaries or break-ins.
R.17	Install motion-detection sensors with audible alarms on fences or purchase video surveillance cameras with motion-detection capabilities to detect unwanted or unlawful intrusions onto campus. Connect motion-detection sensors to central alarm panels in the LASD CCB station, Facilities Department office and a central operations center.



R.18	<p>When replacing cameras, ensure they can be integrated to provide real-time information to the LASD CCB and campus stakeholders during emergencies and to detect and respond to criminal incidents. Most modern cameras and surveillance recording platforms offer analytic capabilities. The following features can provide video analytics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">+ Trip line – One can set the traffic flow parameters or expectations. If an object passes through the trip line, an alarm alerts security. This would be particularly beneficial around the site’s perimeter, entrances and exits in infrequently used areas.Advanced object tracking – This feature allows the user to set object parameters and identify behavior around the object (e.g., object left behind, object removed from location). This is beneficial if items are left unattended or if someone removes items from the site.+ Dwell and loitering – For example, if an individual loiters in an area for longer than a pre-determined amount of time, an alert could notify security or LASD CCB personnel.+ Facial surveillance – This captures images of faces and video associated with the face. Facial surveillance is becoming more advanced, but it is subject to additional scrutiny as laws make it more difficult to implement this type of indexing. Before implementing, LACCD’s Legal Department should review. Facial surveillance stores and indexes each event, which allows investigators to:<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Find persons of interest faster when investigating cases of theft or robbery.– Protect assets better by using facial similarity searching to find a suspect quickly across multiple locations.– Improve the efficiency by capturing, indexing and cataloging faces, as well as the associated video.
R.19	<p>Develop a comprehensive video surveillance system policy that establishes best practice requirements for: regular audits to ensure camera operability; identification and remediation of blind spots; live video monitoring guidelines and staff training; compliance with government facility guidelines and mandates; repair and maintenance schedules; storage and export; and the establishment of a lifecycle replacement program for all video equipment, software and firmware.</p>
R.20	<p>Integrate the access control and video surveillance systems so when an alarm triggers, the access control system automatically pulls up the associated camera feeds to provide a faster, more comprehensive response.</p> <p>Ensure the access control system’s graphical user interface (GUI) has an interactive map that allows the operator to click on a camera or access control device to get live feeds or statuses. This would minimize the training required to learn camera naming conventions as the system would represent them graphically.</p>
R.21	<p>Consider placing access control readers on all exterior doors, classroom doors and building spaces that have experienced thefts or burglaries as part of the Build LACCD project to upgrade security technology systems across the campus. This would increase LASD CCB personnel’s ability to monitor and account for people accessing certain buildings and spaces.</p>



R.22	Add an intrusion detection system to campus buildings to alert the LASD CCB station to unauthorized entry or occupation.
R.23	Consider installing more panic alarms throughout the campus to allow people to alert the LASD via a silent alarm in the event of an incident. Consider placing such alarms in all classrooms and at receptionists' desks in the library, student services building and administrative offices.
R.24	Establish a routine meeting schedule for a committee designated to identify security technology gaps and coordinate and monitor associated improvements. The committee should include representatives from LASD CCB, LACCD Facilities Department personnel and Information Technology (IT).
R.25	Consider adding barbed-wire or anti-climb fencing at access points that are continuously bypassed or evaded by intruders.
R.26	Conduct a master key study and determine who has access to critical infrastructure assets and sensitive areas. Consider limiting key access to individuals who need to access to restricted areas to perform their jobs.
R.27	Regularly audit the access system to determine if the appropriate individuals have access to the system and specified areas and if others, such as former employees, have been removed. Enlist the managers of specific buildings or departments to review access reports and determine which access rights should be removed.
R.28	Restore the HEAT Program or a comparable mental health crisis response program with return of on-campus instruction and services.
R.29	Establish a formal insider threat program to identify, analyze, prevent and mitigate criminal or terrorist acts by disgruntled students, faculty or staff.
R.30	Implement a well-developed security awareness program for all on-site employees and partners with a focus on education, training and exercises. Establish a formal and regular schedule of security awareness trainings for students and staff with the college president and other campus administrative leadership.
R.31	Contact the Facilities Department to ensure the LASD CCB station has keys to all exterior and interior doors for emergency access.
R.32	Upgrade the electronic access control system throughout the campus to automate building openings and closings and to control access to the facilities.
R.33	Connect the video surveillance system to the backup power generator to ensure access to the system from inside the LASD CCB station during power outages.
R.34	Consider using the LASD CCB's, another law enforcement agency's or a third-party contractor's explosive detection canine units to inspect vulnerable areas and conduct screening before and during special events hosted on campus such as graduations, cultural celebrations or any event that results in mass gatherings of people on campus.
R.35	Consider placing retractable wedge barriers, retractable bollards, speed bumps, crash-rated drop-down gates or a security booth at delivery points for trucks, vans and other delivery vehicles.



R.36	Place heavy planters or crash-rated bollards (i.e., K-rated) in vehicle access points that someone could exploit during a hostile vehicle or vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack.
R.37	<p>Task the Facilities Department with establishing a formal vendor delivery system and appointment schedule for all campus deliveries.</p> <p>Share this delivery schedule with the LASD CCB station and LASD CCB patrol officers so they can coordinate patrols with busy delivery periods.</p> <p>Do not accept deliveries without an appointment.</p> <p>During periods of civil unrest or a heightened threat level for terrorism, subject all vendor trucks to visual inspections with an undercarriage mirror and, if necessary, conduct explosive detection canine inspections.</p>
R.38	<p>Establish a formal, written vehicle inspection policy for LASD CCB to enforce daily. Allow only authorized students, faculty and staff to park on campus in designated areas.</p> <p>Inspect vehicles inside parking lots or parking structures that the general public can access as part of the roving patrol to identify criminal behavior or terrorism pre-planning surveillance or terrorism-related activities such as vehicle-borne improvised explosive device or hostile vehicle attacks.</p>
R.39	Develop an ongoing proactive and well-defined door maintenance program to ensure thefts and burglaries do not occur in office buildings and classrooms.
R.40	<p>Develop a standard that establishes the placement of security technology that may be implemented. Use this standard for current and future construction projects and for upgrades to provide consistency. The security technology standard document should address the following areas, among others:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">+ The technology's intended use (e.g., the field of view, what it protects or secures)+ Camera placement in areas where obstructions can occur.+ Integration into the existing system, taking into account forthcoming upgrades.+ Typical locations for security technology (e.g., access control, cameras, duress buttons, alarm points) that have been vetted internally to determine assets and areas that need additional protection.
R.41	Audit emergency phones on campus for operation and monitor them at the LASD CCB station at all times. Integrate the emergency phones with the video surveillance system to allow the LASD CCB to view the area near the emergency phone when activated.



01 *The Unique Challenges Confronting Campus Policing*

Unique Responsibilities of College Police

The LASD CCB officials we interviewed and met with during our site visits informed us they understand that their policing responsibilities are unique from a traditional law enforcement assignment. These deputies and security officers know they are there to protect and support the students, faculty and staff. As such, they engage in security duties atypical of a police department, such as escorting students and faculty to vehicles, opening and closing campus buildings, securing building doors, providing directions and general information to students and visitors, attending administrative meetings, and giving active assailant readiness and response presentations in classrooms.

The way the LASD CCB deputies and security officers interact with students who are gang members and the gangs in the neighborhoods around the campus, is an excellent example of the team's unique and effective approach to campus policing. At Los Angeles Southwest College, some students are known gang members. The unofficial motto for the LASD CCB and the gang members is "treat with respect, get respect." The LASD CCB personnel continuously work to develop relationships with students in local gangs so they can build and maintain trust. As a result, the LASD CCB and gang members share mutual respect, and the gang members consider the campus a safe space. According to LASD CCB personnel, gang violence has not disrupted campus life.

Campus policing requires a nuanced approach that differs from the traditional policing efforts of a federal, state or local agency. Specifically, law enforcement personnel who provide services on a campus – including the LASD CCB – must serve and integrate into the campus community.

For campus police officers, the community they protect and with which they interact is more than a police beat or service area assignment. The population includes students, faculty, staff, administration, commuters, sports fans, vendors and the surrounding neighbors and businesses that serve the campus and occupy campus property and spaces. Colleges and universities, including the LACCD, pride themselves on creating open environments for all stakeholders to foster a broad educational experience and provide a safe space for the surrounding neighborhood to enjoy. To execute this approach, campus leaders must be open to new and diverse ideas from their respective communities and the LASD CCB and offer physical environments with mostly public access, which presents unique security challenges.

Some of the campus police responsibilities overlap with those of traditional law enforcement agencies, such as patrol and response to calls for service, criminal investigation, and traffic and parking duties. However, the campus environment also presents unique issues. Those who use college campuses explore ideas and expression. This inherently includes potential clashes involving those with opposing views. Although this discourse is largely not law enforcements' concern when peaceful, the LASD CCB's approach to this freedom of expression is critical to its role in the campus community. Additionally, campus law enforcement agencies work with individuals who occupy space and buildings for various reasons. The community needs the deputies to provide safety, security and



customer service. Although colleges and universities value this openness, campus personnel are also aware of the importance of providing a protected learning environment.

Campus Community Policing

The overarching theme of the feedback we received was that the LASD CCB must be part of the campus community. Many understood the LASD CCB's safety and security responsibilities, but they emphasized their desire to see a more robust community-oriented approach to law enforcement in which the officers can truly engage with the campus community.

We also acknowledge the LASD CCB's immense responsibility to provide safety and protection on campuses given the size of the community it serves and the complexity of the environment. However, we are in full support of the LASD CCB taking on a community-oriented policing approach. Southwest College has demonstrated such an approach through the LASD CCB's interactions with gang members. Leadership should appropriately recognize that officers must receive training and fulfill professional expectations to achieve this goal.

Professionalism on Campus

Enhancing the professionalism of campus police officers would increase administrators' and students' confidence in the unit and improve the officers' self-confidence and reputation. The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) adopted a series of policy statements on managing campus law enforcement. These statements recognize:¹

- + Officers' roles are to engage the campus community in law enforcement and crime prevention capacities.
- + Officers must enforce laws impartially.
- + Use-of-force policies should be consistent with public expectations and the law.
- + Officers must have training and follow the standards required of public sector law enforcement.
- + Officers are accountable to the community they serve.
- + Officers must support the campus community in crime prevention.

Based on the interviews and site visits we conducted across the LACCD campuses, most of the LACCD college presidents, department heads and students want an armed law enforcement presence on campus. However, we recognize there is a minority who object to having an armed and visible LASD CCB presence. The LASD CCB deputies and security officers are aware of this tension, but they believe having trained armed personnel on campus who can quickly respond to serious threats, such as an active assailant, is the most effective way to protect each campus.

¹ www.iaclea.org



We believe there are critical advantages to having an armed professional and sworn law enforcement agency on the LACCD campuses. This presence reduces the reaction time to neutralize on-campus active assailant incidents, activate the campus emergency response, and leverage additional resources such as SWAT, explosive detection canine teams and bomb squads.

General Threats to Campus Safety

LASD CCB and LACCD officials are most concerned about a possible active assailant attack. Although every college campus in the U.S. is vulnerable to this threat, several factors make the LACCD campuses and satellite sites we assessed more vulnerable. These include the lack of physical barriers, the antiquated and malfunctioning security technology systems, the LASD CCB's and Facilities Department inability to lockdown exterior and classroom doors automatically on most campuses, and the reduced level of LASD CCB staffing since the start of COVID-19 pandemic. However, we acknowledge the staffing level was reduced in response to the LACCD cancelling nearly all on-campus instruction and services.

Gang violence in certain neighborhoods also poses a significant threat to LACCD campuses. Although there is no documented gang violence directed at students, faculty or staff, the campuses require a strong police presence to deter potential violence and protect the community from other recurring crimes, such as petty theft, vandalism, burglary, grand theft, motor vehicle burglary, narcotics distribution and use and sexual offenses.

People experiencing homelessness are also a rising threat to campus security, as some are breaking into campus buildings for shelter or to steal property. In some cases, certain campuses frequently dispatch LASD CCB personnel to mitigate or respond to these crimes. Additionally, the LASD CCB personnel and college officials are concerned that some of these individuals may suffer from underlying mental health issues, which create a higher risk of violent encounters with students, faculty or employees.

Security Technology Challenges

The LACCD is in the midst of a security technology improvement project across several campuses. Although these video surveillance and access control improvements will benefit the campuses in the long-term, installing these systems takes time. Meanwhile, most of the campuses' buildings do not have automatic lockdown doors that they can activate during an active assailant incident. They also lack integrated video surveillance and access control systems (ACS) that would alert the LASD CCB or the Facilities Department of unwanted or unlawful intrusions. Several of the campuses we visited had malfunctioning closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, or the cameras had such poor resolution that authorities would not be able to identify the individuals in a recording.



The intrusion detection systems (IDS) were also problematic on some campuses. Many did not function, or the LASD CCB did not have monitoring access into the IDS alerting system. None of the campuses have incorporated 100 percent of their doors with an ACS, so the LASD CCB personnel and the Facilities Department cannot remotely activate the systems. All campuses have panic alarm systems that connect to the LASD CCB station, but they vary in number and location, and most campus classrooms do not have panic alarms. Campus leadership must make security technology improvements if they are to overcome some of the staffing deficits. Additionally, they should promote early crime detection, aid crime investigations and coordinate their response to criminal incidents with college officials and external partners, such as the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).

Standards

The LACCD has many security and emergency management strengths, such as highly engaged college presidents, a formal emergency management structure and a professionally trained law enforcement agency on-site to mitigate risks and respond to threats and hazards. However, the campuses do not share minimum standards for physical barriers, ACS, camera surveillance, IDS or panic alarms, and the LASD CCB foot, bike, golf cart and vehicle patrols do not have general standards. Campus leadership teams have not implemented standards to ensure the LASD CCB officers report crimes to campus officials in a timely manner.

Furthermore, LACCD does not have standardized physical security protection measures, security technology requirements, and emergency preparedness and protocols across the campuses and satellite sites to address crimes.

For example, some LASD CCB officials on some campuses did not know if they were officially members of the college Incident Management Team (IMT). However, on other campuses, personnel were integral members of the IMT. Additionally, the response to people on campus who are experiencing homelessness is inconsistent across the campuses. The desired response communicated to LASD CCB officers may differ across the campuses and among leadership, faculty and staff on the same campus. For example, a campus employee may contact the LASD CCB to remove a homeless person sleeping in the library; however, another campus employee could instruct the LASD CCB that the person can remain. In another example, the LACCD must provide shower facilities for LACCD students who are experiencing homelessness. However, LASD CCB reported that homeless individuals who are not students were taking advantage of the service. LACCD has not established a standard response or process for mitigating this issue.



Crime Statistics Analysis

We analyzed CRIMECAST data for each site we evaluated. CRIMECAST assigns a rating to crime in the area on a scale from zero to 2,000 with 100 being the average. We found that the average crime rates in the neighborhoods around the LACCD campuses can range from 0.66 to 7.13 times the national average. The crime ratings for the neighborhoods around the LACCD campuses are as follows:

- + **Los Angeles Trade Tech:** 1.19 to 13.2 times higher than the national average; overall, 7.13 times higher than the national average rating
- + **Los Angeles Southwest College:** 0.43 to 7.21 times the national average; overall, 4.56 times higher than the national average rating
- + **Los Angeles City College:** 0.66 to 6.87 times the national average; overall, 3.87 times higher than the national average rating
- + **Los Angeles Harbor College:** 0.30 to 4.57 times the national average; overall, 2.8 times higher than the national average rating
- + **Los Angeles Mission College:** 1 to 5.78 times higher than the national average; overall, 2.67 times higher than national average rating
- + **West Los Angeles College:** 0.26 to 5.22 times the national average; overall, 1.91 times higher than national average rating
- + **Pierce College:** 0.24 to 6.75 times the national average; overall, 1.9 times higher than the national average rating
- + **East Los Angeles College:** 1.26 to 4.49 times higher than the national average; overall, 1.77 times the national average rating
- + **Los Angeles Valley College:** 0.29 to 4.25 times the national average; overall, 1.66 times higher than the national average rating

Campus Data

Although violent crime on campus is rare, lower-level crime is a persistent challenge that negatively impacts all facilities. Analyzing the LASD's 2016-2020 Crime Statistics Report, we found that 2,124 reported crimes occurred during this five-year period. This means there were approximately 511 crimes per year. Table 1 shows the top 10 most common crimes during this time, and the number of times each occurred.



Table 1: Top 10 Most Common Crimes from the LASD's 2016-2020 Crime Statistics Report

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Petty Theft	775
Vandalism	369
Burglary	189
Non-Aggressive Assault	159
Grand Theft	150
Motor Vehicle Burglary	119
Grand Theft Auto	79
Sex Offense, Misdemeanor	71
Misdemeanor, Miscellaneous	54
Narcotics	9

Every LACCD campus has instances of petty theft, vandalism, burglary, motor vehicle burglary, grand theft, grand theft auto, aggravated assault and sexual offense (misdemeanor). Los Angeles Trade Tech accounted for the highest rates of petty thefts, vandalism/destruction of property, grand theft and narcotics crimes. East Los Angeles College had the most instances of motor vehicle burglary, grand theft auto, sexual offenses (misdemeanors) and misdemeanors (miscellaneous). Los Angeles City College had the most burglaries, and Los Angeles Southwest experienced the most non-aggravated assaults.

In addition, during this time, there were 21 weapons violations during which individuals brought firearms, knives or other weapons onto a campus. For example, City College had six weapons violations, one of which resulted in an arrest of a student with a firearm in 2018. Los Angeles East College had five weapons violations (knives), which resulted in two arrests in 2018; and Harbor College had four violations, which resulted in two arrests in 2016 and one in 2018.



02 Overview of the LACCD's Security and Emergency Preparedness

Security Force

The LACCD contracts with the LASD to provide security services at the nine college campuses, the Educational Services Center, also known as the district office, and three satellite offices: Van de Kamp Innovation Center, South Gate Education Center and the Corporate Center. At minimum, during the LASD CCB's COVID-19 curtailment plan, the LASD staffs one team leader, two deputies and six security officers daily at each campus. Typically, the team leader works a flexible shift that aligns with campus activities, and one deputy works from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. A second deputy works from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m., and at least two security officers work all three shifts (6 a.m. to 2 p.m., 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. and 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.). Students who work in the Student Cadet program – an employment opportunity for students enrolled in post-graduate education who are interested in a career in law enforcement – supplement the security officers and deputies. Each office also has a senior administrative officer (SAO) who serves as the administrative liaison between the college and the LASD. Currently, the LACCD Educational Services Center (ESC) uses a private security firm, as the LASD CCB COVID-19 staffing curtailment plan discontinued the previously assigned LASD deputy role.

The LASD security officers generally have more experience working on the campuses than the deputies, and they perform much of the security-related work at the campuses. Security officers are not sworn law enforcement officers but are armed and must successfully complete an entrance exam, pass a background investigation and attend a five-week training academy before they are assigned to a post. They help the deputies secure the campus and they handle most issues independently. However, they contact the deputy on duty when a crime is committed.

The student cadets serve as additional eyes and ears on campus and help open and close buildings. They also assist the LASD with security processes, such as roving patrols, checking building security, unlocking doors and other non-enforcement duties. The assigned task and level of training that student cadets complete before getting their assignments are inconsistent across the campuses. They can perform some minor duties at the station but are inconsistently available in part because the LACCD limits the hours they work. The number of available cadets also varies significantly across the campuses. The students can work up to 25 hours per week and typically work eight hours or less per shift. Cadets usually spend two years or fewer working at the station.

Intelligence and Information Sharing

The LASD reviews threat assessment bulletins from external agencies, such as the FBI, the LAPD and other municipal police departments. However, the LACCD and the LASD do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential internal terrorist attacks that students, faculty and staff could initiate. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, LACCD suspended nearly all on-campus instruction and services. As a result, the LASD implemented a staffing curtailment plan,



which included disbanding the Higher Education Assessment Team (HEAT) program. The suspension of the HEAT program significantly reduced the leaderships' ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats and acts of violence.

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, faculty, staff or students could contact an LASD Deputy and a mental health clinician from the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health if they were concerned a student might be presenting with mental health concerns that could negatively impact the individual (e.g., suicide) or the campus at large (e.g., threats to attack the campus). The LASD CCB reported 317 referrals in the first year, 2016. While the number of referrals decreased over time, the value of this partnership program was consistently communicated to our team through our stakeholder outreach. The LASD CCB reports indicates that the HEAT program's interventions with those experiencing mental health crises helped stop several potential mass violent attacks.²

The LASD CCB had only one officer conduct social media monitoring for all of the campuses. However, this program no longer exists. Instead, the campus has a passive threat intelligence and information sharing program. If a faculty member sends them a suspicious or threatening email or social media post from a student or former student, they investigate. Neither the LASD CCB nor the LACCD leadership conduct general social media searches for potential threats to the campus. We recommend the LASD and LACCD engage in a more robust social media monitoring process.

Additionally, the LACCD campuses do not have a formal insider threat assessment program in which the LASD CCB can participate. Any student, faculty member or employee with insider knowledge about campus buildings that lack access control systems with automatic lockdown features, functioning video surveillance cameras, or that store toxic chemicals or flammable and combustible material could leverage this information to launch an attack.

Protective Measures

The LASD CCB personnel conduct patrols by foot, bicycle, golf cart and vehicle on most campuses. At minimum, LASD CCB security officers patrol the campuses on foot throughout each shift. Typically, one security officer goes on patrol while the second security officer on shift monitors the surveillance cameras and serves as the LASD CCB dispatcher. Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers conduct patrols or respond to calls for service, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires.

² LACCD & LASD HEAT Team Overview, April 4, 2017 (hardcopy).



The level and sophistication of physical security measures differs on each campus. For example, Los Angeles Southwest has steel gates that secure most of the campus, but most do not have gates or have only limited fencing. None of the campuses have gates or fences with motion detectors to alert the LASD CCB of potential intrusions during the Early Morning shift. Some campuses have vehicle barriers, but those that have them do not consistently position them at all campus access points. While we acknowledge the LACCD's desire to provide an open campus, defining campus boundaries with some level of visual or physical barrier can increase the perception of security and serve as a deterrent. However, we learned that some homeless individuals breach campus fences by cutting, scaling and prying open gates to access campus property, such as Van de Kamp and Los Angeles Southwest College. Even if a campus has gates with locks to prevent trespassing and to control entry, human error can diminish the effectiveness. For example, we learned that City College students typically forget to close an iron gate that is close to a metro stop frequented by homeless individuals.



Van de Kamp perimeter fencing

Emergency Management Program

The LASD CCB maintains its own emergency response and school safety plans. All LASD CCB personnel take annual training in active assailant readiness and response and other emergencies as part of the internal training program. The LASD CCB and college administrative officials informed us that the LASD CCB is the initial emergency response agency on campus and launches response resources to neutralize active assailant incidents or other violent activities on campus. When necessary, the LASD CCB defers its incident commander role to external agencies such as the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD).

Before the COVID-19 pandemic limited the number of students on campus, the LACCD Safety and Emergency Services manager facilitated joint active assailant and other emergency response trainings and exercises conducted by LASD CCB with the LAPD, LAFD and other municipal police and fire departments.

We reviewed available emergency management plans and learned that the LASD CCB and college administrative officials understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster. However, we recommend they further integrate the plans, policies and procedures to benefit LACCD's emergency preparedness and response capabilities.

Additionally, LACCD could benefit from standardizing its emergency management plan process, including where it stores the plans and who has access to them. For example, while we acknowledge the individuality of the nine colleges, we recommend LACCD take a standard approach to posting emergency plans on the colleges' websites. These plans should be clearly identified in a standardized



manner and location on each website. Further, we did not find the plans in all the LASD CCB stations we visited. The LASD CCB is aware of the LACCD emergency plan and the individual campus emergency plans, but it does not have copies. In some cases, the LASD CCB team leaders were unsure if they are official members of the campus IMTs. We did not find documentation that specifies the LASD CCB personnel's emergency response roles.

Emergency Communications

The Director of Communications & External Relations assigned at the ESC leads LACCD's emergency communications and serves as the primary public information officer (PIO) for the district. Each college has a public relations manager (PRM) that reports through a dotted line to the Director of Communications and External Relations and reports directly to an administrator at the college level. The director emphasizes the value of information in a crisis and to that end, promotes training and exercises to evaluate the various information officers' competency.

The PRMs had completed received the basic Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) training before the COVID-19 pandemic that prompted the LACCD to activate the EOC. The director reported that due to the training and their familiarity with the Incident Command principles, the PRMs could effectively operate in the pandemic's emergency management process.

Before the pandemic, the director arranged meetings with the PRM team at least once monthly, typically rotating the meeting location to the individual campuses to increase campus familiarity and awareness throughout the team.

Although the director promotes the team concept, he does not have authority over the PRMs, the campus reporting structure varies across the district. For example, some PRMs report to the college president, while others report to the Vice President of Administrative Services. Similarly, each college denotes their structure and communication plan within the Emergency Action Plan.

The reporting structure is not sufficiently established or practiced to ensure the most effective and efficient messaging to the campus community and subsequently, the LACCD. We found that the communications platforms in place to transmit messaging across the campus is not as efficient or effective as desired by many at the colleges.

The individuals who can or are assigned to disseminate the information via these platforms is inconsistent across the district. Some colleges designate the PRM to issue emergency messages while others designated a member of the leadership team, such as the Vice President of Administrative Services. Moreover, there is not a formalized process for LASD CCB officers to engage in emergency messaging. Although we respect the autonomy of the individual colleges, standardizing the communication structure and processes would ensure the most efficient and effective messaging to emergency response.



03 *Campus-Specific Risk, Threat and Vulnerability Assessments*

Methodology

Hillard Heintze RiskRater™ Analysis

We examined each of the LACCD sites through the lens of our proprietary security risk analysis framework, the Hillard Heintze RiskRater™ System. Specifically, the table below lists: the threats assessed during this engagement; the individual threat, vulnerability and consequence rankings; the mathematically derived risk score; and the resulting risk ranking in prioritized order. See the following pages for a guide on how to use this methodology to improve decision making and return on investment.

For our assessment, we prioritized the risk categories as if LACCD implemented the mitigation measures recommended in this report.

BRIEF EXPLANATION OF RISK ASSESSMENT FACTORS

Our RiskRater™ table is based on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's risk methodology that defines risk as a function of threat, vulnerabilities and consequences.

Threat: Any individual or occurrence that has the potential to cause harm to an individual or property.

Vulnerability: A physical or operational flaw that makes a facility, critical asset, system, network or geographic area more susceptible to an attack or hazard event.

Consequence: The negative impact an event, incident or occurrence can have on an individual, facility, system, network or geographical area.



Table 2: LACCD RiskRater™ Analysis

LACCD RiskRater™ Analysis								
	Threat Rating		Vulnerability Rating		Consequence Rating		Risk Score	RISK RANKING
Risk Category	Range 0 to 5	x	Range 0 to 5	x	Range 0 to 5	=		
Theft	◇ 5.00	x	◇ 4.00	x	☆ 3.50	=	70.00	1
Active Shooter	☆ 3.50	x	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 4.50	=	63.00	2
Mass Attack	☆ 3.00	x	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 4.75	=	57.00	3
Motor Vehicle Burglary	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 4.00	x	☆ 3.50	=	56.00	4
Earthquake	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 3.70	x	◇ 4.00	=	53.28	5
Robbery	☆ 3.50	x	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 3.80	=	53.20	6
Utility Failure	☆ 3.50	x	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 4.20	=	52.92	7
Vandalism	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 4.00	x	☆ 3.30	=	52.80	8
Burglary	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 3.60	=	51.84	9
Weapons Law Violations	☆ 3.00	x	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 4.30	=	51.60	10
IED	☆ 2.50	x	◇ 4.50	x	◇ 4.50	=	50.63	11
Sabotage	☆ 3.00	x	◇ 4.20	x	◇ 4.00	=	50.40	12
VBIED	☆ 2.50	x	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 5.00	=	50.00	13
Pandemic	☆ 3.00	x	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 4.50	=	48.60	14
Hostile Vehicle	☆ 3.00	x	◇ 4.50	x	☆ 3.50	=	47.25	15
Grand Theft Auto	◇ 3.60	x	☆ 3.50	x	◇ 3.60	=	45.36	16
Arson	☆ 2.80	x	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 4.00	=	44.80	17
Gang Violence	◇ 3.60	x	☆ 3.50	x	☆ 3.50	=	44.10	18
Bomb Threat	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 4.00	x	☆ 3.00	=	43.20	19
Fire	☆ 3.50	x	☆ 3.00	x	◇ 4.00	=	42.00	20
Locker Burglary	☆ 3.50	x	◇ 3.60	x	☆ 3.20	=	40.32	21



(Campus Safety Security Assessment)

Conducted on Behalf of the Los Angeles Community College District

Sexual Offenses	☆ 3.00	x	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 3.71	=	40.07	22
Workplace Violence	☆ 2.50	x	◇ 4.00	x	◇ 4.00	=	40.00	23
Non-Aggravated Assault	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 3.60	x	☆ 3.00	=	38.88	24
Grand Theft	☆ 3.00	x	◇ 3.60	x	☆ 3.50	=	37.80	25
Aggravated Assault	☆ 3.20	x	◇ 3.80	x	☆ 3.00	=	36.48	26
Narcotics	☆ 3.20	x	3.60	x	☆ 3.00	=	34.56	27
Rape	☆ 2.50	x	3.60	x	◇ 3.80	=	34.20	28
Hazardous Materials Incident	☆ 2.50	x	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 3.60	=	32.40	29
CBRNE	☆ 2.00	x	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 4.00	=	28.80	30
Civil Unrest	☆ 3.00	x	☆ 3.10	x	☆ 3.00	=	27.90	31
Severe Weather	☆ 3.00	x	☆ 3.00	x	☆ 3.00	=	27.00	32
Wildfire	☆ 2.50	x	☆ 3.50	x	☆ 3.00	=	26.25	33
Kidnapping/Hostage	☆ 2.50	x	☆ 3.50	x	◇ 3.00	=	26.25	34
Disorderly Conduct	☆ 3.00	x	☆ 3.50	x	☆ 2.00	=	21.00	35
Homicide	† 1.00	x	◇ 3.60	x	◇ 4.00	=	14.40	36

† **LOW**

Range
0.0 – 1.5

☆ **MEDIUM**

Range
1.6 – 3.5

◇ **HIGH**

Range
3.6 – 5.0

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How to Use the RiskRater™ System

To fully understand, use and apply the information summarized on the previous page, please keep the following key points in mind:

- + **This is a strategic planning tool and framework.** It is carefully designed to help LACCD discuss, craft and achieve consensus on precisely which risks are its greatest concern.
- + **This methodology enhances financial rigor, discipline and return on investment for security spend.** The prioritized list of risks should help to determine, continuously realign and refine security funding and investment priorities.
- + **This is a dynamic framework that must be kept up to date to deliver value.** Consider the factors used to determine the risk ranking, and how often and why these might change.
 - The threat rating changes infrequently, simply because the probability of occurrence for most threats tends to stay relatively constant over time.
 - The vulnerability rating is the most likely to change over time as LACCD implements the recommendations in this report and takes other actions that improve the management, mitigation or transfer of risk.
 - The consequence rating is unlikely to change often or extensively because the maximum outcome of a given threat, independent of the site's vulnerability, tends to stay relatively constant. As LACCD takes action and lowers vulnerability to these threats, the risk scores for those particular threats begin to decline and the prioritization of the risk rankings shifts accordingly.
- + **This framework is valuable at multiple levels.** LACCD leadership can use the results to prioritize perimeter countermeasures, security investments, emergency resource allocations and security-related training programs.

Actions We Recommend Taking

- + Consult these rankings and apply your own experience, insights and knowledge to them.
- + Review this analysis regularly as part of the budgeting process and whenever a significant change in threats, vulnerabilities or potential consequences emerges.
- + Develop escalation procedures that apply when urgent, out-of-cycle action is required.



CRIMECAST Analysis

To provide an overall snapshot of the crime risk at the LACCD sites, we ran a CRIMECAST CAP Index Report (CAP Report) within a pre-determined radius of the sites. The CAP Report uses a proprietary algorithm that analyzes multiple data points, including neighborhood demographics and crime and loss statistics. The report also includes a CRIMECAST score, which is calculated based on this algorithm. The score ranges from 0 to 2,000, with 2,000 indicating the highest risk. A score of 100 is the average.



1. Los Angeles City College

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview

The LASD CCB reported that from 2016 to 2020, 419 criminal offenses occurred on the Los Angeles City College (City College) campus, averaging 83 crimes per year. The LASD CCB categorized these offenses into 22 types of crimes. These crimes represent 16.37 percent of the crimes committed on all nine LACCD campuses.³

City College had the third highest overall crime rate and experienced the most burglaries across all LACCD campuses.

Below, we list the most common crimes committed during the last five years.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant
- + Fire
- + Theft

Table 3: Most Common Crimes between 2016 and 2020 at City College

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Petty Theft	143
Vandalism/Property Destruction	74
Burglary	46
Grand Theft	38
Non-Aggravated Assault	17
Motor Vehicle Burglary	14
Narcotics	11
Sexual Offense, Misdemeanor	10
Misdemeanor, Miscellaneous	8
Grand Theft Auto	7

³ Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, "Community College Bureau All Campus – Total 2016 – 2020 Crime Stats Report"



During this five-year period, six violations of weapons laws (e.g., carrying or possessing a weapon) resulted in one arrest in 2018.

In 2019, petty theft, vandalism and burglary were the most prevalent crimes on campus. Overall, crime decreased 58 percent from 2019 to 2020. In 2020, petty thefts decreased by 83 percent (18 incidents in 2019 to three incidents in 2020); vandalism by 53 percent (17 incidents in 2019 to eight incidents in 2020) and burglaries by 29 percent (14 incidents in 2019 to 10 incidents in 2020). However, grand theft auto and weapons violations both increased by 100 percent (one incident in 2019 to two incidents in 2020). It is important to note that during this time, LACCD had suspended nearly all on-campus instruction and services.

Recent Incidents

LASD CCB and campus administrative personnel noted the following recent incidents at City College:

- + A homicide at a Mobile Gas Station at the intersection of Melrose and Vermont avenues, which is near the campus custodial staff parking lot
- + Theft of equipment from a campus construction site
- + An attempted robbery of computers from the Student Services Building

The interviewees attributed much of the crime on campus to homeless individuals who trespass on campus, commit thefts and vandalize property.

Despite the number of thefts, vandalism and burglaries that occur each year, those we interviewed believe City College has a safe campus and noted violent crime is extremely rare.

Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined a high rate of crime occurs in the neighborhood surrounding the campus and that gang activity and crimes involving people experiencing homelessness are the biggest concerns off campus. Gang activity in the neighborhood has directly impacted the campus.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 1.1-mile radius of the City College campus is 3.87 times higher than the national average, 3.14 times higher than the state average and 2.38 times higher than the county average.



Areas within 0.5 to 1.1 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **Northwest:** 0.94 less to 3.32 times the national average
- + **Northeast:** 0.66 less to 2.18 times the national average
- + **Southwest:** 1.31 to 6.87 times the national average
- + **Southeast:** 0.77 less to 5.31 times the national average

CRIMECAST projects the crime rate for this area will drop slightly to 3.62 times higher than the national average by 2026. The most frequent crimes occurring around the campus include the following:

- + Robbery
- + Crimes Against Persons
- + Aggravated Assault
- + Homicide
- + Rape

Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood surrounding the campus experiences gang activity and has a large population of homeless individuals. The biggest security concerns are gang violence, thefts and homeless persons trespassing, interfering with students and vandalizing property.

City College rents space to the Hollywood Work Source Center, a nonprofit that helps homeless students and individuals. Some Hollywood Work Source clients have mental and behavioral health issues that sometimes require the LASD CCB's assistance.

The LASD CCB station conducts regular vehicle, bike and foot patrols on campus to act as a visual deterrent and to check known areas where homeless people enter the campus and hide. Although City College has a small footprint, LASD CCB officers must conduct continuous patrols to ensure the campus remains secure.

Through our site assessment and interviews with LASD CCB and campus officials, we learned gang activity occurs in the immediate neighborhood due to rival gangs on the east and west side of the campus. Approximately six months ago, a gang-related shooting occurred at a Jack in the Box restaurant two blocks from the campus. The suspects ran onto the City College campus to evade police. LASD CCB personnel searched the campus for the suspects and their weapons and later arrested the suspects off-campus.



The City College campus is experiencing a rise in the number of homeless individuals on campus. City College and LASD CCB officials believe the campus has the largest number of homeless individuals among the LACCD campuses. If staff find tents on campus property, they immediately remove them and power wash the sidewalks. The LASD CCB reports that homeless individuals have broken into buildings including Student Services, Science Tech and Radio Tech to seek shelter or steal property. Some homeless individuals used a wooden plank to scale a fence onto a building near the south campus pool. A faculty member has found a naked homeless man sitting inside his office using the computer on several occasions.

The Child Development Center (CDC) was a persistent target of theft and trespassing into the bathrooms near the playground. The LASD CCB recently worked with the Facilities Department to remove outdoor electrical outlets near the CDC to reduce the number of cell phone thefts that occurred from individuals using them for charging stations. The Facilities Department also raised the fence height around the CDC to deter trespassing and theft.

Individuals have easy access onto campus because they can reach through campus gates and open them. The construction areas on campus are also vulnerable to trespassing. Some homeless individuals use the Metro Red Line stop on the northeast side of the campus to enter the campus. An iron gate near this Metro Red Line bus stop at Willow Brook Avenue and Vermont Avenue helps restrict access, but students often forget to close it completely, allowing access to the campus. Because most gates and fences on campus easily penetrable, petty theft, vandalism and burglary remain consistent problems. Two vehicles were stolen from the campus this year.

LASD CCB personnel noted that homeless individuals in the area do not respect private security guards at other facilities in the neighborhood. We concur that the high crime rate in the neighborhood and the population of people experiencing homelessness in the area suggest the need for an armed law enforcement personnel presence.

Campus officials noted the student body faces unique mental health challenges. City College has the highest number of disabled and LGBTQ students among all LACCD campuses. Campus officials noted that many students become stressed, existing or new mental health issues become more intense, and the students' use of alcohol and drugs often increase when they are unable to achieve the acting careers they seek in Hollywood. They noted many students do not feel comfortable approaching the LASD CCB for assistance, but the campus administration would like to develop a partnership with the LASD CCB to address these issues. In the absence of the HEAT program, City College officials want to provide mental health services to students to offer assistance and mitigate potential criminal issues.

The campus did not experience any violence or property damages during periods of civil unrest in Los Angeles last year.



Terrorism

LASD CCB and City College officials' greatest terrorism concern is an active assailant attack or mass attack involving firearms on campus. Based on our assessment and interviews, we believe the terrorism threats that could impact the campus include vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) attacks and hostile vehicles.

Like other colleges, City College is susceptible to students making bomb threats for reasons including avoiding an exam or causing a disruption to campus life. However, City College has not received a bomb threat.

LASD CCB officials consider fire to be a serious threat to City College campus due to the extent of construction on campus and because the fire alarm system does not connect to the LAFD. However, City College is in the process of upgrading its fire alarm system.

The City College campus may be prone to a terrorist attack because it hosts public sporting events, theatre and concerts. If these events attract significant media attention, they could entice a lone wolf attacker, domestic or homegrown violent extremist group supporting a foreign terrorist organization to plot and execute an attack. The threat of such an attack is low but the LASD CCB and City College officials should evaluate the risk when hosting external entities on campus.

City College inconsistently hires additional security services for these public events. Community groups could be targets, and an attack could indirectly and negatively impact the campus and its students, faculty and staff. Additionally, a disgruntled Hollywood Work Source Center client or an individual suffering a mental health crisis and using the Hollywood Work Source Center's services could mount an active assailant attack.

Based on our discussion with the LASD CCB and our research, we do not consider City College to be a terrorist target at this time. The LASD CCB reported no credible terrorism threats against the college, its students, faculty or staff.

The LACCD and the LASD CCB do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks by students, faculty and staff at City College. The suspension of the HEAT program significantly reduces City College's ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats. In the past, the LASD CCB tasked an officer with conducting social media monitoring for the campuses, but the program no longer exists. The LASD CCB does not conduct social media monitoring.

The City College campus has a passive insider threat system. When a faculty member sends the LASD CCB a suspicious or threatening email or social media post from a student or former student, LASD personnel investigate it. Neither the LASD CCB nor City College Security Office personnel engage in general social media research for potential threats to the campus. Because City College does not have an insider threat program and students, a malicious faculty and staff member could



plot and execute an attack based on their insider knowledge about which buildings do not have access control systems, functioning video surveillance cameras, the location of toxic chemicals in the Science and Technology building's laboratories and flammable and combustible material storage areas on campus. City College is most vulnerable to an insider attack that involves the following types of incidents: active assailant, mass attack, IED, sabotage, and kidnapping or hostage event.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

We reviewed available emergency management plans (i.e., 2009 LASD School Safety Plan for City College, a LACC Immediate Action and Event-Specific Checklist and a LASD CCB City College General Operation Plan) and interviewed LASD CCB and college administrative officials⁴ The LASD CCB and City College officials understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster, but they could further integrate their plans, policies and procedures to enhance City College's emergency preparedness and response capabilities.

For example, City College and the LASD CCB have their own internal emergency response plans. They should develop a customized joint plan that:

- + Incorporates the unique building and design aspects of the campus.
- + Describes how to leverage and coordinate internal (e.g., video surveillance system) and external resources (e.g., LAPD, LAFD).
- + Details key response actions for all likely threats and hazards.
- + Provides an intended response timeline and documents the expected flow of communications.
- + Explains how to send alerts using mediums such as the Blackboard Connect Emergency Notification System, Safety App and phone announcements.

Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of City College's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + City College has an Incident Management Team (IMT), and the college president or their designee is the lead decision-maker.
- + The LASD CCB is designated the lead agency during an active assailant attack and other emergency incidents. The LASD CCB issues emergency notifications, whenever possible, to the City College president, IMT and administrative leadership.

⁴ We requested copies of the LASD's and City College's emergency plans but have yet to receive them so instead, we reviewed the plans on the City College website.



- + The City College website provides the following resources: City College Emergency Procedures booklet, Emergency Evacuation Map, video about active assailants from the LASD CCB, a Campus Safety Bulletin and an emergency notifications link for Blackboard Connect.
 - The City College Emergency Procedures booklet addresses serious accidents or injuries, crimes in progress, civil disturbances, severe winds, earthquake, fires, chemical spills and fires, flooding and water damage, bomb threats, utility failures, evacuation of people with disabilities, and verbal or written threats.
- + The Emergency Evacuation Zones map denotes evacuation zones and assembly areas.
- + Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the LACCD Safety and Emergency Services manager facilitated active assailant and security briefings in classrooms for students and faculty conducted by LASD CCB, as well as full-scale active assailant exercises and other emergency drills with the LAPD and the LAFD. The LASD CCB integrated lessons learned from the after-action report into its internal emergency response plans.
- + In the event of an emergency the LASD CCB Team Leader or deputy on duty notifies the vice president, who provides information to the EMT. The college uses the Blackboard mass notification application to broadcast emergency information to students.

Emergency Preparedness Equipment

Below is a list of City College's emergency preparedness-related equipment:

- + Most campus buildings have panic buttons that alert in the LASD CCB station.
- + The parking structures and soccer stadium have emergency phones.
- + A fire control panel in the LASD CCB station provides fire alarm notification. An alarm panel is also located in facilities management. The alarm is monitored by the station and Facilities (Facilities Department is not automatically dispatched; must be called if alarm sounds).

Opportunities for Improvement

Although we noted many strengths of City College's emergency management program, we identified some areas for improvement:

- + Although LASD CCB personnel are aware of the campus emergency plan, we could not locate a hardcopy in the LASD CCB station during our site visit. LASD CCB officials said City College does not provide them with a copy of the City College emergency plan.
- + The LASD CCB is the primary emergency response agency on campus but is not an official member of the City College IMT.



- + None of the campus building doors connected to the access control system (ACS) have an automatic lockdown function. All doors must be manually locked during an emergency, such as an active assailant attack.
- + Not all classrooms lock from the inside.
- + It is unclear how often LASD CCB officers, City College personnel or faculty test locking the interior doors or understand how to lock these doors quickly during emergencies.
- + City College does not have an electronic database for master and other building keys.
- + The LASD CCB is unaware of how many students, faculty and staff registered to use the Blackboard Connect emergency notification system or City College Safety App.
- + The LASD CCB conducts verbal debriefs after drills and exercises but does not issue written after-action reports to City College officials so they can update their emergency plans or training sessions.
- + City College and the LASD CCB do not have a formal emergency planning committee that oversees the integration of City College and the LASD CCB's emergency plans, annual updates, plan dissemination, after-action reports for drills and exercises, and changes or upgrades to emergency notification systems or equipment.
- + Emergency drills are conducted irregularly.
- + There is no regularly scheduled emergency incident training for students and City College staff.
- + The LASD CCB and City College officials do not have a formal written plan to address issues involving people experiencing homelessness or mental health issues.

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

As noted, LASD CCB personnel must conduct continuous patrols to ensure a secure campus environment. LASD CCB personnel perform duties such as locking and unlocking doors, traffic control, and providing directions and general information to students and visitors. However, these additional duties take them away from their main campus policing duties.

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers conduct patrols, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services LACCD



requires. Since December 2020, the LASD has eliminated five CCB security officer positions as part of its COVID-19 personnel curtailment plan. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:

- + **Team Leader:** Flexes their schedule according to operational needs.
- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Two security officers

The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.

LASD CCB security officers form the backbone of the station's personnel. They generally have more experience on the campus and perform much of the work at the station. The security officers are not sworn law enforcement officers, but they are armed and must complete an entrance exam, pass a background investigation and attend a five-week training academy before being assigned to a post. They assist the deputies in securing the campus. The security officers can address most issues independently, but when they note a crime has been committed they contact the on-duty deputy, who responds immediately.

City College-employed Student Cadets are assigned to the station when available. A City College-employed Senior Office Assistant (SOA) supervises the Student Cadets at the station and serves as a liaison between the station and City College. Student Cadets act as additional eyes and ears on campus and help open and close buildings. They do not receive any special training, although they must meet eligibility requirements, and City College limits their work hours. Although they can perform some minor duties at the station, they are an unreliable workforce as they generally do not spend more than two years working at the station.

The LASD CCB station does not have an assigned dispatcher; rather, Student Cadets and LASD CCB personnel share dispatching duties. The SOA does not perform dispatching duties at City College.

During the overnight shift (10 p.m. – 6 a.m.), the two security officers forward station calls to their cell phones while on patrol. However, because alarms from the on-campus emergency phones announce in the station and cannot be forwarded to their cell phones, one security officer must stay at the station to staff the radio and phones. This reduces the number of foot patrols that can occur overnight.

We noted the following concerns regarding the City College security force:

- + LASD CCB deputies must leave the City College campus to patrol the Van de Kamp Center to support security officers posted at that site.



- + Due to the suspension of the HEAT program, deputies must respond to mental health crises and try to resolve these issues.
- + City College hosts sporting and other special events and for most, it assigns additional security personnel. However, when it does not, there is some confusion with LASD CCB regarding its responsibility to cover it.
- + The campus is easily accessible during the regular school day, which can result in homeless individuals trespassing or engaging in other unwanted, and potentially criminal, behavior.
- + The Hollywood Work Source Center provides workshops and other job search assistance to the public, which increases pedestrian traffic for LASD CCB to monitor to provide for the safety and security of the campus at large.
- + Crime rates on the commuter trains students and faculty use are high, and a Metro train station is just outside the college perimeter fence. Homeless individuals tend to congregate and sleep near the escalator. Criminal activity associated with the Metro train has the potential to impact the campus.



Metro stop campus gate

During the site visit, we encountered students and staff and did not witness any animosity toward armed LASD CCB personnel. Everyone seemed comfortable interacting with LASD CCB personnel. City College officials consider having an armed, professional police force on campus an asset to campus security.

City College administration would like the LASD CCB to have a more visible presence on campus and improve its information sharing and notification system. For example, City College officials want LASD CCB personnel to notify them immediately about crimes on campus and to include key City College administrative leadership members in all security-related notifications.

Physical Security

We noted the following major physical security vulnerabilities:

- + Fencing only partially protects the campus perimeter, including new fencing that was erected due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- + During the school day, the gates are open, allowing easy access to the campus.
- + The campus is vulnerable to vehicle-borne attacks. Several vehicle entrances allow vehicles to access the campus walkways and buildings.



Unfenced perimeter



- + Most lighting on campus is adequate. However, per our interviews and site visit, the campus needs more lighting on the north side.
- + The campus needs more emergency call boxes throughout.

Security Technology

Only a few campus buildings have an IDS, which makes it possible for someone to enter and stay inside most buildings after hours and remain undetected. Limited camera coverage makes it difficult for security personnel to assess situational awareness.

Unauthorized individuals can easily bypass fences, gates and building doors. City College must properly maintain these access control measures throughout the campus to help prevent unwanted entry into the campus. City College must also adjust the door closers to ensure the gates close and are secure.

LASD CCB officials advised that Facilities Department personnel are responsive, but budget and staffing shortages can delay repairs. The LASD CCB does not have a budget to improve or repair college systems, and the LASD CCB does not have the authority to ask City College staff to complete tasks. The LASD CCB Team Lead communicates their concerns with City College administration, but it does not appear they hold regularly scheduled meetings to discuss security matters.

We identified the following security technology system gaps:

- + The parking structures do not have camera coverage. LASD CCB officials estimate only approximately half of the campus has coverage and advised that the college is working to improve it.
- + City College has two video surveillance systems (Lenel and Pelco) that have a mix of analog and digital cameras, most of which are at least five years old and lack modern resolution capabilities.
- + The LASD CCB reported the only IDS on campus is in the Workforce Bungalows. An off-campus monitoring company monitors the alarms and notifies the LASD CCB station, whose staff respond.
- + Most buildings have panic alarms that report directly to the LASD CCB station. Campus phones also directly contact the station.
- + City College's ACS is not integrated. The LASD CCB monitors the DSX system, and the Facilities Department monitors two different Lenel OnGuard systems (Enterprise and Standard)



Example of vehicle access to campus



Camera monitors



- + The DSX system does not have a centralized lockdown function. Automatic lockdowns are only possible if someone inside the building activates internal controllers. The Lenel system does not have lockdown function.
- + Only approximately half of the campus buildings have an electronic ACS. The LASD CCB station has an ACS workstation.
- + City College does not conduct an ACS or lockdown training program for LASD CCB personnel or City College faculty or staff.
- + The LASD CCB station has hard key access to all campus buildings. Facilities Department personnel distribute and maintain records of key distribution.
- + Not all classrooms can be locked from the inside in the event of an active assailant attack or other shelter-in-place emergency requiring room inhabitants to lock their doors against malicious parties seeking access.
- + Respective personnel monitor the fire control panel in the LASD CCB station and Facilities Department office. In the event of a fire alarm, personnel must call the LAFD, as they are not automatically dispatched.



Fire control panel in LASD station

Community Perspectives

We noted the following perspectives and themes during our interactions with campus stakeholders.

- + Participants' reviews were mixed about their satisfaction with the LASD CCB, the relationships they have built and their responses. We noted more reports than from participants at other campuses of officers sitting in the station or their patrol cars rather than engaging in foot or bike patrols.
- + Participants expressed that they would like the LASD CCB to increase its community engagement efforts.
- + Participants expressed favorable opinions and support for armed officers' presence on campus.
- + Participants noted that it is critical that officers take trainings on handling mental health crises and de-escalation tactics.
- + Participants want the LASD CCB to conduct more campus patrols, specifically during night classes. Some noted that they do not see as many security personnel patrolling when night classes let out or assisting with the shuttle service.
- + Homeless individuals' access to campus is a major concern of participants who noted the open campus exacerbates the issue. Participants suggest developing a civilian response group that can work with the individuals and the campus to come to a resolution.



- + Participants would like to have easier access to contact the LASD CCB, as well as better communication with the LASD CCB on security-related matters. They would also like to improve their understanding of LASD CCB officers' roles.
- + Participants would like an increased focus on emergency response, which may include providing training and reference sheets to the campus community.
- + Participants noted poor lighting and inoperable cameras, particularly in parking areas. They noted that security personnel need to monitor cameras.
- + Participants reported that they have poor cellular reception on campus, a communications vulnerability that can negatively impact the outcomes of security-related incidents.
- + Participants stated that it would be beneficial for the campus community to wear visible identification.

Recommendations

Los Angeles City College	
3.1.1	Add the LASD CCB team leader and designee to the City College Incident Management Team (IMT).
3.1.2	Integrate the Lenel and DSX access control systems into a single system. Install access control readers at all exterior building doors. Connect all buildings' exterior doors to an automatic locking system that activates from a workstation in the LASD CCB station and the Facilities Department office.
3.1.3	Update the LASD CCB and City College 2009 Safety Plan and develop a series of threat prevention trainings and exercises.
3.1.4	<p>Leverage the results of the 2019 City College Security Assessment and Physical Security Campus Drawings to conduct a camera surveillance system audit (i.e., a blind spot) of the campus.</p> <p>As part of this study, inspect all cameras to ensure they are not on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) list of banned video surveillance camera devices, which includes the following: Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE and Hytera Communications. If any of these companies' cameras are identified, remove and replace them with cameras consistent with the NDAA's requirements.</p> <p>Identify buildings and locations to add motion detection video surveillance cameras. Consider critical locations and high-crime areas such as the Central Plant, Theatre Arts, Science Technology, Da Vinci Hall, the exterior of Herb Alpert Music Center, Life Science, Chemistry, Jefferson Hall, Franklin Hall, and the exterior of the Kin North and South buildings.</p>



3.1.5 Enclose the campus with gates or fences to prevent unwanted and unlawful intrusions. Install an audible alarm on the iron gate near the Metro Red Line bus stop on the northeast side of campus.

Program the alarm to alert a central working station in the LASD CCB station if the door is left open for more than five to 10 seconds. This would help alleviate unwanted intrusions onto campus, especially in the evening.

Post a sign on or near the fence reminding students to close it shut.

3.1.6 Schedule regular joint training with the LAPD and the LAFD.

3.1.7 Add lighting on the north side of campus and install more emergency call boxes throughout the campus.



2. Educational Services Center

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview

The LACCD Educational Services Center (ESC) is in downtown Los Angeles, in a highly populated business area considered to have a high crime rate. Many of the concerns in the area involve the large population of people experiencing homelessness, drug abuse, gang activity, burglary and theft.

The LACCD is the sole tenant of the nine-story building.

Currently, the LACCD ESC uses a private security firm, as the LASD CCB COVID-19 staffing curtailment plan discontinued the previously assigned LASD deputy role.

Because the ESC is a satellite facility, the LASD CCB does not record separate crime statistics for the facility. However, we assessed the crime rates in the area surrounding the facility.

Recent Incidents

The ESC suffered vandalism and loss of property on the morning of May 29, 2020, during protests in response to George Floyd's murder. Individuals broke the Administrative Hearing Room's first-floor windows. ESC personnel reported graffiti and damaged property. ESC staff boarded the windows and doors to prevent further damage.

Campus Neighborhood

The ESC is in the highest crime rate area of the facilities we team assessed. The LAPD's Central Area Community Police Station is responsible for all operations in downtown Los Angeles and responds to crimes committed. Crime in the area is a concern due to individuals engaging in drugs use, the large population of people experiencing homelessness and the proximity to the Metro train station. Violent crime is rare, and police are responsive when called. There are no reports of crime in the building.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant Incident
- + Vandalism



Underground parking is available for some employees; however, many either walk or use a shuttle service to go to an off-site parking facility. Our stakeholder outreach revealed satisfaction with security services inside the building but noted numerous concerns with the individuals who they encounter outside of the building, particularly when walking to the parking facility.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 1.1-mile radius of the ESC is 11.16 times higher than the national average, 9.07 times higher than the state average and 6.87 times higher than the county average. The immediate ECS area is rated as 13.24 times higher than the national average.

Areas within 0.5 to 1.1 miles of the ECS have the following crime rates:

- + **North:** 1.05 to 9.84 times the national average
- + **East:** 3.97 to 18.16 times the national average
- + **South:** 4.61 to 7.68 times the national average
- + **West:** 1.36 to 11.62 times the national average

CRIMECAST projects the crime rate for this area will drop slightly to 11.09 times higher than the national average by 2026. The most frequent crimes occurring around the campus include the following:

- + Larceny
- + Motor Vehicle Theft
- + Crimes Against Property
- + Robbery
- + Burglary

Crime Threat Summary

The area surrounding the ESC is a highly populated business district. We learned that people generally feel safe in the building but are concerned by crime outside of the building. The crime rate in the area is very high and ESC employees are at a greater risk when walking to and from off-site parking locations or when using public transportation.

As indicated, there is a large population of people experiencing homelessness in the area. We learned that ESC personnel have observed drug activity in the surrounding areas, parking structures and metro stations.



ESC personnel use Joe's Auto Park for off-site parking. This parking structure is approximately one-half mile away from the ESC with a walking time of 10 minutes. A shuttle to the structure is available but we learned it is unreliable. The structure has no security, and many interviewees raised concerns about the safety of walking to and from it.

We learned that LASD CCB security officers are a welcomed presence at the ESC. LASD CCB officers perform regular patrols at the building to act as a visual deterrent to crime. All visitors to the building must check in with the security officer at the front desk before accessing the elevators and floors.

Terrorism

LASD CCB and ESC personnel's greatest terrorism concern is an active assailant attack or mass attack involving firearms on campus. Other terrorism threats include VBIED and IED attacks and hostile vehicles. The ESC is the LACCD headquarters, where decisionmakers implement policies and decisions that impact all campuses. Therefore, the building is susceptible to violent threats or attacks from individuals or groups that disagree with the LACCD or from disgruntled former students or faculty.

The ESC lacks physical barriers to prevent or deter vehicular assaults. In 2019, a vehicle lost control and crashed through the front lobby door. The LACCD considered installing bollards at the main entrance; however, the City of Los Angeles would not permit it.

The ESC has an underground parking garage. During normal business hours and before COVID-19 restrictions began, the roll-down gate was left open, allowing unauthorized entry into the garage and increasing the potential for a VBIED attack.

Based on our discussion with the LASD CCB and our research, we do not consider the ESC to be a terrorist target at this time. The LASD CCB reported no credible terrorism threats against the LACCD or building occupants.



Front Entrance



Garage entrance with gate down

Emergency Preparedness and Response

The ESC has a comprehensive building emergency procedures manual with posted evacuation plans. Each floor has fire extinguishers and fully stocked first aid cabinets.



Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of ESC's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + An off-site company monitors the fire panel. The fire department's response time is approximately five minutes.
- + The ESC has an IMT that activates in the event of an emergency.
- + The LASD CCB is the lead agency during active assailant attacks and other criminal emergencies. It issues notifications to the EOC and IMT whenever possible.
- + The ESC has a detailed emergency response plan covering several emergency incidents, such as:
 - Evacuation
 - Workplace Violence
 - Bomb Threats
 - Civil Disturbance
 - Earthquake
 - Flood
 - Industrial Accident
 - Explosion, Crash, or Similar Incident
 - Medical Emergency
 - Power Failure
- + The emergency response plan includes evacuation maps for the building and assembly areas.
- + The emergency response plan includes organizational charts with responsibilities, chain of command and span of control.
- + Each floor has an assigned floor warden. The emergency response plan includes a detailed Floor Warden Manual that outlines their responsibilities for specific emergencies.



Fire panel and PA system

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the LASD CCB assigned one deputy and one security officer to the ESC. Due to COVID-19 restrictions and lack of employees inside the building, no deputies currently staff the ESC. However, a security officer presence is at the building on a 24-hour basis daily. Additionally, a LASD CCB deputy from the City College station regularly patrols the ESC and responds to any emergencies. The deputy assigned before the COVID-19 pandemic had an office on the 8th floor and routinely patrolled the nine floors and attached parking structure.



The security officer currently stationed at the front main lobby monitors the front main entrance, screens visitors, and monitors the ACS and VSS.

Physical Security

We noted the following physical security vulnerabilities:

- + The parking garage has a rolldown door and gate; however, they are typically left open during business hours. As a result, unauthorized persons have accessed the garage.
- + As indicated, there are no barriers, bollards or barricades to prevent vehicle intrusion into the building.

Security Technology

The building has a VSS with 32 cameras. The cameras are primarily on the perimeter of the building and inside the underground parking garage. The building has a Lenel ACS that controls the main lobby door, elevators and individual rooms. The security guard at the reception desk monitors the cameras and the ACS.

We identified the following security technology system gaps:

- + We were unable to confirm if the building has an IDS.
- + We did not observe any panic buttons in the ESC, nor was the property manager aware of any.



Main Entrance Reader

Community Perspectives

- + Overall, participants were satisfied and supportive of security personnel, including the LASD CCB previously assigned and the security officer posted at the front desk. Participants shared positive comments about security officers engaging in and building relationships with employees and making rounds.
- + Participants desire increased employee awareness about and competency in all emergency response procedures.
- + Participants would like to see a focus on employee engagement in security and increased use of technology such as communication, internal access control measures and cameras.
- + Most participants want an armed security officer presence.
- + Participant were overwhelmingly concerned by the exterior of the ESC, specifically the off-site parking available at Joe's Auto Park and their commutes to and from the parking structure.
- + Participants noted drug users and people experiencing mental health crises are prevalent in the area in part due to the nearby Metro station.



- + Participants stressed the challenges of the building's layout and its impact on shelter-in place procedures for active assailant incidents.
- + Participants want better communication with and from LASD CCB personnel, LAPD and Metro police on security matters.

Recommendations

Educational Services Center in Downtown Los Angeles	
1.2.1	Increase staffing to no fewer than two security officers per shift to patrol the building and the parking areas. Consider increasing the shuttle service or safety escorts to and from the remote parking areas when necessary. The staffing level should include coverage gaps due to illness or vacation.
1.2.2	Install IDS devices, such as door contacts, glass-break sensors and motion detectors. Integrate the IDS with the VSS and ACS so alert security officers at the reception desk to possible intrusions into the building.
1.2.3	In cooperation with the city of Los Angeles, consider the installation of vehicle-rated barriers, such as planters, to protect the building from vehicle intrusion.
1.2.4	Secure the automatic retractable gate for the underground parking garage when not in use.
1.2.5	Consider installing panic buttons at the front reception desk, administrative hearing room and executive offices. Develop notification procedures for when panic alarm activates.
1.2.6	Consider installing additional cameras to cover public areas inside the building such as the elevator lobby area for each floor.
1.2.7	Implement mass notification application or similar emergency notification software to notify employees of an emergency.
1.2.8	Develop a threat reporting process between the LASD CCB and the LAPD to relay information about emergencies or threats near the ESC building.
1.2.9	Consider developing a virtual escort app so security officers can track people using the app as they move through high-crime areas outside of the ESC building.
1.2.10	Improve the reliability of the shuttle bus for the off-site parking garage to limit the number of employees walking to and from the ESC building.
1.2.11	Consider requiring a security officer presence at the contracted off-site parking structure.
1.2.12	Consider relocating the ESC to an area with a lower crime rate.



3. East Los Angeles College

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview

The LASD CCB reported that from 2016 to 2020, 531 criminal offenses occurred on the East Los Angeles College (ELAC) campus, averaging 106 crimes per year. The LASD CCB categorized these offenses into 24 types of crimes. East Los Angeles College had the second highest overall crime rate and experienced the most motor vehicle burglaries, grand theft auto, sexual offenses (misdemeanors) and misdemeanors (miscellaneous) across all LACCD campuses. East Los Angeles College and Valley College both experienced the most campus robberies. East Los Angeles College and West Los Angeles College experienced the most campus forgeries.

Below, we list the most common crimes committed during the last five years.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Theft
- + Active Assailant Incident

Table 4: Most Common Crimes between 2016 and 2020 at ELAC

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Petty Theft	142
Vandalism/Property Destruction	52
Motor Vehicle Burglary	39
Grand Theft Auto (Motor Vehicle Theft)	37
Burglary	26
Grand Theft	22
Sexual Offense, Misdemeanor	17
Misdemeanor, Miscellaneous	14
Robbery	5
Arson	5



During this time, there were five violations of weapons laws (e.g., carrying, possessing) that resulted in two arrests in 2018.⁵ The incidents involved knives.

In 2019, petty theft, motor vehicle theft and burglary were the most prevalent crimes on campus. In 2020, there were 81 percent less petty theft (20 incidents in 2019 to eight incidents in 2020). However, burglaries increased 100 percent (five incidents in 2019 to 10 incidents in 2020), and motor vehicle theft increased 14 percent (seven incidents in 2019 to eight incidents in 2020). Overall, crime has decreased 32 percent from 2019 to 2020. It is important to note that during this time, LACCD had suspended nearly all on-campus instruction and services.

Recent Incidents

The LASD CCB and campus administrative personnel noted the following recent incidents at ELAC:

- + Theft of computers, cell phones and bikes.
- + Trespass, theft and vandalism attributed to homeless individuals.

Despite the number of thefts, burglaries and motor vehicle thefts each year, the individuals we interviewed believe the campus is safe and violent crime is rare.

Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined a high rate of crime occurs in the neighborhood surrounding the campus and that gang activity and crimes involving people experiencing homelessness are the biggest concerns off campus. Gang activity in the neighborhood has not directly impacted the campus.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 1.8-mile radius around the ELAC campus is 1.77 times higher than the national average, 1.44 times higher than the state average and 1.09 times higher than the county average.

Areas within 1 to 1.8 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **Northwest:** 1.28 to 4.49 times the national average
- + **East:** less than 1.40 times the national average
- + **South:** 1.26 to 3.6 times the national average
- + **West:** 1.27 to 4.32 times the national average

⁵ East Los Angeles College Main Campus 2020 Annual Security Report



CRIMECAST projects the crime rate for this area will drop slightly drop to 1.75 times higher than the national average by 2026. The most frequent crimes around the campus include the following:

- + Motor Vehicle Theft
- + Robbery
- + Aggravated Assault
- + Crimes Against Persons
- + Homicide

Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood around the campus has gang activity and a large population of homeless individuals. The biggest security concerns are thefts and homeless individuals trespassing, interfering with students and vandalizing property.

The Monterey bus stop near campus exacerbates the situation, as does the openness of the campus. During the site visit, we encountered homeless individuals loitering on campus. The LASD CCB Deputies asked them to disperse, and they complied.

The LASD CCB station conducts regular vehicle, bike and foot patrols on campus to check areas where homeless individuals often enter the campus. These patrols also serve as a visual deterrent to bad actors. Because the campus is large, the officers should conduct continuous patrols to ensure the campus is secure.

During our site assessment and interviews with LASD CCB and campus officials, we learned there is some gang activity in the immediate neighborhood. However, it mostly occurs approximately two miles southeast of the campus and has not directly impacted the campus.

The number of homeless individuals on campus has increased. The LASD CCB reports that homeless individuals have broken into buildings to seek shelter during cold evenings, and the officers found several homeless individuals showering in the sports stadium. At night, officers have found homeless people entering open doors to campus buildings or the stadium. The construction areas on campus are also vulnerable to trespassing. Some homeless people access the campus from the Monterey Park bus stop next to the campus.

Motor vehicle theft is a consistent problem. Campus leadership reminds students to lock their car doors and to keep valuables in the trunk, especially cell phones and chargers. Bad actors often target cars in parking structures 4 and 8 and in parking lots 3 and 4. In 2021, one vehicle was stolen from the stadium and one from a parking structure.



Before the COVID-19 pandemic, security officers patrolled the Child Development Center (CDC) (currently closed) on campus. The LASD CCB informed us that the CDC staff shares restraining order information with LASD. Once they have the restraining order, the deputy has more leverage to make an arrest if a domestic dispute arises at the CDC.

Terrorism

The LASD CCB and ELAC officials' greatest terrorism concern is an active assailant attack or mass attack involving firearms on campus. Based on our assessment and interviews, we believe the terrorism threats that could impact the campus include VBIED attacks, IED attacks, CBRNE attacks, and hostile vehicle attacks.

Like other colleges, ELAC is susceptible to students making bomb threats for reasons including avoiding an exam or causing a disruption to campus life. However, ELAC has not received a bomb threat.

The ELAC campus might be more prone to a terrorist attack because it hosts community events. For example, before implementing restrictions to prevent COVID-19, the campus hosted between 25 and 29 graduation ceremonies for local high schools and other external schools each year. The campus also hosts a football classic; cultural celebrations, such as the Chinese New Year celebrations; religious events, such as the Catholic Lady of Guadalupe feast day services; and filming for television and movies. If these events attract significant media attention, they could entice a lone wolf, domestic extremist group or homegrown violent extremist group supporting a foreign terrorist organization to plot and execute an attack. The threat of such an attack is low, but the LASD CCB and college officials should evaluate the risk when hosting external entities on campus.

Although ELAC leadership sometimes hires additional security services for these events, they do not do so for every event they host. Some community groups and religious organizations could be targets for bad actors whose actions might indirectly have a negative impact on the campus, students, faculty and staff.

Based on our discussion with the LASD CCB personnel and our research, ELAC is not considered a terrorist target at this time, and there are no credible terrorism threats against the college or students, faculty and staff.

Similar to the other LACCD campuses, the LACCD and the LASD CCB do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks from students, faculty and staff at ELAC. The suspension of the HEAT Program significantly reduces ELAC's ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats. We also learned that an officer in the LASD CCB conducted social media monitoring. However, this program no longer exists, and the LASD CCB no longer conducts social media monitoring.



The ELAC campus has a passive insider threat system. For example, when a faculty member sends the LASD CCB a suspicious or threatening email or social media post from a student or former student, LASD CCB personnel investigate it. LASD CCB and college personnel do not engage in general social media research for potential threats to the campus. Because the ELAC does not have an insider threat program, and because students, faculty and staff could have insider knowledge about which campus buildings are vulnerable, ELAC is more vulnerable to an insider active assailant attack, mass attack, IED, sabotage, or kidnapping or hostage events.

The lack of physical barriers at entry points to the campus also make the campus vulnerable to VBIED and hostile vehicle attacks.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

As part of this high-level threat and vulnerability assessment, we reviewed LACCD's emergency management plans published on their website. We also interviewed the LASD CCB and college administrative officials. We learned that the LASD CCB and college administrative officials understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster. However, the officials could further integrate the plans, policies and procedures to benefit ELAC's emergency preparedness and response capabilities.

For example, ELAC and the LASD CCB have individual internal emergency response plans, but they do not have a joint plan customized to meet the unique building and design aspects of the campus. This plan would also describe how they would leverage and coordinate internal (e.g., video surveillance system) and external resources; detail key response actions for all likely threats and hazards; provide an intended response timeline; and document the expected flow of communication and alerts with mediums, such as the Blackboard Connect Emergency Notification System, Safety App, and speakerphone telephone announcements.

Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of ELAC's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + ELAC has an Incident Management Team (IMT). The college president or their designee is the lead decisionmaker.
- + The LASD CCB is the lead agency during an active assailant attack or other emergency incident. The LASD CCB personnel notifies the ELAC president, IMT and administrative leadership of such incidents when possible.
- + ELAC students, faculty and staff, as well as the larger community, can access the Accessible Emergency Response Guide, Emergency Response Guide, Active Assailant Emergency Plan and School Threat Assessment Response Team brochure on the school's website.



- The Accessible Emergency Response Guide addresses active assailants, bomb threats, chemical and hazardous material spills, civil disturbances, earthquakes, fires or explosions, hostages, suspicious packages and mail, and violent or threatening behavior threats.
- + The Emergency Evacuation Zones map denotes evacuation zones and assembly areas.
- + ELAC created a map of where the emergency phones are on the campus.
- + Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the LACCD Safety and Emergency Services manager facilitated active assailant and security briefings in classrooms for students and faculty conducted by LASD CCB.
- + LASD CCB conducts evacuation drills, earthquake response drills, evacuation and earthquake drill tests on moving special needs or disabled students and evacuating faculty downstairs and outside of the building. This is a best practice.
- + Before the COVID-19 pandemic, LASD CCB conducted active assailant and other emergency drills with Monterey Park Police and Fire Departments
- + During drills and exercises, LASD CCB personnel verify if loudspeakers and/or speakerphones are operating correctly.
- + The LASD CCB and Monterey Park Police Department have a Memorandum of Understanding to provide law enforcement services to ELAC during emergencies.

Emergency Preparedness Equipment

Below is a list of ELAC's emergency preparedness-related equipment:

- + The LASD CCB can automatically lock the exterior building doors connected to the Honeywell access control system (ACS) from their office. This accounts for approximately 50 percent of campus buildings.
- + There are 70 panic buttons in the buildings across the campus, which alert the LASD CCB.
- + The emergency phones in the parking structures, the Student Success Building and the Technology Building connect to LASD CCB office.
- + Students, faculty and staff can use the LACCD Safety App to contact the LASD CCB during an emergency, to request virtual escorts from campus buildings to parking lots, and to access campus emergency plans and guidelines.

Opportunities for Improvement

Although we noted many strengths of ELAC's emergency management program, we identified some areas for improvement:

- + Although LASD CCB personnel know the campus emergency plan, we could not locate a hardcopy of the plan in the LASD CCB office.



- + The LASD CCB is the primary emergency response agency on campus, but the officers are not official members of the ELAC IMT.
- + The LASD CCB officers cannot automatically lockdown the exterior doors connected to the Lenel Enterprise ACS. They must manually lockdown these doors with a key.
- + The LASD CCB office does not have an access control workstation to monitor alarms and initiate lockdowns.
- + As noted in the LASD CCB Active Assailant Emergency Plan, there are eight types of key locks with different locking mechanisms in ELAC classrooms and offices. We could not determine how often LASD CCB officials, college administration and faculty test the locking interior doors or how well faculty or staff understand how to quickly lock these doors during emergencies.
- + LASD CCB officials do not know how many students, faculty and staff have registered to use the Blackboard Connect emergency notification system or the ELAC Safety App.
- + LASD CCB officials conduct verbal debriefs after drills and exercises. However, they do not issue written after-action reports that they can use to update emergency plans or create future training sessions.
- + ELAC and the LASD CCB do not have a formal emergency planning committee that oversees integration of their emergency plans, annual updates, plan dissemination, drills and exercises, after-action reports, or changes or upgrades to emergency notification systems or equipment.

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers conduct patrols, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires. In December 2020 LASD CCB leadership reduced the number of deputies on campus from five to three. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:

- + **Team Leader:** Flexible schedule according to operational needs
- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Two security officers



We noted the following concerns regarding the ELAC security force:

- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.
- + The LASD CCB does not have an assigned dispatcher. Instead, Student Cadets and LASD CCB personnel share these duties. During the overnight shift (10 p.m. - 6 a.m.), when the two on-duty security officers are on patrol, they forward calls to their cell phones. Alarms from the on-campus emergency phones announce in the station and are not forwarded.
- + Due to the suspension of the HEAT program, deputies must respond to mental health crises and try to resolve these issues.
- + LASD CCB personnel from this campus must also patrol the Rosemead Center, which is approximately five miles from the main campus. Additionally, deputies must respond when needed at the Southgate Campus, which is approximately 11 miles from the main campus.
- + We could not locate an emergency procedures manual at the station.
- + The ELAC LASD CCB Team Leader is not part of the campus Emergency Management Team (EMT).

Since 2019, the number of ELAC Student Cadet Program enrollees has decreased from 40 to eight. The cadets help fill security officer and deputy staffing shortages and, when necessary, assist with dispatch services. They also help open and close buildings under the Security Officer's supervision. They do not receive special training before they start, the college limits the number of hours they can work per week, and they rarely work at the station for more than two years. They can perform some minor duties at the station, but the officers cannot count on them as a regular workforce.

Due to the high turnover, the officers cannot rely on the Student Cadets as a stable workforce. Students often leave the program for higher paying jobs and due to general academic and family life pressures.

Physical Security

We noted the following physical security vulnerabilities:

- + Steel and chain link perimeter fencing partially secure the campus. The fencing does not encompass the entire campus. The campus is open, and, therefore, administration does not restrict access.



Unfenced perimeter



- + The campus is vulnerable to vehicle-borne attacks. Several vehicle entrances would allow a vehicle to access to the campus walkways and buildings.
- + The campus needs more lighting and emergency call boxes throughout.




Vehicle Access to Campus

Security Technology

Below we summarize the security technology system gaps on the ELAC campus:

- + The security technology system is antiquated and is not integrated with the LACCD and on-campus systems.
 - For example, the ACS and video surveillance system (VSS) are not integrated and cannot instantly alert the LASD CCB officers of unwanted or unlawful intrusions onto the campus or into campus buildings.
- + The LASD CCB station lacks a central monitoring station where officers can monitor all access control, intrusion detection and video surveillance systems and alarms.
- + Although the administration is upgrading the VSS cameras, they also need to increase the number of surveillance cameras throughout the campus to provide better coverage.
- + During our assessment, the camera monitors in the LASD CCB station were not working. There had been a power outage the day before, and when power returned, the camera monitors did not come back on.
- + The Team Leader told us approximately 50 percent of the buildings have an ACS.
- + The LASD CCB station does not have an ACS workstation. The team does not have access to the ACS with the exception of an emergency button that locks down about half of the campus buildings. Facilities Department personnel monitor the ACS.
- + Buildings and classrooms that do not have access control readers can be manually locked from inside in the event of a lockdown situation. However, faculty, staff or LASD CCB officers may not have time to manually lock multiple doors during an active assailant attack.
- + There is a FireWorks workstation in the LASD CCB station for fire alarm notification. Facilities Management also has an alarm panel.



Inoperable security camera monitors



Emergency lockdown button



- + We did not observe an IDS in any campus buildings. We also did not see an IDS workstation in the LASD CCB office. However, we were informed that some buildings may have it.
- + The campus has panic alarms in public areas of the buildings but not in classrooms.
- + The panic alarms report directly to the LASD CCB station through the telephone system. Additionally, campus phones can also be used to directly contact the LASD CCB station.

Community Perspectives

We noted the following perspectives and themes during our interactions with campus stakeholders.

- + Overall, participants are satisfied with the LASD CCB. We noted many positive comments about the relationships they have built and integrated into the campus community. However, participants would like more community engagement.
- + Most participants desire armed officers, but some suggested they wear less formal uniforms.
- + Participants expressed that mental health crisis training for officers is important.
- + Participants want more campus patrolling, specifically during night classes. They say they do not see as many security personnel patrolling at this time.
- + Due to the open campus, the homeless population has access to many of the buildings and presents concerns for the community.
- + Participants desire better communication with and from LASD CCB on security-related matters and their responsibilities.
- + Participants noted inconsistent campus policies or actions in security-related matters.
- + Participants noted poor lighting and inoperable cameras, particularly in parking areas.
- + Participants stated that it would be beneficial for the campus community to wear visible identification.

Recommendations

East Los Angeles College

- | | |
|-------|--|
| 1.3.1 | Integrate the Lenel and Honeywell access control systems into one system. Install access control readers at exterior building doors. Create a workstation in the LASD CCB and Facilities Department offices. Connect the buildings' exterior doors to an automatic locking system so appropriate personnel can activate it from the workstation. |
| 1.3.2 | Add the LASD CCB Team Leader and designee to the ELAC Incident Management Team (IMT). |



1.3.3 Investigate options to reduce the number of different door key locks in classrooms and offices. Provide annual training for new and existing faculty and staff on how to quickly lock doors during an emergency. Add an appendix to the emergency plan with a list of the doors with manual locks.

1.3.4 Conduct a VSS audit or blind spot study of the campus. Use the 2019 ELAC Security Assessment and Physical Security Campus Drawings to help inform the study. Identify buildings and other locations that need motion detection video surveillance cameras, including areas with high crime rates, such as the central plant, stadium, parking structure exteriors, Ingalls Auditorium, the Performing Arts Building, the Fine Arts Complex, Bailey Library (south and east exterior doors), Student Services building (southwest and southeast exterior doors), men's and women's gymnasiums, baseball field, administration building and Vincent Price Gallery.

During the study, inspect existing cameras to ensure they are not on the NDAA banned video surveillance camera list, which includes the following Chinese companies: Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE and Hytera Communications. If the campus has cameras from these companies, remove and replace them with cameras that are consistent with NDAA requirements.

1.3.5 Enclose the campus with gates or fences to prevent unwanted and unlawful intrusions onto the campus.

1.3.6 Schedule regular joint trainings with the Monterey Park Police Department and Culver City Police Department.



4. Corporate Center in Monterey Park

Threat Assessment

Crime

The Corporate Center is approximately one mile northwest of ELAC. Due to their proximity, we refer to the Crime section for ELAC to learn about crime at the Corporate Center.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant Incident
- + Theft

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Emergency Preparedness

The LASD CCB station is in the Corporate Center and maintains individual emergency response plan and procedures. However, like the South Gate Education Center, the ELAC emergency response plan includes the Corporate Center. In the event of an emergency, LASD CCB command staff at the facility would be the primary response, supported by ELAC personnel if necessary.

Below is a summary of the Corporate Center's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + LASD CCB personnel know what to do in the event of an emergency.
- + LASD CCB personnel regularly train according to the LASD CCB's policies.
- + Contact regarding an emergency is facilitated through LASD CCB radio communications.
- + The Corporate Center has a fire panel and a Knox Box for first responder access.

Emergency drills and security procedures should be reviewed and revised as appropriate to ensure familiarity, particularly with the recent staffing changes in LASD CCB command.

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we learned that due to the LASD CCB headquarters located in the Corporate Center they do not have officers specifically assigned as with other facilities and campuses. However, when staffing permits, a Student Cadet is assigned to the front foyer area to greet visitors and contact employees to escort the visitor during business hours. In discussion we learned that at the time of our assessment ELAC did not have a sufficient number of Student Cadets to provide coverage for the Corporate Center. We learned that for a brief time period an LASD CCB officer was assigned to the position during the time supervision conducted an administrative inquiry



on him. The Corporate Center is an LACCD administrative facility, like the LACCD office. As such, during the pandemic most employees have not been working in the facility. LASD CCB reports there only a few employees in the building. Absent those times when LASD CCB personnel are in their office area, the building is empty and there is no security or intrusion detection alarms to notify of unauthorized entry.

Physical Vulnerabilities

We noted the following major physical security vulnerabilities:

- + The Corporate Center is not protected by fencing.
- + The main entrance is unlocked during business hours. Access to the LACCD and LASD CCB offices from the foyer is through key-locked glass doors. The Student Cadet greets visitors and contacts their host to come to the main entrance and permit entry. However, as noted, no cadets were assigned during our assessment period.
- + On-site parking is available for employees and LASD CCB personnel. Entrance to the property and parking area is unrestricted or unprotected from a vehicular attack.
- + Exterior lighting is minimal.
- + Cameras are minimal and the footage cannot be viewed from the LASD CCB office or ELAC LASD CCB Station.

Security Technology

We identified the following security technology system gaps:

- + The Corporate Center does not have an adequate surveillance camera system. The exterior of the facility has some older cameras; however, two cameras at the rear of the building were recently replaced. LASD CCB advised that the camera system facility-wide will be scheduled for an upgrade at some point in the future. There are no cameras in the foyer or other interior spaces. Corporate Center occupants, including LASD CCB personnel, cannot monitor the available cameras.
- + The Corporate Center does not have an IDS or panic or duress alarms.
- + Phones throughout the building contact the front security desk; however, it is not currently staffed.
- + The building does not have an ACS, rather using hard keys. LASD CCB personnel maintain keys for access.



Recommendations

Corporate Center in Monterey Park

- | | |
|-------|---|
| 1.4.1 | Install an electronic ACS throughout the building to automate door openings and closings and to control access. |
| 1.4.2 | Install an IDS that includes motion and glass-break sensors to alert the ELAC LASD CCB station of unauthorized entry. |
| 1.4.3 | Upgrade the exterior security cameras and install cameras in common interior areas. Monitor the cameras locally and at ELAC LASD CCB station. |



5. South Gate Education Center

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview⁶

The South Gate Education Center (South Gate) falls under the jurisdiction of ELAC's LASD CCB station. The LASD CCB station is in the South Gate Health and Safety Office.

Because South Gate is a satellite facility, the LASD CCB does not record separate crime statistics for the facility. However, we assessed the crime rates in the area surrounding the facility.

Compared to the main ELAC campus, crime is not a major issue at South Gate. Per the LASD 2020 South Gate Annual Security Report, only three crimes occurred between 2016 and 2019, two fondling sex offenses in 2018 and one robbery on campus in 2019. In 2016, a vehicle burglary occurred in the parking lot near Southern and Calden Streets.⁷ Most crime involves theft of items from cars in the parking lot.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant Incident
- + Theft

Recent Incidents

LASD CCB reported that in early April, before our site visit, a homeless individual lit a fire outside of the campus fence line and lit the fence on fire.



Fence lit on fire

⁶ https://www.elac.edu/ELAC/media/ELAC-Assets/Documents/Admin-Services/Sheriff/AnnualReports/2020-ASR-SGEC-Final_Edited12232020.pdf. The South Gate Campus does not have crime statistics for 2016.

⁷ https://www.elac.edu/ELAC/media/ELAC-Assets/Documents/faculty-staff/Sheriff/SG_Vehicle_Burglares.pdf



Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined a high rate of crime occurs in the neighborhood. Like at the ELAC campus, the biggest concerns are gang activity off campus and crimes involving homeless individuals. Gang activity has not directly impacted the campus.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 1.3-mile radius of the South Gate campus is 3.95 times higher than the national average, 3.21 times higher than the state average and 2.43 times higher than the county average.

Areas within 0.07 to 1.8 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **North:** 1.14 to 4.47 times the national average
- + **East:** 1.24 to 3.40 times the national average
- + **South:** 1.55 to 8.24 times the national average
- + **West:** 1.97 to 7.04 times the national average

CRIMECAST projects the crime average for this area will drop slightly to 3.87 times higher than the national average by 2026. The most frequent crimes occurring around the campus include the following:

- + Motor Vehicle Theft
 - + Robbery
 - + Aggravated Assault
 - + Homicide
 - + Crimes Against Persons
-

Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood around the campus has gang activity and a large population of people experiencing homeless. However, gang activity does not impact the campus. The biggest security concerns are thefts and homeless persons trespassing, interfering with students and vandalizing property. LASD CCB security officers conduct regular foot patrols on campus to act as a visual deterrent and to check known areas where homeless persons enter the campus. Security officers from ELAC's LASD CCB station conduct vehicle patrols of South Gate to supplement the on-duty security officer.



LASD CCB personnel and campus officials indicated that the LASD CCB security officers are a welcomed presence at South Gate; however, the limited staffing of LASD CCB officers is a security concern.

Terrorism

The main terrorism concern of LASD CCB and South Gate is an active shooter attack or mass attack involving firearms on campus. Other terrorism threats include VBIED attacks, IED attacks and hostile vehicles.

Like other facilities, South Gate is susceptible to students making bomb threats for reasons including avoiding an exam or causing a disruption to campus life. However, South Gate has not received a bomb threat.

Based on our discussion with LASD CCB and research, South Gate is not considered a terrorist target at this time. LASD CCB also reports that there are no credible terrorism threats against the South Gate or occupants of the building.

Similar to the other LACCD campuses, the LACCD and the LASD CCB do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks from students, faculty and staff at South Gate. The suspension of the HEAT program significantly reduces the ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats. The LASD CCB does not conduct social media monitoring.

Because South Gate does not have an insider threat program and students, faculty and staff could use their insider knowledge about the building, access, surveillance cameras, and the location of any hazardous materials stored on site to plot and execute an attack. South Gate is most vulnerable to an insider attack that involves the following types of incidents: active assailant, mass attack, IED attack, sabotage, and kidnapping or hostage events.

Emergency Preparedness and Response


The South Gate campus is part of the ELAC emergency response program and has its own School Safety Plan. We reviewed the plan. In the event of an emergency on campus, a security officer would contact the ELAC LASD CCB station for support. Staff at the LASD CCB station would make other necessary contacts.



Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of the South Gate's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + LASD CCB personnel know what to do in the event of an emergency.
- + LASD CCB personnel train regularly according to the LASD CCB policies.
- + LACCD SES and LASD CCB coordinate to conduct emergency drills at least once each semester. There are no other regularly scheduled trainings for students or staff.



LASD School Safety Plan

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on site to perform the services that LACCD requires. Only one LASD CCB security officer works each shift with the staffing curtailment plan. Staffing two security officers per shift would provide better security for the campus, as it would allow for increased foot patrols and the security officers' safety. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:

- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** One security officer
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One security officer
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Campus closed



Security office

We noted the following concerns regarding the South Gate security force:

- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.
- + The LASD CCB station is a branch of the ELAC LASD CCB station, which does not have an SOA or Student Cadets on staff.



Physical Vulnerabilities

We noted the following physical security vulnerabilities:

- + A perimeter comprised of steel-bar fencing on the southeast side of South Gate building and chain-link fencing protects the campus. Steel plates have been installed over areas of the fencing where homeless individuals have cut and breached the fence.
- + The gates and doors are unlocked during normal school hours.
- + Students must use two off-site parking lots when the campus lot is full. The lots are about one block from the campus. Students must walk through the neighborhood on a dimly lit sidewalk to get to and from class. There are no reports of serious assaults, but students have reported being harassed while walking to and from class.
- + Although the campus parking lot is open, bollards in front of the main entrance help prevent a vehicle attack.



Hole in Chain Link Fence



Steel plates installed over fencing

Security Technology

South Gate has a VSS with good camera coverage. Staff in the security office on site monitor the cameras. Once the VSS is fully integrated and operational, the cameras will also be monitored from the ELAC LASD CCB station.

South Gate has an IDS. Security officers disarm the IDS when they report to work in the morning and arm it when they lock the doors at night. An off-campus monitoring company monitors the alarms and notifies the ELAC LASD CCB station upon alarm activation. Deputies from ELAC respond to investigate alarms.



Alarm panel

Below we summarize the security technology system gaps on the campus:

- + South Gate building and parking areas do not have panic buttons.



- + Building occupants cannot dial *80 but must dial the full facility phone number, (323) 357-6222, to reach the security office on site.
- + The building does not have an ACS and instead uses hard keys. The LASD CCB station has keys to all doors. The ELAC LASD CCB station has keys to respond after hours.
- + The phone system can make building-wide announcements. The campus used the Blackboard Connect Emergency Notification System.
- + Classrooms have emergency boxes containing room keys should occupants need to lock the room from the inside. One can break open the emergency box to access the key.
- + A fire panel is in the equipment closet near the LASD CCB station. A fire alarm indicator panel is mounted near the LASD CCB station. An off-site monitoring company monitors the alarm and dispatches the fire department upon alarm activation.



Emergency key box

Recommendations

South Gate Education Center	
1.5.1	Increase staffing to no fewer than two security officers per shift. Security officers need to be available to patrol the building and the parking areas. They also need to respond to problems and escort students to and from the remote parking areas when necessary. Staffing should include coverage for personnel that may miss work due to illness or vacation.
1.5.2	Upgrade the building IDS to include additional motion and glass-break sensors so that the ELAC LASD CCB station is alerted to entry or occupation of campus facilities after hours.
1.5.3	Schedule joint training with the South Gate Police Department at regular intervals.
1.5.4	Contact the Facilities Department to repair holes and other damage to the perimeter fence.
1.5.5	Install an electronic ACS throughout the building to automate building openings and closings and control access to facilities
1.5.6	Install panic buttons in each classroom and emergency call boxes throughout the parking areas.



6. Los Angeles Harbor College

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview⁸

Crime consistently occurs on campus, similar to the amount at other LACCD campuses. From 2016 to 2020, 20 different reported crimes accounted for 142 criminal offenses, averaging 28 crimes per year. Los Angeles Harbor College had the seventh highest overall crime rate and experienced the most rapes across all LACCD campuses.

Below, we list the most common crimes committed at Harbor during the last five years:

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant Incident
- + Theft

Table 5: Most Common Crimes between 2016 and 2020 at Harbor

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Burglary	24
Petty Theft	17
Vandalism	13
Motor Vehicle Burglary	11
Non-Aggravated Assault	10
Federal Offense (with money)	9
Grand Theft	8
Grand Theft Auto	5
Sex Offenses, Misdemeanor	5
Felonies, Miscellaneous	5
Misdemeanor, Miscellaneous	5

During this time, there were four violations of weapons laws (e.g., carrying, possessing), which resulted in two arrests in 2016 and one arrest in 2018.

⁸ Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Community College Bureau All Campus – Total 2016 – 2020 Crime Stats Report



In 2019, burglary, petty theft and federal offenses with money were the most prevalent crimes on campus. In 2020, there were 60 percent more burglaries (five incidents in 2019 to eight incidents in 2020). There was 25 percent less petty crime (four incidents in 2019 to three incidents in 2020). There was also a 100 percent drop in federal offenses with money (four incidents in 2019 to zero in 2020). In addition, vehicle burglaries increased 100 percent (one incident in 2019 to two incidents in 2020). Overall, crime has decreased 86 percent from 2019 to 2020. It is important to note that during this time, LACCD had suspended nearly all on-campus instruction and services.

Recent Incidents

The LASD CCB and campus administrative personnel noted the following recent incidents at Harbor:

- + Theft of \$20,000 worth of tools taken from the Facilities Department maintenance yard. Missing equipment includes construction supplies and electric carts.
- + Vandalism of a motor in Facilities Department maintenance yard.
- + Someone threw a brick through the back windshield of an LASD CCB vehicle.

LASD CCB attributes much of the theft and vandalism on campus to homeless individuals who trespass.

Despite the number of burglaries, thefts and vandalism each year, the individuals we interviewed believe the campus is safe, and violent crime is extremely rare.

Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined a high rate of crime occurs in the neighborhood surrounding the campus and gang activity and crimes involving people experiencing homelessness are the biggest concerns off campus. Gang activity in the neighborhood has not directly impacted the campus.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 2.1-mile radius of the Harbor campus is 2.80 times higher than the national average, 2.28 times higher than the state average and 1.72 times higher than the county average.

Areas within 0.9 to 2.1 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **Northwest:** 0.63 less to 2.28 times the national average
 - + **Northeast:** 0.47 less to 1.55 times the national average
 - + **Southwest:** 0.30 less to 1.19 times the national average
-



- + **Southeast:** 0.1.85 to 4.57 times the national average

CRIMECAST projects the crime rate for this area will increase slightly to 2.84 times the national average by 2026. The most frequent crimes that occur around the campus include the following:

- + Motor Vehicle Theft
- + Robbery
- + Aggravated Assault
- + Crimes Against Persons
- + Homicide

Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood around the campus has some gang activity, and there is a large population of homeless individuals. Among the most significant security concerns on campus are homeless individuals committing trespass, theft, vandalism and interfering with students. The LASD CCB tried to vary its patrols to monitor homeless individuals on campus, but the decreased number of personnel limits their crime prevention and response capability.

Like the other campuses, Harbor is experiencing a rise in the number of homeless individuals on campus. Harbor and LASD CCB officials report that there is a large population of homeless individuals in Wilmington and around the campus. LASD CCB informed us that this summer, 75 temporary cabins were erected about 30 yards from the campus on Los Angeles Recreation and Parks Department property to house homeless individuals. The cabins have electricity, air conditioning and heat, and the site offers bathroom, shower and dining facilities. College officials indicate that 25 cabins are reserved for homeless students.

The LASD CCB reports that most homeless individuals' trespass onto campus and do not commit additional crimes. However, some look for opportunities to steal campus property or break into buildings. The LASD CCB believe a homeless individual stole \$20,000 worth of tools in March 2020 from the campus maintenance yard. They have yet to make an arrest. Additionally, when the LASD CCB parked a vehicle in an area with a large homeless population, someone threw a brick into the back window. LASD CCB reports that many of the homeless individuals who come onto the campus have drug abuse and mental health issues and can negatively impact students and staff. Because Harbor is an open campus that does not have fencing or gates, it is quite easy for anyone, including homeless individuals, to access campus facilities.

It is important the campus has an armed law enforcement presence due to the high crime rate in the neighborhood and the population of homeless people in the area. Deputies are trained and have the experience and authority to respond to criminal activity and other incidents. The officers can also respond to incidents that take place just outside of the campus as needed, which further secures the campus.



The LASD CCB and campus officials told us that there is gang activity in the neighborhood. However, it has not negatively impacted the campus. The LASD CCB personnel considers gang violence to be a low threat at Harbor.

Terrorism

The top terrorism concerns for LASD CCB personnel and college administration are an active assailant attack or a mass attack involving firearms on campus. Other terrorism threats include VBIED attacks; IED attacks; CBRNE attacks; and hostile vehicles.

Like the other colleges, Harbor is susceptible to bomb threats from students who do not wish to take an exam or who want to cause general disruption to campus life. However, Harbor has yet to receive a bomb threat.

Because Harbor hosts multiple sporting events (football, baseball and softball), theatre and music performances that are open to the public it could be susceptible to a terrorist attack. If these events attract significant media attention, they could entice a lone wolf, domestic extremist group or homegrown violent extremist group that supports a foreign terrorist organization.

Although this is unlikely, LASD CCB and college officials should still consider the possibility and take the appropriate precautions when hosting external entities on campus. The college administration hires additional security services for some, but not all, of these events. Security personnel should consider that certain community groups could be targets for terrorism, which might indirectly have a negative impact on the campus, students, faculty and staff.

Additionally, the Harbor Teacher Preparation Academy high school is on the Harbor campus. A disgruntled high school student, faculty or staff member could engage in an assailant attack that negatively impacts the Harbor campus.

The Phillips 66 Refinery, about a half-mile from the campus, could also be a potential terrorist target.

LASD CCB officials do not currently consider Harbor a terrorist target. Our research into the matter verifies this, as well. LASD CCB officials also report no credible terrorism threats against the college, its students, faculty or staff.

Like other campuses, LACCD and LASD CCB do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks from students, faculty and staff at Harbor. Suspending the HEAT Program significantly reduced the ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats.

Additionally, the LASD eliminated the LASD CCB social media monitoring role, and no one in the LASD CCB security office conducts social media monitoring. Instead, the campus has a passive insider threat system. For example, when a faculty member sends the LASD CCB a suspicious or threatening email or social media post from a student or former student, LASD CCB personnel




investigate it. LASD CCB and college personnel do not engage in general social media research for potential threats to the campus.

The LASD CCB and Harbor personnel do not perform general social media searches for potential campus threats. The campus does not have an insider threat program, and students, faculty and staff could have insider knowledge about which buildings do not have access control systems, functioning video surveillance cameras and the location of toxic chemicals and flammable and combustible material storage areas. Therefore, Harbor is vulnerable to an insider attack, such as an active assailant, mass attack, IED, sabotage or kidnapping and hostage events.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

As part of this high-level threat and vulnerability assessment, we reviewed available emergency management plans. We reviewed the plans posted on the Harbor website and interviewed LASD CCB and college administrative officials. We found an Emergency Procedures Manual in the LASD CCB Security Office. However, it is outdated, and the LASD CCB personnel were not familiar with it.



Emergency Procedures Manual

LASD CCB and college administrative officials understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster. However, they should further integrate the plans, policies and procedures to benefit Harbor's emergency preparedness and response capabilities. For example, Harbor and the LASD CCB have their own internal emergency response plans, but they do not have a joint plan customized to meet the unique building and design aspects of the campus and that describes how they will leverage and coordinate internal (e.g., VSS) and external resources. The plan should also detail key response actions for all likely threats and hazards; display an intended response timeline; and document the expected flow of communication and alerts using different mediums, such as the Blackboard Connect Emergency Notification System, Safety App, and speakerphone telephone announcements.

Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of Harbor's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + Harbor has an IMT, and the college president or their designee is the lead decisionmaker.
- + The LASD CCB is the lead agency during an active assailant attack and other emergency incidents. When possible, it issues notifications to the Harbor College president, IMT and administration.
- + The Harbor website contains the following resources for students, faculty and the larger community: Emergency Preparedness Guide, dated July 16, 2014 (this guide also opens when users click on the Emergency Response Guide), Evacuation Plan Map, Evacuation



Organizational Chart, Building Captain Responsibilities (dated June 18, 2013), Significant Event Response Plan & Procedures (Facilities Maintenance & Operations Department Plan), and an LAFD Emergency Preparedness Booklet.

- The Emergency Preparedness Guide (dated July 16, 2014) lists the emergency roles and responsibilities for Harbor and LASD CCB officials in case of earthquakes, bomb threats, explosive devices, hostage situations, barricaded suspects, sit-in procedures and utility shutoffs.
- + Evacuation zones and assembly areas are denoted in the Emergency Evacuation Zones map.
- + LASD CCB policy requires station personnel to complete regular emergency response trainings.
- + Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the LACCD Safety and Emergency Services manager facilitated monthly trainings and drills with Harbor students, faculty and staff conducted by LASD CCB.
- + LASD CCB tests active assailant, lockdown and other emergency response scenarios in different parts of the campus, which is a best practice.
- + The LASD CCB receives the automated emergency notifications from the Phillips 66 oil refinery. Additionally, the LASD CCB maintains an emergency contact list of Phillips 66's employees.
- + If necessary, the LASD CCB Team Leader calls the nearby LASD CCB stations to assist with emergency response or reaches out to the LASD CCB Bomb Squad.



Phillips 66 Refinery Smokestacks taken from Sheriff's Station Parking Lot

Emergency Preparedness Equipment

Below is a list of Harbor's emergency preparedness-related equipment:



- + The campus has emergency phones on campus sidewalks, in parking areas and around the baseball field.
- + The LASD CCB station uses the campus public address (PA) system to announce emergencies. The college uses the Blackboard mass notification and LA Harbor College Safe applications (Safe App) to disseminate emergency information.
- + The PA system in the LASD CCB office reaches many of the campus buildings.
- + The Director of Facilities and the Locksmith maintain a Master Key List of which personnel have which keys.
- + There is a fire panel in the LASD CCB station for fire alarm notifications. The Facilities and Maintenance Building also has a monitoring station.
- + The Facilities Department recently purchased a \$20,000 electronic key box to track LASD CCB and Facilities Department personnel key sets. The key set owners report key status at least once per week.



LAHC Safe App

Although we noted many strengths of Harbor's emergency management program, we identified some areas for improvement.

- + Although LASD CCB personnel are aware of the campus emergency plan, they did not provide us access to review the response plan online or as a hard copy.
- + The LASD CCB officials do not know if Harbor leadership has a formal IMT. If they do, they do not know if they are on the team.
- + Only the library and Learning Resource Center has a remote automatic lockdown function. Faculty and staff must manually lockdown the other campus buildings or access the telecommunications equipment rooms to trigger an automatic lockdown.
 - During an active assailant attack, faculty and staff might not be able to reach telecommunications equipment room or to manually lock the exterior and interior doors.
- + We could not determine how often the LASD CCB personnel, college administration and faculty conduct drills on locking the interior doors. We are also unsure of how well faculty or staff understand how to quickly lock these doors during emergencies.
- + Harbor does not have an electronic database to track who has master keys, as well as other building keys.
- + The LASD CCB personnel do not know how many students, faculty and staff registered to use the Blackboard Connect emergency notification system or the Harbor Safety App.
- + Campus buildings do not share a common PA system.



- + Harbor and the LASD CCB do not have a formal emergency planning committee that integrates Harbor and LASD CCB emergency plans, annual updates, plan dissemination, drill/exercise after-action reports, and changes or upgrades emergency notification systems or equipment.
- + Although there is an Emergency Procedures Manual in the LASD CCB station, it is outdated, and the personnel are unfamiliar with it.
- + The LASD CCB officials do not know if Harbor has a formal Incident Response Team (IRT) or if the LASD CCB is an official part of it.
- + The LASD CCB and Harbor officials have not developed a formal plan to address serious issues involving the homeless population who sometimes trespass onto the campus. This includes the mental health issues this population experiences and the impact it might have on students, faculty and staff. Harbor administration and the LASD CCB should create a formal written plan to address the matter.

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

The LASD CCB officers should conduct continuous patrols to secure the campus due to the crime rate in the neighborhood and the population of homeless individuals..

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers conduct patrols or respond to calls, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires. Since December 2020, the LASD has eliminated two security officer positions. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:

- + **Team Leader:** Flexible schedule based on operational needs
- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Two security officers

According to the LASD CCB, staffing levels are based on the original contract with the LACCD, which was awarded approximately 20 years ago.

We noted the following concerns regarding the Harbor security force:



- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.
- + Student Cadets are assigned only as they are available.
- + The college assigns an SOA to the station to supervise the Student Cadets and to serve as an administrative liaison between the station and the college.
- + The LACCD CCB does not have a designated dispatcher. Instead, all of the employees share dispatching duties. On the overnight shift (10 p.m. – 6 a.m.) when the two on-duty security officers are on patrol, they forward station calls to their cell phones. However, alarms from the on-campus emergency phones announce in the station and are not forwarded.
- + Since the suspension of the HEAT program, deputies now respond to calls for assistance with mental health crises.
- + Although the Harbor Teacher Preparation Academy falls under the official jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), the LASD CCB responds to incidents at the high school, as it is on the Harbor campus. Incidents have included minor infractions such as petty theft and fighting. The LASD CCB also responds to mental health situations at the school.
 - The LASD CCB notifies LAUSD of incidents at the school and responds when the school contacts the station directly. The LASD CCB does not have additional staff to cover this response.
- + LASD CCB station personnel train regularly according to LACCD CCB policies. However, since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has not been a regular security training schedule for students and staff.

LASD CCB's biggest security concern is homeless individuals who trespass onto campus, interfere with students and vandalize property. The LASD CCB regularly patrol the campus, which provides a visual deterrent while officers check the areas where homeless individuals most often camp out.

Station personnel also perform additional duties, such as locking and unlocking doors, traffic control, providing directions and general information to students and visitors, and other tasks as needed. However, these additional duties take them away from their main campus policing duties. The LASD CCB must have sufficient staffing for all of the duties that the administration requires them to perform and to support the security needs of the entire campus.

LASD CCB officials informed us that the college is reluctant to prosecute individuals for trespassing, and the administration does not provide standard guidance for the LASD CCB to follow across the campuses. As it is possible the administration will opt against enclosing the entire campus with a fence soon, they must provide clear guidelines on trespassing and trespassing-related crimes and the clarify role and expectations of the LASD CCB. The administration might need to hire additional LASD CCB officers or enhance security technology solutions to meet their new security standards.



The LASD CCB security officers handle most issues independently. However, they contact the deputy on duty when someone commits a crime on campus. Because the deputy on duty is on campus, they can respond immediately.

Student Cadets provide additional eyes and ears on campus and help open and close the buildings. They do not receive special training before they start, the college limits the number of hours they can work per week, and they rarely work at the station for more than two years. They can perform some minor duties at the station, but the officers cannot count on them as a regular workforce.

We observed friendly encounters between the LASD CCB and the students and staff. We did not witness animosity toward armed LASD CCB personnel. The LASD CCB Team Leader reports that he has a good relationship with the college administration, and they listen to his thoughts on security matters. We also learned that college officials consider it an asset to have an armed and professional police force on campus. However, campus administration would like the LASD CCB to have a more visible presence on campus and to issue more detailed crime reports with in a timelier fashion. For example, we learned that the Facilities Department has asked the LASD CCB several times to provide more patrols of the maintenance yard because of the recent theft. The Facilities Department also wants LASD CCB to provide written updates and crime reports for these incidents.



Window in the Old Administration Building, which was broken into three times in one week.

Physical Security

The campus has adequate lighting and emergency call boxes.

We noted the following physical security vulnerabilities:

- + The college does not have perimeter fencing.
- + The campus is vulnerable to vehicle-borne attacks. Several areas around the campus would allow a vehicle to easily access pedestrian areas and buildings.



College perimeter

Security Technology

Below we summarize the security technology system gaps on the Harbor campus:


- + Some of the security systems on campus are insufficient and ineffective.



- For example, while we were on campus, the LASD CCB Team Leader radioed the station to test the PA system. Some posts reported hearing the test announcement, but we were standing near a PA speaker and did not hear the announcement. The LASD CCB Team Leader contacted the Facilities Department to investigate the problem.
- + The campus buildings do not have an IDS, which could allow someone to enter a building after hours and stay there undetected. Camera coverage is limited, which makes it difficult to assess situational awareness. Some door hardware is not properly maintained, and, therefore, it is easier for trespassers to enter buildings.
- + The LASD CCB personnel informed us that Facilities Department personnel are responsive, but budget and staffing shortages can delay repairs. The LASD CCB security office does not have a budget to improve or repair college systems, and college staff do not report to the LACCD CCB. The station depends on the college to improve and repair security systems. The LASD CCB Team Leader communicates his concerns with the college administration. However, they do not have regularly scheduled meetings.
- + The campus needs additional cameras for adequate coverage. At the time of the assessment, the camera monitors in the LACCD CCB station were working.
- + The campus has an IDS For which the LACCD CCB station has a monitor, but they do not control the system and have little knowledge of how it operates. The system is still being implemented. The LACCD CCB station personnel do not know the brand name of the system, but they believe it is a Lenel system. Much of the system is offline.
- + The buildings have panic alarms in public areas but not in classrooms. The panic alarms report directly to the LACCD CCB station. Phones directly connect to the LACCD CCB station.
- + Some classrooms and office have an emergency call button installed on the new VoIP phones.
- + There are two different electronic ACSs on campus: Lenel and Tyco's C-Cure software systems. Lenel is used for new installations and C-Cure is part of the older campus ACS system. The LACCD administers both systems. A 2019 draft Security Assessment states the campus has Lenel and GE Diamond II access control systems.
- + Most campus buildings have an ACS, but not all doors are integrated. Most building exterior doors must be locked and unlocked with a hard key.
- + The LACCD CCB station does not have visibility or monitoring capability for the ACSs.



Security Camera Monitors



IDS Monitor



- + LACCD CCB personnel must routinely assist employees entering buildings because not all staff have access control privileges.
- + LASD CCB personnel estimate that 30 to 40 percent of campus buildings are part of the ACS.
- + All exterior doors can be secured with a hard key.

Community Perspectives

We noted the following perspectives and themes during our interactions with campus stakeholders.

- + Participants overwhelmingly support having an armed LASD CCB presence on campus. We received many positive comments about the relationships the officers have built and how officers have integrated into the campus community.
- + However, participants acknowledge that many non-white individuals in the community, particularly the student body, might not agree. The participants stressed the need for officer diversity.
- + Participants consider LASD CCB personnel well trained and responsive.
- + Participants state that mental health crisis response is a priority and that they valued the HEAT program.
- + Participants want more patrols throughout the day and especially during night classes. They say they do not see as many security personnel patrolling when night classes let out.
- + Participants are concerned about the homeless individuals who trespass on campus. They suggest that LASD CCB personnel treat them with respect and try to find assistance for them.
- + Participants request better communication with and from LASD CCB personnel about security matters. They would like more clarity on the LASD CCB's duties and responsibilities and clearer guidelines on who to call for which issues, such as a mental health crisis.
- + Participants reported poor lighting and inoperable cameras.
- + Participants expressed concerns about traffic especially during evacuations or peak campus travel times.



Recommendations

Los Angeles Harbor College	
1.6.1	Institute the LASD CCB Team Leader and designee as official members of the Harbor College Incident Management Team (IMT).
1.6.2	Integrate the Lenel or C-Cure (or DSX) access control systems (ACSs) into one system. Install access control readers at all exterior building doors. Connect all of the buildings' exterior doors to an automatic locking system that the LASD CCB personnel can activate from a workstation in their office and in the Facilities Department office.
1.6.3	Review the ACSs and confirm which brands the campus has. Share this information with LASD CCB personnel, Facilities Department personnel and other relevant campus departments.
1.6.4	Update the 2014 Emergency Preparedness Guide, and develop a series of threat prevention trainings and exercises for the campus community.
1.6.5	<p>Leverage the results of the 2019 City College Security Assessment and Physical Security Campus Drawings to conduct a video surveillance system (VSS) audit or blind spot study of the campus.</p> <p>Identify buildings and locations to add motion detection video surveillance cameras, including areas with high rates of crime, such as the north sides of the Maintenance and Operations buildings, southeast side of Fine Arts building, Technology building, and the north and west sides of the Physical Education Center.</p> <p>Inspect the existing cameras to ensure they are not on the NDAA banned video surveillance camera list. If the following brands are in use, remove them immediately and replace with cameras that meet NDAA requirements: Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE and Hytera Communications.</p>
1.6.6	Install gates or fences that enclose the campus and help prevent unwanted and unlawful intrusions. Ensure the gates or fences have audible alarms that alert to monitoring station in the LASD CCB security office.
1.6.7	Schedule regular joint training with the LAPD and LAFD.
1.6.8	Install more emergency call boxes throughout the campus.
1.6.9	Require that LASD CCB provides timely and detailed criminal investigation and final arrest reports for the Facilities Department and the President's Office.



7. Los Angeles Mission College

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview⁹

Los Angeles Mission College (LAMC) is in Sylmar, a suburban neighborhood of Los Angeles. Campus administration reported that from 2016 to 2020, 71 criminal offenses occurred on the LAMC campus, averaging 14 crimes per year. The LASD CCB categorized these offenses into 13 different types of crimes. These crimes represent 2.7 percent of the crimes committed on all nine LACCD campuses. During this five-year period, Los Angeles Mission College had the ninth highest overall crime rate and did not lead in any LASD campus crime categories.

Below, we list the most common crimes committed during the last five years.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant Incident
- + Theft

Table 6: Most Common Crimes between 2016 and 2020 at LAMC

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Petty Theft	17
Vandalism	17
Locker Burglary	7
Burglary	4
Sex Offenses, Misdemeanor	4
Grand Theft	3
Non-Aggravated Assaults	3
Grand Theft Auto	1
Vehicle Burglary	1
Arson	1

⁹ Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Community College Bureau All Campus – Total 2016 – 2020 Crime Stats Report



In 2019, petty theft, vandalism and locker burglary were the most prevalent crimes on campus. In 2020, there was no change in the amount of petty theft (two instances both years). There was 100 percent less locker burglary (three instances in 2019 to zero instances in 2020). However, burglaries increased 100 percent (zero instances in 2019 to one instance in 2020), and vandalism increased 33 percent (two instances in 2019 to three instances in 2020). Although overall crime has increased 18 percent from 2019 to 2020, the total number of criminal offenses in 2020 was 13, which is relatively low. It is important to note that during this time, LACCD had suspended nearly all on-campus instruction and services.

Recent Incidents

The LASD CCB and campus administrative personnel noted the following recent incidents at LAMC:

- + An individual attempted to complete suicide in the parking structure on campus.
- + An active assailant threatened to “shoot up campus” during finals week but the follow-up investigations determined the threat was false.
- + Much of the crime on campus is attributed to homeless individuals who trespass on campus and commit thefts and vandalize property.

The individuals we interviewed believe LAMC has a safe campus and violent crime is extremely rare.

Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined a low rate of crime in the neighborhood surrounding the campus, and crimes involving people experiencing homelessness are the biggest concerns off campus. During our on-site assessment, we observed homeless camps along the east side of the campus near Maclay Street.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 1.8-mile radius of the LAMC campus is 2.67 times higher than the national average, 2.17 times higher than the state average and 1.64 times higher than the county average. However, the immediate area surrounding the campus area has a crime rate 0.59 times lower than the national average.

Areas within 1 to 1.8 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **Southwest:** 1.68 to 5.56 times the national average
 - + **West:** 1 to 2.88 times the national average
 - + **South:** 0.85 to 5.78 times the national average
-



CRIMECAST projects the crime rate for this area will increase slightly increase to 2.8 times higher than the national average by 2026. The most frequent crimes that occur around the campus include the following:

- + Motor Vehicle Theft
- + Aggravated Assault
- + Robbery
- + Crimes Against Persons
- + Larceny

Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood surrounding the campus is mainly residential. There is a population of homeless individuals in the area. The largest security concerns for the campus are thefts and homeless persons trespassing, interfering with students and damaging property. The LASD CCB station conducts regular patrols on campus that serve as a visual deterrent. While patrolling, the officers check areas where homeless individuals are known to enter the campus and linger.

LAMC is an open campus and does not have perimeter fencing. We saw encampments of homeless individuals near the campus. LAMC reported instances of vandalism, theft and homeless individuals who have broken into buildings. On one occasion, in October 2020, a homeless man started a fire at the Center for Math & Science Building, which destroyed the building façade.

Terrorism

The number one terrorism concern of LASD CCB and college administrative officials is an active assailant attack or mass attack involving firearms on campus. Other terrorism threats include VBIED attacks; IED attacks; CBRNE attacks; and hostile vehicles.

Like other colleges, LAMC is susceptible to bomb threats for reasons including avoiding an exam or causing a disruption to campus life.

The lack of physical barriers at entry points into the campus also make the campus vulnerable to VBIED and hostile vehicle attacks.

Based on our discussion with LASD CCB personnel and our own research, LAMC is not considered a terrorist target at this time. LASD CCB personnel informed us there is a known white supremacy group nearby, but they have not had an impact on campus.



However, as stated, the LACCD administration and LASD CCB personnel do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks from students, faculty and staff. Suspending the HEAT Program significantly reduced the ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats.

Because LAMC does not have an insider threat program and students, faculty and staff could use their insider knowledge about which buildings do not have access control systems, functioning video surveillance cameras, the location of toxic chemicals in the Science building's laboratories and flammable and combustible material storage areas on campus to plot and execute an attack. LAMC is vulnerable to an insider attack that involves the following types of incidents: active assailant, mass attack, IED, sabotage, and kidnapping or hostage event.

Additionally, the LASD eliminated the LASD CCB social media monitoring role, and no one in the LASD CCB conducts social media monitoring. Instead, the campus has a passive insider threat system. For example, when a faculty member sends the LASD CCB a suspicious or threatening email or social media post from a student or former student, LASD CCB personnel investigate it. LASD CCB and college personnel do not engage in general social media research for potential threats to the campus.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

As part of this high-level threat and vulnerability assessment, we interviewed LASD CCB and college administrative officials and reviewed the available Emergency Operations Plans (EOP) posted on the LAMC website.¹⁰ LASD CCB and college administrative officials understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster. However, they could benefit from updated plans, policies and procedures on LAMC emergency preparedness and response capabilities.

LAMC administrative services, faculty, facilities, LASD CCB personnel, academic affairs, student services, college council and the academic senate developed the EOP, which was signed in March 2016. The EOP establishes the emergency chain of command and authority and lists emergency contact phone numbers. Additionally, it outlines the National Incident Management System (NIMS) framework and the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), a statewide California system that aids communication and multiagency response. However, the groups should update the EOP to ensure the information is up to date and accurate.

The EOP covers incident response plans for active assailants, bomb threats, earthquakes, evacuation, fire, flooding, hazardous material release, lockdown, medical emergencies, terrorist attacks, utility outage and weather emergencies. It also identifies the locations of exits, fire extinguishers and fire alarm pull stations for each campus building and designates the quad as the rally point in the event of a building evacuation.

¹⁰ <http://www.lamission.edu/docs/EmergencyOperationsPlan.pdf>



Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of LAMC's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + LAMC EOP denotes an emergency chain of command authority, and the college president or Vice President of Administrative Services is the lead decisionmaker.
- + The LAMC website contains a PDF of the EOP.
- + The EOP addresses active assailants, bomb threats, earthquakes, evacuation, fire, flooding, hazardous material release, lockdown, medical emergencies, terrorist attacks, utility outage and weather emergencies. The Emergency Evacuation Zones map denotes evacuation zones.

Emergency Preparedness Equipment

Below is a list of LAMC's emergency preparedness-related equipment:

- + Emergency call boxes are adequately placed around the campus.
- + The exterior building doors connect to the ACS, and therefore the Facilities Department personnel can automatically lock them. Approximately 50 percent of the buildings have remote locks.
- + Students, faculty and staff can use the LACCD Safety App to contact the LASD CCB during an emergency, to request virtual escorts from campus buildings to parking lots, and to access campus emergency plans and guidelines.
- + We learned that prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the LACCD Safety and Emergency Services manager facilitated training for students and faculty conducted by LASD CCB; however, they have not conducted an emergency response drill or exercise since 2019.

Although there are strengths in the LAMCs emergency response plans, we did note some areas for improvement below:

- + LASD CCB office does not have an access control workstation to monitor alarms and initiate lockdowns.
- + LASD CCB personnel do not know how many students, faculty and staff are registered to use the Blackboard Connect emergency notification system or LAMC Safety App.
- + The LASD CCB and LAMC have not participated in an emergency response drill or exercise since 2019.
- + LAMC and the LASD CCB personnel have not developed a formal emergency planning committee to integrate the organizations' emergency plans, annual updates, plan dissemination, drill or exercise after-action reports, and changes or upgrades to emergency notification systems or equipment.



Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers conduct patrols or respond to calls, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires. Since December 2020, the LASD reduced the number of deputies on campus from five to three. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:

- + **Team Leader:** Flexible schedule according to operational needs
- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Two security officers

We noted the following concerns regarding the security force:

- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.
- + Student Cadets work at the LASD CCB station as they are available.
- + The LASD CCB does not have an assigned dispatcher. Instead, the employees share the dispatching duties. During the overnight shift (10 p.m. – 6 a.m.) the two on-duty security officers forward station calls to their cell phones while they are on patrol. However, alarms from the on-campus emergency phones announce in the station and do not forward.
- + Due to the suspension of the HEAT program, LASD CCB deputies now respond to these issues themselves.
- + LASD CCB policies dictate personnel undergo regular emergency response trainings. However, the LASD CCB has not set up a regular security training schedule for students and staff.
- + The campus is open and does not have perimeter fencing, which makes it easy for anyone to walk on campus.
- + We were could not locate a hardcopy of the EOP at the LASD CCB station.

The Student Cadet program helps fill security officer and deputy staffing shortages. When necessary, the Student Cadets can assist with dispatch services and help open and close buildings under a security officer's supervision. The cadets do not receive special training before they start, the college



limits the number of hours they can work per week, and they rarely work at the station for more than two years. They can perform some minor duties at the station, but the officers cannot count on them as a regular workforce. The cadets often leave the program when they find higher paying jobs or due to general academic and family life pressures.

Physical Security

Emergency call boxes are adequately placed throughout the campus.

We noted the following physical security vulnerabilities:

- + As previously stated, the campus does not have any perimeter fencing. The LAMC campus is considered open and access is not restricted.
- + The campus is vulnerable to vehicle-borne attacks. There are several areas on campus through which a vehicle could easily access pedestrian areas and buildings.
- + Lighting is inadequate near the Instructional Administration Building and Student Services and Administration Building.



Unfenced perimeter



Vehicle access to campus

Security Technology

Below we summarize the security technology system gaps on the campus:

- + The security technology system is antiquated and is not integrated with the LACCD and on-campus systems.
 - For example, the ACSs and VSSs are not integrated and cannot instantly alert the LASD CCB officers who are monitoring for unwanted or unlawful intrusions onto the campus or into campus buildings.
- + The LASD CCB security office does not have a central monitoring station from where they can monitor all access control, intrusion detection and video surveillance systems and alarms.
- + The Team Leader estimates that cameras cover 90 percent of the campus. However, officers only monitor the cameras approximately 10 percent of the time.
- + The cameras are not integrated with an ACS and do not use video analytics.



Security Camera Monitors



- + Officers told us that the campus does not have an IDS. However, the LACCD Security Assessment conducted in May 2019, indicates a few buildings on campus have an IDS with local audible alarms. The report indicates that none of the IDSs installed are currently monitored.
- + The campus does not have panic alarms.
- + About 50 percent of campus buildings have an electronic ACS of varying manufacturers.
- + The LAMC Facilities Department monitors the ACS. The LASD CCB office does not have an ACS workstation from which they can monitor or lockdown buildings.
- + If necessary, faculty and staff can manually lock buildings and classrooms without access control readers from inside in the event of a lockdown. However, they might not have time to manually lock multiple doors during an active assailant attack.
- + The LASD CCB station has hard keys for all doors on campus. Facilities Department personnel distribute the keys and maintains records.
- + The LASD CCB station has a fire alarm panel for fire alarm notification. The Facilities Department has a panel that they monitor.

Community Perspectives

We noted the following perspectives and themes during our interactions with campus stakeholders.

- + Overall, participants are satisfied and support the LASD CCB. Many had positive comments about the relationships they have built and how officers have integrated with the campus community. However, we received an isolated comment about profiling students. Participants do not want “loud” voices to dictate that LASD CCB services should be removed from LAMC.
- + Participants expressed that mental health crisis response is important. Participants valued the HEAT program and the associated training LASD CCB is provided. Participants suggest LASD CCB personnel respond to such crises with a trained civilian counterpart.
- + East campus is not as safe as the main campus, and LASD CCB officers do not patrol enough.
- + Participants want more patrols and escorts, specifically during night classes when they do not see as many security personnel patrolling when night classes let out.
- + Participants have significant concerns about the homeless population who live near the campus and often trespass and damage and deface property.
- + Participants would like an easier process to contact LASD CCB.
- + Participants would like better communication with and from LASD CCB personnel on security related matters and a greater focus on emergency response training for the campus community.
- + Participants reported poor lighting, cameras and monitoring protocols.



- + Participants reported having poor cellular reception on campus.

Recommendations

Los Angeles Mission College	
1.7.1	Integrate the access control systems (ACSs) into one system, and install access control readers at exterior building doors. Connect the buildings' exterior doors to an automatic locking system that LASD CCB personnel can activate from a workstation in their office and the Facilities Department office.
1.7.2	<p>Use the results of the 2019 LAMC Security Assessment and Physical Security Campus Drawings to conduct a campus video surveillance system (VSS) audit or "blind spot" study of the campus. Install additional motion detection video surveillance cameras in critical locations and areas with high rates of crime such as the Collaborative Studies (northeast door), Instructional Administration (northeast and northwest doors, Student Services & Administration, Campus Services (northwest exterior), Culinary Arts Institute, Plant Facilities and Central Plant, Health Fitness & Athletics Complex and Center for Math & Science.</p> <p>Ensure the cameras are not on the NDAA banned video surveillance camera list, which includes the following Chinese companies: Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE and Hytera Communications. If any of these companies' cameras identified, remove and replace them with cameras that are consistent with NDAA requirements.</p>
1.7.3	Conduct a functionality test of all installed IDS devices. Upgrade and add IDSs to buildings on campus so that the LASD CCB station can actively monitor and receive alerts in case of unauthorized entry or occupation of campus facilities.
1.7.4	Enclose the campus with gates or fences to prevent unwanted and unlawful intrusions onto the campus.
1.7.5	Add additional lighting to ensure the campus and parking areas are properly illuminated.
1.7.6	Schedule regular joint trainings with the Los Angeles Police Department.



8. Los Angeles Pierce College

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview¹¹

The LASD CCB reported that from 2016 to 2020, 216 criminal offenses took place on the Los Angeles Pierce College (Pierce) campus, averaging 52 crimes per year. The LASD CCB personnel categorized these offenses into 16 types of crimes. These crimes represent 10.16 percent of crimes committed on all nine LACCD campuses. Pierce College had the fifth highest overall crime rate across all LACCD campuses and did not lead in any LASD campus crime categories.

Below, we list the most common crimes committed during the last five years.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant
- + Fire
- + Theft

Table 7: Most Common Crimes between 2016 and 2020 at Los Angeles Pierce College

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Petty Theft	78
Vandalism/Property Destruction	41
Non-Aggravated Assault	20
Burglary	18
Locker Burglary	10
Grand Theft	10
Felony, Misdemeanor	6
Misdemeanor, Miscellaneous	6
Grand Theft Auto	5
Motor Vehicle Burglary	4
Sexual Offense, Misdemeanor	4

¹¹ Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Community College Bureau All Campus – Total 2016 – 2020 Crime Stats Report



Aggravated Assault	3
Fraud (Check)	3
Narcotics	3

During this time, there were no weapons law violations (e.g., carrying or possessing).

In 2019, petty theft, vandalism and felonies, miscellaneous were most prevalent crimes on campus. Overall, crime has decreased 44 percent from 2019 to 2020. In 2020, there were 75 percent less petty thefts (12 incidents in 2019 to three incidents in 2020); 67 percent more acts of vandalism (six incidents in 2019 to 10 incidents in 2020); and 67 percent less felonies, miscellaneous (three incidents in 2019 to one in 2020). However, burglaries increased 200 percent (one incident in 2019 to three incidents in 2020). It is important to note that during this time, LACCD had suspended nearly all on-campus instruction and services.

Recent Incidents

The LASD CCB and campus administrative personnel noted the following recent incidents:

- + There was a fire on the southwest side of campus in a farm area. The LASD CCB personnel believe homeless individuals set the fire to cook. The Los Angeles Fire Department responded and suppressed it.
- + Homeless individuals have broken into buildings for shelter.
- + The LASD CCB personnel attribute much of the crime on campus to individuals experiencing homelessness. They often trespass on campus and steal or vandalize property.

Despite the number of thefts, vandalism and burglaries that occur each year, the individuals we interviewed believe the campus is safe and violent crime is rare.

Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined a moderate rate of crime occurs in the neighborhood surrounding the campus. Although there is gang activity in the area, it has not directly impacted the campus. Crimes involving homeless individuals are the biggest concerns off campus.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 2.0-mile radius around the campus is 1.90 times higher than the national average, 1.54 times higher than the state average and 1.17 times higher than the county average.



Areas within 1.0 to 2.0 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **Northwest:** 0.32 less than to 6.75 times the national average
- + **Northeast:** 0.24 less than to 2.26 times the national average
- + **Southwest:** 0.33 to 1.13 times the national average
- + **Southeast:** 0.21 less than to 2.21 times the national average

CRIMECAST projects the national crime average for this area will remain at 1.90 times higher than the national average. The most frequent crimes that occur around the campus include the following:

- + Motor vehicle theft
- + Larceny
- + Crimes against persons
- + Burglary
- + Robbery

Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood around the campus has gang activity and a growing population of individuals experiencing homelessness. The biggest security concerns are thefts and homeless individuals trespassing on campus, interfering with students, vandalizing property and starting fires. The LASD CCB station conducts regular vehicle, bike and foot patrols on campus, which serve as a visual deterrent to crime. During the patrols, they check known areas where homeless people enter the campus and linger. Because the campus is large and has open access, the LASD CCB personnel must conduct continuous patrols to ensure the campus is secure.

During our site assessment and interviews with LASD CCB and campus officials, we learned there is gang activity in the neighborhood immediately surrounding the campus, including rival gangs on the east and west sides of the campus. Approximately six months ago, a gang-related shooting occurred at a Jack in the Box restaurant two blocks from the campus, and the suspects ran onto the campus to evade police. The LASD CCB personnel searched the campus for the individuals and the weapons but could not find either. The LAPD later arrested the suspects off-campus.

Additionally, Pierce has had increasing numbers of individuals experiencing homelessness who have trespassed on campus. Approximately three months ago, an encampment of homeless individuals was established on the west side of campus. The LASD CCB cleared the encampment but report that homeless individuals have broken into multiple buildings to seek shelter or steal property.

Homeless individuals sometimes use the Orange Line station near campus as refuge. They sometimes use narcotics in the station, as well. In 2018, the campus was evacuated because a student overheard a homeless individual on the Orange Line state that he was going to “shoot up the



campus.” When LASD CCB personnel investigated the incident, they determined that the homeless individual meant he was going to “shoot up” drugs on the campus.

Because the campus is large and has open fields and limited fencing, it is susceptible to trespass. During our tour of the campus, we encountered a homeless woman attempting to enter the campus at the main entrance to use the restroom. LASD CCB personnel advised her that, due to COVID-19 restrictions, the restrooms were closed, and she left the area.

The campus has large tracts of farmland and fields, and LASD CCB personnel are concerned homeless individuals could accidentally start a fire or commit arson in this area. The LASD CCB personnel and some college officials believe that due to the large campus, the inability to automatically lockdown campus buildings and the potential mental health issues associated with the growing population of homeless individuals around the campus, the campus should have armed law enforcement personnel. Because the campus is easily accessed and lacks a gate or fencing around the entire perimeter, it is constantly susceptible to petty theft, vandalism and accidental or intentional fires.

Terrorism

The number one terrorism concern of LASD CCB and college administrative officials is an active assailant attack or mass attack involving firearms on campus. Other terrorism threats include VBIED attacks, IED attacks, CBRNE attacks and hostile vehicles.

Like colleges across the country, Pierce is susceptible to bomb threats from students who do not want to take an exam or who wish to cause general disruption to campus life. However, Pierce has not experienced a bomb threat.

The Pierce campus may be more susceptible to a terrorist attack when hosting sporting events, external movie shoots, theatre shows or when the campus serves as a temporary shelter for people and animals impacted by wildfires. If these events attract significant media attention, they could entice a lone wolf, domestic extremist group or homegrown violent extremist group that supports a foreign terrorist organization. The threat of such an attack is low, but the LASD CCB and college officials should evaluate the risk when hosting external entities on campus. Certain community groups could be targets and might indirectly impact the campus, students, faculty and staff.

In addition, a disgruntled employee or client of the Child Development Center (CDC) or an individual suffering from mental health issues who accesses the campus could engage in an active assailant attack.

Based on our research and discussions with LASD CCB personnel, Pierce is not considered a terrorist target at this time. LASD CCB personnel also report that there are no credible terrorism threats against the college, its students, faculty or staff.



Like other campuses, LACCD and LASD CCB do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks by students, faculty and staff. The suspension of the HEAT program significantly reduced the ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats.

The Pierce campus has a passive insider threat system. For example, when a faculty member sends the LASD CCB a suspicious or threatening email or social media post from a student or former student, LASD CCB personnel investigate it. LASD CCB and college personnel do not engage in general social media research for potential threats to the campus. Because the Pierce campus does not have an insider threat program, and because students, faculty and staff could have insider knowledge about which campus buildings are vulnerable, Pierce campus is more vulnerable to an insider active assailant attack, mass attack, IED, sabotage, or kidnapping or hostage events.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

We reviewed available emergency management plans on the Pierce website, interviewed LASD CCB and college administrative officials and examined emergency plans during our site visit. We reviewed an emergency procedures manual we found in the LASD CCB office during our site visit and learned that LASD CCB and college administrative officials understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster.

Pierce and the LASD CCB should better integrate their plans, policies and procedures to enhance their emergency preparedness and response capabilities. For example, Pierce and the LASD CCB have their own internal emergency response plans, but they have yet to write a joint plan customized to the unique building and design aspects of the campus. This plan should also describe how they will use and coordinate internal (e.g., VSS) and external resources and should include details of key response actions for likely threats and hazards. It should also provide a possible response timeline and should document the expected flow of communication and alerts and the mediums used to disseminate the information, such as Blackboard Connect Emergency Notification System, Safety App, speaker and telephone announcements.

Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of Pierce's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + Pierce has an Incident Management Team (IMT). The college president or their designee serves as the lead decisionmaker on the team. Other IMT members include:
 - Vice President of Student Services
 - Facilities Director
 - Public Information Officer
- + The LASD CCB is part of the campus IMT. In case of an emergency event, the LASD CCB Team Leader or their designee notifies the campus emergency management team (EMT) of the incident.




- + The LASD CCB acts as the lead agency during an active assailant attack or other emergency incident. When possible, the LASD CCB issues notifications to the Pierce president, IMT and administration.
- + Students, faculty and the larger community can find the Pierce College Emergency Procedures (March 2018) and the Annual Security Report on the college's website. The website also states that the campus has developed comprehensive emergency procedures and has emergency booklets in each classroom. The booklet includes an evacuation map.
 - The Emergency Procedures include active assailant, terrorism, bomb threats, structural fires, civil disturbances, hazardous conditions, earthquake, power failures, public health hazards and floods.
 - The website informs students that the college uses Blackboard Connect, voice paging via campus telephone system and wireless communication boxes in classrooms to send emergency alerts.¹²

Emergency Preparedness Equipment

Below is a list of Pierce's emergency preparedness-related equipment:

- + The President's Office, Bookstore and Finance Office have panic alarms that alert in the LASD CCB station.
- + The President's Office is secured with electronic cyber keys. The Facilities Department personnel track use and distribution of these keys.
- + The campus has emergency phones along campus sidewalks and parking areas.
- + The Facilities Department building has a fire panel. A third-party vendor monitors the fire alarms and dispatches LAFD when needed.
- + In the event of an emergency, the LASD CCB Team Leader or on-duty deputy notifies the President and Vice President of Student Services. The Vice President is then responsible for informing the IMT.
- + The college uses the Blackboard mass notification application to broadcast emergency information to students.



Emergency procedures manual

Opportunities for Improvement

Although we noted many strengths of Pierce's emergency management program, we identified some areas for improvement.

¹² http://www.piercecollege.edu/campus_safety.asp



- + LASD CCB personnel are aware of the campus emergency plan, but they could not provide access for our team during our site visit.
- + None of the campus building doors that connect to the ACS have an automatic lockdown function. All doors require a manual key lock during an emergency, such as an active assailant attack.
- + Some, but not all, classrooms can be locked from the inside.
- + We could not determine how often LASD CCB personnel, college administration and faculty run drills on locking interior doors or how well faculty or staff understand how to quickly lock these doors during emergencies.
- + Only three campus buildings have panic alarms.
- + The campus does not have a campus-wide public address (PA) system.
- + LASD CCB personnel are unaware of how many students, faculty and staff have registered to use the Blackboard Connect emergency notification system or the City College Safety App.
- + Campus officials consider the Blackboard Connect system cumbersome and difficult to use for emergency notifications.
- + LASD CCB personnel has not conducted recent emergency drills or exercises prior to or during the COVID-19 pandemic for campus personnel. When exercises were held, LASD CCB conducted verbal debriefs after drills and exercises. However, they have not issued written after-action reports for college officials that they can use to update emergency plans or create future training sessions.
- + LACD CCB and LACCD should coordinate to provide regularly scheduled training for students and staff on campus.
- + Pierce administration and the LASD CCB officers do not have a formal emergency planning committee to integrate the Pierce and LASD CCB emergency plans, annual updates, plan dissemination, drill and exercise after-action reports, and make changes or upgrades to the emergency notification systems or equipment.
- + The LASD CCB and Pierce officials have not developed a formal plan to address the issues the homeless individuals pose to the campus. This includes the mental health issues this community often experiences and the impact they might have on students, faculty and staff.
- + The Emergency Procedures Checklist does not address wildfires.



Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

LASD CCB officers must conduct continuous patrols to ensure the campus is secure. Station personnel also perform additional duties, such as locking and unlocking doors, traffic control, and providing directions and general information to students and visitors. However, these additional duties take them away from their main campus policing duties.

LASD CCB security officers are the backbone of the LASD CCB station. They generally have more experience on the campus and perform much of the work of the station. The security officers are not sworn law enforcement officers, but they are armed and must pass an entrance exam, a background investigation and attend a five-week training academy before they receive their post. They assist the deputies in securing the campus and can address most issues independently. However, when someone commits a crime, they contact the on-duty deputy, who responds immediately.

The Student Cadets also serve as additional eyes and ears on campus and help open and close buildings. They do not receive any special training before receiving their assignments. Additionally, college administration limits their work hours to 24 hours per week. They can perform some minor duties at the station, but the officers cannot rely on them as a stable workforce. Additionally, they generally do not spend more than two years working at the station.

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers conduct patrols, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:

- + **Team Leader:** Flexes schedule according to operational needs
- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Two security officers

We noted the following concerns regarding the security force:

- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.
- + The college employs the Student Cadets and assigns them to the station as they are available.



- + The college employs the Senior Office Assistant (SOA) and assigns them to the station to supervise the Cadets. The SOA also serves as a liaison between administration and the LASD CCB officers.
- + The LASD CCB office does not have a designated dispatcher. The SOA, Cadets and LASD CCB personnel share these responsibilities. During the overnight shift (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.) only two security officers are on patrol, and they forward station calls to their cell phones. However, they cannot forward the alarms from the on-campus emergency phones, which announce in the station.
- + Because of the suspension of the HEAT program, deputies now respond to calls for service for mental health-related issues.
- + LASD CCB station personnel train regularly according to their department's policies.
- + The LASD CCB personnel provide training for students, faculty and staff when requested, but they do not have formal regularly scheduled security training.
- + The open campus has limited perimeter fencing, which allows anyone to walk on campus.
- + The open grassy areas of campus present a fire concern.
- + The college frequently hosts sporting and special events, such as movie shoots. During recent fires, displaced persons and animals were boarded on campus. These activities significantly increase campus traffic.
- + LASD CCB personnel stated that many employees do not turn in keys and access cards upon termination, which makes the facilities more vulnerable to unauthorized access.



Movie shoot basecamp in Equestrian parking lot

During the site visit, we encountered students and staff and did not witness animosity toward armed LASD CCB personnel. Everyone seemed comfortable interacting with LASD CCB personnel. Further, college officials told us that having a professional armed police force on campus is an asset to campus security. However, we also learned that some campus officials would like LASD CCB to have a less visible presence on campus and only arm themselves with firearms for certain emergency response actions, such as an active assailant.

LASD CCB Team Leader reports he has a good relationship with the college administration, and that they listen to his input on security matters.



Physical Security

We noted the following physical vulnerabilities:

- + The college has an open campus with limited perimeter fencing. The campus is large and includes open fields.
- + The campus is vulnerable to vehicle-borne attacks. There are several areas on campus that would allow a vehicle to easily access pedestrian areas and buildings.
- + Lighting across the campus is inadequate.
- + The campus has a sufficient number of emergency call boxes. However, they need to be maintained.
- + The campus does not have a PA system that connects to all buildings and parking areas.



Perimeter fencing



Vehicle access to campus

Security Technology

Below we summarize the security technology system gaps on the campus:

- + The campus has minimal VSS capacity throughout the 426 acres. LACCD is updating the older analog cameras to Sony and Pelco Internet Protocol (IP) cameras as part of the security technology improvement program. This upgrade is important for Pierce's security; at least seven cameras point toward the ground and do not provide situational awareness for LASD CCB or Facilities Department personnel.
- + Although there are cameras that monitor the stadium field, none of the cameras capture the entry or exit points. Some described the camera views as "worthless" because the cameras do not work or they point in wrong direction (e.g., toward a wall).
- + During the LACCD camera system update, the Facilities Department personnel lost their ability to remotely monitor the cameras.
- + The security camera monitors were not working at the time of the assessment. The monitors had been down for a couple of days while the LACCD upgraded the system, while additional cameras were added to the system, which LASD CCB officers told us were needed for adequate coverage.
- + LASD CCB personnel informed us that none of the cameras have a license plate reader functionality.
- + Some campus buildings have IDS, but the LASD CCB station does not have an IDS workstation. An off-campus company monitors the system and notifies LASD CCB of alarms.



Security camera monitors



- + Some campus buildings have a Lenel ACS, but most do not. The LASD CCB officers informed us that possibly one or two campus buildings have an ACS.
- + The ACS is monitored in Facilities Department, not LASD CCB.
- + LASD CCB has hard keys for all doors on campus. The Facilities Department personnel distributes the keys and maintains records.
- + The LASD CCB station does not have a fire panel.

Community Perspectives

- + Participants are generally satisfied with and supportive of the LASD CCB. However, we heard isolated comments about poor relationships and interaction with the LASD CCB, including negative interactions with students with undocumented residency.
- + Participants encouraged more community-oriented policing.
- + Participants would like the officers to take more trainings on de-escalation techniques.
- + Participants said it is important that officers complete mental health crisis response and de-escalation trainings. Some participants had concerns about officers escalating certain situations.
- + Participants stressed their desire for the campus to more heavily rely on a civilian response group. They also expressed support for HEAT program, as well as concerns about the LASD CCB personnel not working with the campus Be Safe team that responds to mental health crises in lieu of the HEAT program.
- + Most participants stated they felt safer with armed officers on campus.
- + Participants want more patrols throughout the day and night and especially during night classes. They stated they do not see as many security personnel patrolling when night classes let out.
- + Homelessness is a concern.
- + LASD CCB parking enforcement is a concern, particularly for a student receiving a parking ticket.
- + Participants state they would like a greater focus on emergency response training for the campus community and a better alert system.
- + Participants reported some emergency phones do not work, the lighting is insufficient throughout the campus, and cell reception is poor throughout the campus.
- + Participants have concerns about the abundance of glass doors and its impact on their safety during an active assailant incident.



Recommendations

Los Angeles Pierce College	
1.8.1	Replace the analog cameras with digital surveillance cameras. Ensure camera views provide coverage of entrance and exit points and that they do not point toward the ground or walls.
1.8.2	Upgrade the Lenel access control systems (ACSs). At a minimum, all campus buildings should have access control readers on exterior building doors. Connect the buildings' exterior doors to an automatic locking system that the LASD CCB or Facilities Department personnel can activate from workstations in their offices.
1.8.3	Update the LASD CCB and Pierce emergency plans. Develop a series of threat prevention trainings and exercises for students, faculty and staff.
1.8.4	<p>Conduct a VSS audit or blind spot study of the campus. Use the 2019 ELAC Security Assessment and Physical Security Campus Drawings to help inform the study. Identify buildings and other locations that need motion detection video surveillance cameras, including areas with high crime rates, such as the west and south campus areas, Industry Technology building, Veterinary Technical building, southeast corner of the library's exterior, Media Center, Pierce Village, stadium exterior, Field House, horticulture building and southeast areas of the campus near Winnetka Avenue.</p> <p>During the study, inspect existing cameras to ensure they are not on the NDAA banned video surveillance camera list, which includes the following Chinese companies: Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE and Hytera Communications. If the campus has cameras from these companies, remove and replace them with cameras that are consistent with NDAA requirements.</p>
1.8.5	Install new lighting throughout the entire campus, especially near access points where homeless individuals often break into buildings or use fires to cook in open fields on campus.
1.8.6	Conduct an intrusion detection system (IDS) audit to verify the functionality of the systems in every campus building. Install an IDS monitoring system in the LASD CCB station so personnel can monitor unauthorized entry or occupation of campus facilities.
1.8.7	Enclose the campus with a gate or fence and install an audible alarm. This will help alleviate unwanted intrusions on campus, especially in the evening.
1.8.8	Continue scheduling regular joint training with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD).
1.8.9	Install more emergency call boxes throughout the campus.



9. Los Angeles Southwest College

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview¹³

The LASD CCB reports that from 2016 to 2020, 156 criminal offenses occurred on the Los Angeles Southwest College (LASW) campus, averaging 31 crimes per year. These crimes represent 6.10 percent of crimes committed on all nine LACCD campuses. Los Angeles Southwest College had the sixth highest overall crime rate and experienced the most non-aggravated assaults across all LACCD campuses.

Below, we list the most common crimes committed during the last five years.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant Incident
- + Gang Violence

Table 8: Most Common Crimes between 2016 and 2020 at Southwest College

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Petty Theft	50
Non-Aggravated Assault	29
Vandalism/Property Destruction	15
Sexual Offense, Misdemeanor	9
Motor Vehicle Burglary	8
Felonies, Miscellaneous	7
Grand Theft	5
Disorderly Conduct	5
Locker Burglary	4
Sexual Offense, Felonies	3
Aggravated Assault	3
Grand Theft Auto	3
Burglary	3

¹³ Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Community College Bureau All Campus – Total 2016 – 2020 Crime Stats Report



During this time, there were no weapon law violations (e.g., carrying, possessing).

In 2019, non-aggravated assault, petty theft and vandalism were the most prevalent crimes on campus. In 2020, non-aggravated assaults decreased 100 percent (0 cases), petty thefts decreased 78 percent (nine incidents in 2019 to two in 2020), and acts of vandalism decreased 83 percent (six incidents in 2019 to one in 2020). Overall, crime has decreased 85 percent from 2019 to 2020. It is important to note that during this time, LACCD had suspended nearly all on-campus instruction and services.

Recent Incidents

The LASD CCB and campus administrative personnel noted the following recent incidents at LASW:

- + There was an incident of sexual battery during which a female student was groped.
- + There have been thefts of bicycles, cell phones and laptops, vending machines, tools from the woodshop and batteries and machine parts from buildings.
- + Homeless individuals have trespassed on campus.
- + A nursing student was mugged and had her purse stolen outside of the campus wall.
- + A student attending the high school on campus was mugged and their cell phone was stolen.
- + The LASD CCB attributes much of the theft and vandalism to homeless individuals who trespass on campus.

Despite the gang violence and crime that occurs just off campus, those we interviewed believe the campus is safe, and violent crime is rare.

Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined there is a high rate of crime in the neighborhood surrounding the campus and that gang violence and crimes involving individuals experiencing homelessness are the biggest concerns off campus. Additionally, neighborhood gang activity has directly impacted the campus.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 1.8-mile radius of the LASW campus is 4.56 times higher than the national average, 3.71 times higher than the state average and 2.81 times higher than the county average.

Areas within 0.9 to 1.8 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **Northwest:** 0.44 less to 4.50 times the national average
-



- + **Northeast:** 0.80 less to 7.21 times the national average
- + **Southwest:** 0.43 to 1.13 times the national average
- + **Southeast:** 0.58 less to 7.44 times the national average

CRIMECAST projects the national crime average for this area will drop slightly to 4.34 by 2026. The most frequent crimes occurring around the campus include the following:

- + Aggravated Assault
- + Crimes Against Persons
- + Motor Vehicle Theft
- + Robbery
- + Homicide

Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood around the campus experiences a high rate of crime. The significant gang activity and a large population of homeless individuals surrounding the campus who contribute to on campus crimes. The biggest security concerns are gang violence; thefts; and homeless individuals trespassing, stealing, interfering with students, and vandalizing property. The LASD CCB officers conduct regular vehicle, bike and foot patrols on campus, which serve as a visual deterrent to criminals. During the patrols, they check known areas where homeless individuals enter the campus and linger. The LASD CCB should conduct continuous patrols to ensure the campus is secure.

During our site assessment and interviews with LASD CCB and campus officials, we learned there is gang activity in areas that surround the campus. Approximately 10 years ago, a gang shooting outside of campus resulted in victims running onto campus. Gang members shot at the fleeing victims, but no one on campus was injured. Since then, LASD CCB officials erected a fence around the campus, and there have not been additional shootings on LASW property.

LASD CCB and campus officials stated that LASD CCB officials' outreach efforts with the gangs in the immediate area has helped decrease crime on campus. The LASD CCB strives to treat students who are in gangs with respect. Their unofficial shared motto is "Treat with respect, get respect." LASD CCB and campus officials state that the LASD CCB officials and the gang members have mutual respect. As a result, gang violence has not further disrupted campus life.

We also learned that more homeless individuals have trespassed on campus this year than in years past. LASD CCB officers informed us that there are 10 times more homeless individuals on campus since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. LASD CCB officials report that this has increased their concerns about crimes committed by homeless individuals on campus.



There is an encampment of homeless individuals underneath the freeway south of the campus, which contributes to the increased trespassing. Homeless individuals cut through the campus fence. Some have broken into buildings for shelter or to steal LASW property. They have stolen tools from the woodshop, batteries, machine parts and food from vending machines.

Terrorism

The number one on-campus terrorism concern for LASD CCB and college administrative officials is an active assailant attack or mass attack involving firearms. Other terrorism threats include VBIED attacks, IED attacks, CBRNE attacks and hostile vehicles.

Like other colleges across the country, LASW is susceptible to bomb threats from students who want to avoid taking an exam or who want to cause general disruption. However, LASW has not received a bomb threat.

The LASW might become more susceptible to a terrorist attack when the campus hosts sporting events, theatre shows and high school graduations. If these events attract significant media attention, they could entice a lone wolf, domestic extremist group or homegrown violent extremist group that supports a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). The threat of such an attack is low, but the LASD CCB and college officials should evaluate the risk when hosting external entities on campus. Certain community groups could be targets, which could indirectly impact the campus, students, faculty and staff.

In addition, a disgruntled employee or client of the Child Development Center (CDC), or an individual suffering from a mental health crisis who accesses the campus, could engage in an active assailant attack that negatively impacts students, faculty or staff.

We do not currently consider LASW a terrorist target at this time. LASD CCB officials report that there are not any credible terrorism threats against the college, students, faculty or staff.

Like the other LACCD campuses, LASW administration and LASD CCB do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks from students, faculty and staff. The suspension of the HEAT program significantly reduced LASW's ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats.

The LASW campus has a passive insider threat system. For example, when a faculty member sends the LASD CCB a suspicious or threatening email or social media post from a student or former student, LASD CCB personnel investigate it. LASD CCB and college personnel do not engage in general social media research for potential threats to the campus. Because the LASW does not have an insider threat program, and because students, faculty and staff could have insider knowledge about which campus buildings are vulnerable, LASW is more vulnerable to an insider active assailant attack, mass attack, IED, sabotage, or kidnapping or hostage events.



Emergency Preparedness and Response

As part of the high-level threat and vulnerability assessment, we reviewed available emergency management plans posted on the LASW website and interviewed LASD CCB and college administrative officials regarding the plan.

During our site visit, we reviewed the Emergency Procedures Manual in the LASD CCB station. We found the manual to be outdated and the LASB CCB officers we spoke with were not familiar with it. However, we learned that LASD CCB personnel and college administration understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster.

LASW and the LASD CCB have separate internal emergency response plans. We recommend integrating these plans, policies and procedures and customizing them for the buildings and campus. The plan should describe how they can leverage and coordinate internal (e.g., VSS) and external resources, should provide details on key response actions for all likely threats and hazards, and provide a potential response timeline. The document should also state the expected flow of communication and alerts using different platforms, such as the Blackboard Connect Emergency Notification System, Safety App and speakerphone announcements.

Emergency Preparedness

LASW's emergency preparedness strengths include the following:

- + LASW has an Incident Management Team (IMT). The college president or their designee serves as the lead decisionmaker. Other IMT members include:
 - All Vice Presidents
 - Facilities Director
 - Mental Health Dean
- + LASD CCB is part of the IMT. If an event occurs, the LASD CCB Team Leader or their designee notifies the campus emergency management team (EMT).
- + In an emergency, the campus IMT sends email blasts to students and faculty. The LASW Public Information Officer (PIO) sends blast to students and administration.
- + The College President sends a mass text to students to inform them of a campus lockdown.
- + The college uses the Blackboard mass notification application to disseminate emergency information.
- + The LASD CCB is the lead agency during an active assailant attack and other emergency incidents. LASD CCB officers notify the LASW president, IMT and administrative leadership of incidents when possible.
- + If necessary, LASD CCB officials request additional resources to assist with emergency response during incidents such as an active assailant attack.




- + LASW is the only LACCD campus with a separate LASD CCB vehicle patrol. This group posts at the LASD CCB Southwest Station, which is one block from campus.
- + The LASW website has the active assailant “Run, Hide, Fight” video; a link to the LACCD Emergency Response Plan; and emergency checklists.
 - The emergency checklists address the following threats and hazards: active assailant, bomb threats, civil disturbance, earthquake, floods, hazardous conditions, public health incidents, structural fires, terrorist activity and power failures.
- + The Vice President of Services ensures the entire administrative team completes Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) online emergency training classes (e.g., ICS 100-200, NIMS 700 & 800).
- + The LASD CCB officers train regularly according to the LASD CCB policies, specifically in active assailant response.
- + Professors invite the LASD CCB Team Leader to their classrooms to give a security and safety briefing, The Team Leader has presented in 30 classes in last two years.
- + IMT members review general security and active assailant response.
- + Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the LACCD Safety and Emergency Services manager coordinated campus-wide training with LASD CCB. However, we were not advised of a regular training schedule to address security related topics including active assailant response at Southwest.
- + LASD CCB officials and the LASW President invite the LAPD, LAPD-SWAT and LAFD to tour the campus and utilize the campus for LASD CCB training sessions (e.g., use the LASW pool for training).
- + LASD CCB officials test radio communication with LAPD Hawthorne and Englewood stations to ensure interoperability.
- + The LASD CCB officials create after-action reports to update their emergency plans and create future training modules. They also share the after-action reports with the LASW President and Vice Presidents.
- + The LASD CCB station has access to the LASD bomb squad and the canine explosive detection teams. The LASD CCB Team Leader obtains permission from the LASW President or their designee before disseminating the teams on campus to assist with investigations or emergency response.



Emergency Preparedness Equipment

Below is a list of LASW's emergency preparedness-related equipment:

- + Campus buildings have panic alarms in public areas but not in classrooms. The LASD CCB officers test them regularly, which is a best practice.
- + The panic alarms and phones report directly to the LASD CCB station.
- + The emergency phones are placed in the parking structures, parking areas and on sidewalks across the campus.
- + The LASD CCB office and the Facilities Department offices have Simplex fire alarm workstations.



Simplex Workstation


Opportunities for Improvement

Although we noted many strengths of LASW's emergency management program, we identified some areas for improvement:

- + The campus has an automatic lockdown system through one of the Software House ACSs. However, not all campus building doors connect to it.
- + A 2019 LACCD Security Assessment notes that the LASD CCB can automatically lockdown certain buildings on the LASW campus. However, the LASD CCB informed us it does not have access to the Software House or Lenel OnGuard Enterprise System.
- + Only some classroom doors can be locked from the inside.
- + We could not determine how often LASD CCB personnel, college administration and faculty run drills on locking interior doors or how well faculty and staff understand to quickly lock these doors during emergencies.
- + The LASW website does not provide information on campus evacuation zones and assembly areas.
- + The LASD CCB does not know how many students, faculty and staff are registered to use the Blackboard Connect emergency notification system or the LASW Safety App.
- + LASD CCB Southwest officers are not familiar enough with the campus and often need directions.
 - The LASD CCB Team Leader trained the Southwest Sergeant and provided maps in the station.
- + The Emergency Procedures Manual in the station is outdated, and LASD CCB personnel are not familiar with it. LASD CCB personnel know what to do in the event of an emergency.



- + LASW administration and the LASD CCB personnel do not have a formal emergency planning committee to integrate the organizations' emergency plans, annual updates, plan dissemination, drill and exercise after-action reports, and changes or upgrades to the emergency notification systems or equipment.
- + The LASD CCB and LASW officials should develop a formal written plan to address the issues associated with the growing population of homeless individuals who live near the campus.



Emergency procedures

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

LASD CCB officers need to conduct continuous patrols to secure the campus. LASD CCB personnel perform additional duties, such as locking and unlocking doors, traffic control, and providing directions and general information to students and visitors. However, these additional duties take them away from their main campus policing duties.

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers conduct patrols, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires.

Since December 2020, the LASD CCB has eliminated one security officer position. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:


- + **Team Leader:** Flexes their schedule according to operational needs.
- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Two security officers

We noted the following concerns regarding the LASW security force:

- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.



- + The college employs the Student Cadets and assigns them to the station when the Student Cadets are available.
- + The college employs the Senior Office Assistant (SOA), who they assign to the LASD CCB station to supervise the Student Cadets and to serve as an administrative liaison between the station and the college.
- + The LASD CCB office does not have a designated dispatcher. The SOA, Cadets and LASD CCB personnel share these responsibilities. During the overnight shift (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.) only two security officers are on patrol, and they forward station calls to their cell phones. However, they cannot forward the alarms from the on-campus emergency phones, which announce in the station.
- + LASD CCB and campus officials informed us that the suspension the HEAT program is a significant deficit. Previously, LASD CCB personnel worked with the HEAT mental health clinicians to provide effective assistance to students experiencing mental health crises. The deputies now respond to these calls without mental health clinicians. Instead, they rely on a countywide mental health evaluation team, but this resource has limited availability and has slow response times.
- + There are two high schools on the campus; Middle College High School is part of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and under its jurisdiction, and Bright Star Academy is a charter school. The LASD CCB station responds to incidents at both schools. Incidents are considered minor and include petty theft, fighting and mental health issues. The LASD CCB station notifies LAUSD when there is an incident at Middle College School. The school faculty and staff call the LASD CCB station directly when they need support.
- + Some classrooms are on the West Campus, which does not have sufficient parking and is inaccessible from the main campus. Students must park at the main campus and walk approximately one block outside the campus perimeter fence to the West Campus, which exposes them to off-campus crime threats.



Sidewalk to West Campus classrooms

The neighborhood around the campus has a high rate of crime, considerable gang activity and a large population of individuals experiencing homelessness. The biggest security concerns are neighborhood crime coming onto campus and homeless individuals trespassing, interfering with students and vandalizing property. The station conducts regular foot, golf cart and vehicle patrols, which serve as a visual deterrent to criminals. During their patrols, they check areas where homeless individuals often enter campus and linger.

LASD CCB security officers are the backbone of the LASD CCB station. They generally have more experience on the campus, and they perform much of the work of the station. Security officers are not sworn law enforcement officers, but they are armed, and they must pass an entrance exam, a background investigation and attend a five-week training academy before they receive their post. The



security officers assist the deputies in securing the campus. They handle most issues independently, but when someone commits a crime, they contact the on-duty deputy who responds immediately.

The Student Cadets serve as additional eyes and ears on campus, and they help open and close buildings and fulfil minor duties at the station. They do not receive any special training before receiving their assignments, and the college limits their work hours to 24 hours per week. Additionally, they rarely work at the LASD CCB station for more than two years. As such, the officers cannot rely on them as a stable workforce.

We did not witness animosity toward armed LASD CCB personnel during our visit. The LASW president joined our campus walking tour and was complimentary of the LASD CCB officers. She expressed her desire to keep them on campus.

Due to the high crime rate in the neighborhood and the population of homeless individuals in the area, the campus needs to ensure the presence of highly visible armed law enforcement personnel. Deputies can respond to criminal activity or other incidents with the training, experience and authority to resolve the issue. They can also respond outside the campus gate as needed, which provides additional security to the campus.

However, LASW officials would like to increase the number of positive interactions between LASD CCB personnel and the students. Some students do not trust the LASD CCB and other law enforcement agencies due to their previous negative experiences. LASW officials believe additional outreach programs that build relationships and mutual respect will enhance the campus security program. They told us it is important that the LASD CCB workforce is as diverse as the student body.

Physical Security

We noted the following physical security vulnerabilities:

- + A seven-foot gate protects the north, east and west sides of the campus. The south side of the campus has a chain-link fence that homeless individuals frequently breach.
- + The campus is vulnerable to vehicle-borne attacks. There are several areas on campus that would allow a vehicle to easily access pedestrian areas and buildings.
- + Facilities and other departments do not share their delivery schedules with the LASD CCB.
- + Lighting and emergency call boxes on campus are adequate.



Vehicle Access to Campus

Security Technology

Below we summarize the security technology system gaps on the campus:



- + Some of the campus security systems are insufficient and ineffective. As noted in a 2019 LASW draft Security Assessment report, all campus buildings have an installed IDS. However, while on campus, we learned the system does not function properly in any of the buildings, which could allow a bad actor to enter and remain undetected in campus buildings after hours.
- + Camera coverage is limited, and some of the monitors did not work during our assessment. This makes it difficult to assess situational awareness. The LASD CCB personnel estimate that the analog and digital cameras capture 40 to 50 percent of campus.
- + The door hardware is not always maintained properly, which could allow someone to trespass and enter campus buildings. The Team Leader told us that Facilities Department personnel are responsive, but budget and staffing shortages can delay repairs.
- + The LASD CCB station does not have a budget for improving or repairing campus security systems, and, therefore, the LASD CCB station depends on college to improve and repair security systems. The LASW LASD CCB Team Leader communicates his concerns to the college administration. However, they do not have regular meetings to discuss security concerns.
- + The campus has two video management software systems (NiceVision and NetworkClient). The analog cameras are old and have low resolution.
- + The campus needs more cameras for adequate coverage. This is especially the case for the quadrangle and the section of the campus closest to the freeway.
- + At the time of the assessment, the camera monitors in the LASD CCB station did not work. LACCD is in the process of upgrading the VSS.
- + The campus has an IDS, but it is not integrated into the LASD CCB station. The IDS does not have audible alarms that alert LASD CCB to an intrusion.
- + The campus buildings have panic alarms in public areas but not in classrooms. The panic alarms report directly to the LASD CCB station. Phones directly contact the LASD CCB station.
- + The campus has two electronic ACSs; the Lenel OnGuard Enterprise ACS is installed on recently renovated or new construction buildings, while the C-Cure system is found on many of the existing doors from older installations. The 2019 Security Assessment Draft Report also states that some buildings use the Software House ACS.
- + Approximately 905 of the doors on campus have ACS installed. However, not all of the doors in the campus buildings are ACS controlled. Most building exterior doors require a hard key. The LASD CCB station does not have visibility on either ACS system.
- + Not all employees can access the buildings with the ACS, so the officers must let them in. All exterior doors can be secured with a hard key.



Inoperative Security Camera Monitors



Community Perspectives

We noted the following perspectives and themes during our interactions with campus stakeholders:

- + Most participants are satisfied with and support the LASD CCB officers. We heard many positive comments about the working relationships they have with faculty and staff.
- + Participants value the community-oriented policing approach. One participant commented that the LASD CCB is under investigation for a civil rights violation.
- + Many commented on the increase of incidents on campus when media reported LASD CCB would be leaving the campuses.
- + Participants advised that LASD CCB handle situations with individuals well.
- + Participants find the LASD CCB officers well trained and responsive.
- + Participants stated they wanted armed officers on campus.
- + Response to mental health crises is a priority for participants who valued the HEAT program.
- + The southwest neighborhood has a high rate of gang activity and crime. Participants told us the LASD CCB makes them feel safe, but they want more visible patrols throughout the day and night, and especially during night classes.
- + The community of homeless individuals who live near campus is a concern for the participants who have observed trespassing and property damage on campus.
- + Participants would like to have more direct ways to contact LASD CCB officers, such as more panic alarms installed around campus.
- + Participants requested better communication with and from LASD CCB on security issues.
- + Participants reported poor lighting and accessibility to rooms as concerns.
- + Participants noted some analog and inoperable cameras have been upgraded.

Recommendations

Los Angeles Southwest College

- | | |
|-------|---|
| 1.9.1 | Merge the video surveillance software systems into one system. Replace the analog cameras with digital surveillance cameras. |
| 1.9.2 | Integrate the Lenel OnGuard Enterprise, C-CURE and Software House access control systems (ACSs) into one system. Install access control readers at all exterior building doors. Connect all exterior doors to an automatic locking system that the LASD CCB officers and Facilities Department personnel can activate from the workstations in their offices. |



- | | |
|--------------|--|
| 1.9.3 | Update the LASD CCB and LASW College emergency plans, and incorporate information into a joint plan. The LASD CCB officers should work with LACCD to develop a series of regular threat prevention trainings and exercises for students, faculty and staff. |
| 1.9.4 | <p>Conduct a VSS audit or blind spot study of the campus. Use the 2019 ELAC Security Assessment and Physical Security Campus Drawings to help inform the study. Identify buildings and other locations that need motion detection video surveillance cameras, including areas with high crime rates, such as the quadrangle, portions of campus along the freeway, general parking (P3), Parking Structure 4 northwest exterior, football stadium's west bleachers, the Cox Annex exterior and Cox Little Theatre (south entrance) the CDC's northwest exterior and the Maintenance and Operations building's east exterior.</p> <p>During the study, inspect existing cameras to ensure they are not on the NDAA banned video surveillance camera list, which includes the following Chinese companies: Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE and Hytera Communications. If the campus has cameras from these companies, remove and replace them with cameras that are consistent with NDAA requirements.</p> |
| 1.9.5 | Conduct an intrusion detection system (IDS) audit and verify the system functionality in every campus building. Additionally, install an IDS monitoring system the LASD CCB office so are alerted to unauthorized entry or occupation. |
| 1.9.6 | Extend the gate around the entire campus. Replace the fence line with a gate or wall to prevent unwanted and unlawful intrusions. Install an audible alarm on the gate and fence to help prevent unwanted intrusions. |
| 1.9.7 | Continue scheduling regular joint trainings with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD). |
| 1.9.8 | Add more lighting on the north side of campus, and install more emergency call boxes throughout. |



10. Los Angeles Trade-Technical College

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview

LATTC is in the Historic South Central neighborhood of Los Angeles. The LASD CCB reported that from 2016 to 2020, 580 criminal offenses occurred on the Los Angeles Trade-Technical (LATTC) campus, averaging 116 crimes per year. The LASD CCB categorized these offenses into 25 types of crimes. These crimes represent 22.6 percent of crimes committed on all nine LACCD campuses.¹⁴ Crime in this area is a persistent challenge on the campus. LATTC had the highest overall crime rate and experienced the most petty thefts, vandalism, grand thefts and narcotics violations across all LACCD campuses.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Theft
- + Active Assailant
- + Mass Attack

Below, we list the most common crimes committed during the last five years.

Table 9: Most Common Crimes between 2016 and 2020 at Los Angeles Trade-Technical College

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Petty Theft	234
Vandalism	90
Grand Theft	47
Burglary	35
Vehicle Burglary	27
Non-Aggravated Assaults	23
Narcotics	23
Locker Burglary	21
Sex Offenses, Misdemeanor	13
Vehicle Offenses	13

¹⁴ Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, "Community College Bureau All Campus – Total 2016 – 2020 Crime Stats Report"



Overall crime decreased by 63 percent from 2020 to 2019 with a total of 30 criminal offenses in 2020. In 2019, petty theft, vandalism and grand theft were the most prevalent crimes on campus. In 2020, petty theft decreased by 85 percent (46 incidents in 2020 to seven incidents in 2019), vandalism by 27 percent (11 instances in 2019 to eight incidents in 2020) and grand theft by 50 percent (eight incidents in 2019 to four incidents in 2020). It is important to note that during this time, LACCD had suspended nearly all on-campus learning.

Recent Incidents

LASD CCB and campus administrative personnel noted the following recent incidents at LATTC:

- + An investigation of a trespassing offense at a campus building revealed the individual was a former student who was in possession of a set of LATTC keys stolen from a faculty member's desk.
- + Assaults and criminal offenses involving students and faculty as victims have occurred off campus.

The interviewees attributed much of the crime on campus to homeless individuals who trespass on campus, commit thefts and vandalize property.

Those we interviewed believe LATTC is a safe campus and noted violent crime is extremely rare. However, they expressed concerns crime outside the campus area.

Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined a high rate of crime occurs in the neighborhood surrounding the campus and that gang activity and crimes involving people experiencing homelessness are the biggest concerns off campus. However, gang activity in the neighborhood has not directly impacted the campus. The LASD CCB and LATTC administration encourages students and faculty to remain on campus due to the much higher risk of becoming a victim of crime off-campus.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data notes that the crime rate in a 1.3-mile radius around the campus is 7.13 times higher than the national average, 5.79 times higher than the state average and 4.39 times higher than the county average. The campus is in a neighborhood that is 6.64 times higher than the national average.

Areas within 0.8 to 1.3 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **North:** 1.36 to 13.24 times the national average
-



- + **East:** 5 to 7.74 times the national average
- + **South:** 2.79 to 6.29 times the national average
- + **West:** 1.19 to 4 times the national average

CRIMECAST projects the crime rate for this area to slightly decrease to 6.67 by 2026. The most frequent crimes occurring in this area around the campus include the following:

- + Robbery
- + Larceny
- + Motor Vehicle Theft
- + Crimes Against Property
- + Crimes Against Persons

Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood surrounding the campus is a densely populated urban area that experiences gang activity and has a large homeless population. Interviewees expressed concerns about criminal activity spilling onto campus grounds from the light rail station along West Washington on the north side of the campus. The train has a high potential for crime, which could impact the campus.



Metro stop

The biggest security concerns are thefts and homeless individuals trespassing, interfering with students and damaging property. The LASD CCB conducts regular patrols on campus to act as a visual deterrent and to check known areas where homeless people enter the campus and hide.

Through our site assessment and interviews with LASD CCB and campus officials, we learned gang activity occurs around the campus area. Although such activity has not occurred on campus, interviewees expressed concern of violence occurring on the campus.

The campus has experienced an increase in homeless people attempting to enter the campus. The LASD CCB reported that currently this occurs most during the overnight hours due to the lack of LASD CCB staffing. The LASD CCB advised that many homeless individuals ignore security officers but follow law enforcement officers' directions. This has caused issues with timely response because only security officers work overnight and they must call an LASD CCB deputy on patrol near the campus for assistance.



Terrorism

LASD CCB and LATTC officials' greatest terrorism concern is an active assailant attack or mass attack involving firearms on campus. Based on our assessment and interviews, we believe the terrorism threats that could impact the campus include VBIED attacks, IED attacks, CBRNE attacks and hostile vehicles.

Like other colleges, LATTC is susceptible to students making bomb threats for reasons including avoiding an exam or causing a disruption to campus life. However, City College has not received a bomb threat.

Although steel and iron fencing protect the campus, the lack of rated physical barriers at entrances to the campus increases its vulnerability to VBIED and hostile vehicle attacks.

Based on our discussion with the LASD and our research, we do not consider LATTC to be a terrorist target at this time. The LASD CCB noted the presence of a known white supremacy group near the campus, but it has not impacted the campus.

Similar to the other LACCD campuses, the LACCD and the LASD CCB do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks from students, faculty and staff at LATTC. The suspension of the HEAT program significantly reduces LATTC's ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats. The LASD CCB does not conduct social media monitoring.

Because LATTC does not have an insider threat program and students, faculty and staff could use their insider knowledge about which buildings do not have access control systems, functioning surveillance cameras, the location of toxic chemicals in the Science and Technology building's laboratories and flammable and combustible material storage areas on campus to plot and execute an attack. LATTC is most vulnerable to an insider attack that involves the following types of incidents: active assailant, mass attack, IED attack, sabotage, and kidnapping or hostage events.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

We reviewed available emergency management plans and interviewed LASD CCB and college administrative officials¹⁵ The LASD CCB and LATTC officials understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster, but they should update the emergency response plan (ERP) as part of a formal review process.

¹⁵ We requested copies of the LASD's and City College's emergency plans but have yet to receive them, so we reviewed the plans on the City College website.



Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of LATTC's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + LATTC has an emergency management team (EMT) and the college president, or their designee is the lead decision-maker.
- + The LASD is designated the lead agency during an active assailant attack and other emergency incidents. The LASD CCB issues emergency notifications, whenever possible, to the LATTC president, EMT and administrative leadership.
- + The LATTC website contains resources:
 - A campus emergency evacuation map with the assembly points for each campus building
 - An emergency response quick reference guide that addresses civil disturbances, crimes in progress, evacuating people with disabilities, chemical exposures, fires, emergency contact phone numbers, utility failure, bomb threats, earthquakes, and lockdown procedures
 - First aid procedures quick reference guide
- + The Emergency Evacuation Zones map denotes evacuation zones and assembly areas.
- + Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the LACCD Safety and Emergency Services manager facilitated active assailant training and drills conducted by LASD CCB.

Emergency Preparedness Equipment

Below is a list of LATTC's emergency preparedness-related equipment:

- + Panic buttons in the Child Development Center and the president's office alert in the LASD CCB station.
- + A sufficient number of blue emergency phones are located on campus, including in parking structures.
- + LATTC uses the Everbridge Nixle notification system to provide alerts and information to students, faculty and staff.
- + Students, faculty and staff can use the LACCD Safety App to contact the LASD CCB during an emergency, request virtual escorts from campus buildings to parking lots (i.e., staying on the phone with the student until they reach their destination), and access campus emergency plans and guidelines.
- + The LASD CCB station has hard key access to all buildings on campus. The Facilities Department distributes keys and maintains records of key distribution.
- + The President's office and the Child Development Center have panic alarms that report directly to the LASD CCB station.



- + A fire control panel alerts to the LASD CCB station. The Facilities Department also has an alarm panel.

Opportunities for Improvement

Although we noted many strengths of LATTC's emergency management program, we identified some areas for improvement:

- + Exterior doors connected to the access control system cannot be automatically locked down, in that they must be locked manually with a key.
- + The LASD CCB station does not have an access control workstation to monitor alarms or initiate lockdowns.
- + The LASD CCB is unaware of how many students, faculty and staff registered to use the Blackboard Connect emergency notification system, LATTC Safety App or Everbridge Nixle notification systems.
- + The LASD CCB and the LATTC do not have a formalized schedule to conduct emergency response drills or exercises, verbal debriefs or written after-action reports to update emergency plans or future training sessions.
- + LATTC and the LASD CCB do not have a formal emergency planning committee that oversees integration of their emergency plans, annual updates, plan dissemination, drills and exercises, after-action reports, or changes or upgrades to emergency notification systems or equipment.
- + The LASD CCB does not provide any formal training to faculty and students about security awareness and emergency response.

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology to augment staffing. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources and monitor CCTV surveillance cameras, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires. Since December 2020, the LASD has eliminated three LASD CCB security officer positions as part of its COVID-19 personnel curtailment plan. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:

- + **Team Leader:** Flexes their schedule according to operational needs.
- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** Two deputies and three security officers
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One deputy and three security officers
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Three security officers



We noted the following concerns regarding the LATTC security force:

- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors.
- + LATTC-employed Student Cadets are assigned to the station when available. A LATTC-employed Senior Office Assistant (SOA) supervises the Student Cadets at the station and serves as a liaison between the station and City College.
- + The LASD CCB station does not have an assigned dispatcher, so Student Cadets and LASD personnel share dispatching duties. The SOA does not perform dispatching duties. During the overnight shift (10 p.m. – 6 a.m.), a security officer must stay at the station to handle the dispatching responsibilities.
- + Due to the suspension of the HEAT program that previously addressed mental health concerns on campus, deputies must respond and try to resolve these issues themselves.
- + The campus hosts sporting and other special events. Sometimes the college will bring in additional security to support such events, but when it does not, there is some confusion regarding LASD CCB's responsibility to cover the event in addition to their regular responsibilities.
- + A Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) high school is on campus. The LASD CCB responds to incidents at the school. The incidents are generally minor and often include petty theft, fighting and mental health situations. However, this additional responsibility increases the demand on LASD CCB personnel's time.

Physical Security

We noted the following major physical security vulnerabilities:

- + Steel fencing encompasses the entire campus, protecting the campus perimeter. However, from 5 a.m. to 10 p.m., the gates are open, allowing easy access to the campus.
- + Some of the fencing is low and easy to climb over.
- + The campus is vulnerable to vehicle-borne attacks. Several vehicle entrances would allow a vehicle to access to the campus walkways and buildings.
- + Although most on-campus lighting is adequate, the north side of the campus needs more lighting.
- + Not all classrooms can be locked from the inside in the event of a shelter-in-place emergency.



Perimeter fencing



Vehicle access to campus



Security Technology

The LATTC's antiquated security technology system does not integrate with the LACCD on-campus systems. For example, the access control and video surveillance systems cannot instantly notify the LASD CCB officers monitoring these systems about unwanted or unlawful intrusions onto the campus or into campus buildings. The LASD CCB does not have a central monitoring station to monitor all access control, intrusion detection and video surveillance systems and alarms.



Camera on campus

We identified the following security technology system gaps:

- + Although the campus has several cameras, we learned through interviews that staff have requested video recordings, but they could not be retrieved.
- + According to the LACCD Security Assessment in 2019, the campus has several older analog cameras and two disparate video management systems. The assessment identified several locations where expanded exterior coverage throughout the campus would be beneficial.
- + No campus buildings have an IDS.
- + Approximately half of campus buildings have an ACS; however, two unique systems were used. Facilities Department personnel monitor the ACS, and the LASD does not have an ACS workstation or the ability to lockdown buildings remotely.



Fire control panel

Community Perspectives

We noted the following perspectives and themes during our interactions with campus stakeholders.

- + Overall, participants expressed their satisfaction with and support for the LASD CCB. We heard many positive comments about the relationships participants have built with officers and how officers assimilated into the campus community. However, participants noted that not all non-white individuals, particularly students, may feel the same.
- + Participants believe the LASD CCB is well-trained and responsive.
- + Participants expressed wanting officers to be armed and that civilian security officers, such as Student Cadets, should conduct building patrols and door openings.
- + Participants noted that mental health crisis response is a priority. They valued the HEAT program and the training that the LASD CCB offers.
- + They described the LATTC as a "safe bubble" in the neighborhood. Participants expressed concern about crime occurring around campus and that they would like more armed LASD CCB officers present at all times, specifically during night classes. Many noted they do not see as many security personnel patrolling when night classes let out.



- + Major concerns include issues involving homeless individuals trespassing, damaging and defacing property. Participants from the custodial and maintenance staff complained that they frequently encounter areas in which they suspect homeless individuals have defecated and urinated on the floors.
- + Participants would like the ability to contact the LASD CCB more easily.
- + Participants seek better communication with the LASD CCB on security-related matters.
- + Participants also noted the campus has poor lighting, cameras and fencing.

Recommendations

Los Angeles Trade Technical College

- 3.10.1** Update the AMAG access control systems and/or convert to the Lenel OnGuard Enterprise system. Install access control readers on all exterior building doors. Connect all buildings' exterior doors to an automatic locking system that personnel can activate from a workstation in the LASD CCB station and the Facilities Department office.
- 3.10.2** Leverage the results of the LATTC Security Assessment and Physical Security Campus Drawings from 2019 to conduct a video surveillance system audit (i.e., a blind spot study) of the campus.

Identify critical or high-crime locations to add motion-detection capable video surveillance cameras such as Sage Hall, the north side of Magnolia Hall, the west side of Oak Hall, Cedar Hall, Toyon Hall, Sequoia Hall, Laurel Gym and entrances along West 22nd Street.

Inspect all cameras to ensure they are not on the NDAA-banned video surveillance camera list, which includes Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE and Hytera Communications. If any of these companies' cameras are identified, remove and replace them with cameras that are consistent with NDAA requirements.
- 3.10.3** Schedule regular joint trainings for LASD CCB to work with the LAPD.
- 3.10.4** Install lighting on the Oak Hall rooftop parking area and in the south area of the campus.
- 3.10.5** Perform a functionality test of all campus emergency phones.



11. Los Angeles Valley College

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview¹⁶

Los Angeles Valley College (LAVC) is in the Valley Glen community. Crime in this residential area is relatively low. The LASD CCB reported that from 2016 to 2020, 282 criminal offenses occurred on campus, which averages 57 criminal offenses per year. The LASD CCB categorized these offenses into 20 types of crimes. These crimes represent 11 percent of crimes committed on all nine LACCD campuses. Valley College had the fourth highest overall crime rate and, along with East Los Angeles College, experienced the most robberies across all LACCD campuses.

Below we list the most common crimes committed during the last five years.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant
- + Theft

Table 10: Most Common Crimes between 2016 and 2020 at Los Angeles Valley College

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Petty Theft	57
Vandalism	55
Vehicle Laws	54
Burglary	28
Grand Theft	12
Vehicle Burglary	12
Non-Aggravated Assault	10
Grand Theft Auto	8
Narcotics	6
Misdemeanor Sex Offense	6

¹⁶ Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Community College Bureau All Campus – Total 2016 – 2020 Crime Stats Report



In 2019, petty theft, vandalism and vehicle violations were the most prevalent crimes on campus. In 2020, there was a 60 percent decrease in petty theft (five incidents in 2019 to two incidents in 2020), a 24 percent decrease in vandalism (21 incidents in 2019 to 16 incidents in 2020) and a 17 percent decrease in vehicle violations (seven incidents in 2019 to five incidents in 2020). However, burglary increased 133 percent (three incidents in 2019 to seven incidents in 2020). Overall crime decreased 16 percent from 2019 to 2020 with a total of 41 criminal offenses. It is important to note that during this time, LACCD had suspended nearly all on-campus instruction and services.

Recent Incidents

LASD CCB and campus administrative personnel noted the following recent incident:

- + Several computer and vehicle thefts occurred simultaneously approximately three years ago.

The individuals we interviewed believe the campus is safe and violent crime is rare.

Campus Neighborhood

Per our site assessment and interviews, crime in the neighborhood surrounding the campus is low. Crimes involving people experiencing homeless are the biggest concerns for the campus.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 1.7-mile radius around the campus is 1.66 times higher than the national average, 1.35 times higher than the state average and 1.02 times higher than the county average. The immediate campus area is rated below the national average.

Areas within 0.9 to 1.7 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **North:** 0.52 to 3.44 times the national average
- + **East:** 0.7 to 2.37 times the national average
- + **South:** 0.22 to 0.83 times the national average
- + **West:** 0.32 to 5.13 times the national average

CRIMECAST projects the national crime average for this area will decrease slightly to 1.63 by 2026. The most frequent crimes that occur around the campus include:

- + Motor Vehicle Theft
 - + Robbery
 - + Crimes Against Persons
 - + Larceny
 - + Aggravated Assault
-



Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood surrounding the campus is mainly residential. The Ulysses S. Grant High School is on the east side of the campus. The biggest security concerns for the campus include theft and members of the nearby community of homeless individuals trespassing on campus, interfering with students and damaging property. The area also has a history of higher rates of vehicles stolen from campus.

Although most of the surrounding area has low rates of crime, the area north of the campus has gang activity and violence. However, the gang activity has not occurred on campus. The LASD CCB station conducts regular patrols on campus, which serve as a visual deterrent. During the patrols, they check known areas where homeless individuals enter the campus and linger.

Terrorism

The top terrorism concern for LAVC LASD CCB and college administrative officials is an active assailant or mass attack involving firearms. Other terrorism threats include VBIED attacks, IED attacks, CBRNE attacks and hostile vehicles.

Similar to other colleges across the country, LAVC is susceptible to bomb threats from students who do not want to take an exam or who wish to cause general disruption to campus life. However, LAVC has not experienced a bomb threat.

The LAVC campus might be more prone to a terrorist attack because it hosts multiple community events. If these events attract significant media attention, they could entice a lone wolf, domestic extremist group or homegrown violent extremist group that supports a foreign terrorist organization. The threat of such an attack is low, but the LASD CCB and college officials should evaluate the risk when hosting external entities on campus. Certain community groups and religious organizations could be targets, which might indirectly impact the campus, students, faculty and staff.

The LAVC campus lacks physical barriers at multiple entry points, which makes the campus vulnerable to VBIED and hostile vehicle attacks.

Based on our discussion with LAVC LASD CCB officials and our own research, LAVC is not considered a terrorist target at this time. LASD CCB officials also report that there are not any credible terrorism threats against the college, students, faculty or staff.

However, the LACCD and LASD CCB do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks by students, faculty and staff. The suspension of the HEAT program significantly reduced the ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats.

The LAVC campus has a passive insider threat system. For example, when a faculty member sends the LASD CCB a suspicious or threatening email or social media post from a student or former



student, LASD CCB personnel investigate it. LASD CCB and college personnel do not engage in general social media research for potential threats to the campus. Because the LAVC does not have an insider threat program, and because students, faculty and staff could have insider knowledge about which campus buildings are vulnerable, LAVC is more vulnerable to an insider active assailant attack, mass attack, IED, sabotage, or kidnapping or hostage events.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

As part of this high-level threat and vulnerability assessment, we reviewed available emergency management plans and emergency information we found on the LAVC website. We interviewed LASD CCB and college administrative officials and examined emergency plans during our site visit.

We learned that the LASD CCB and college administrative officials understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster, and that LAVC has a comprehensive Emergency Response Plan (ERP). However, the LASD CCB has a separate ERP and was not aware LAVC had its own formalized ERP.

The LAVC ERP follows the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), a state-wide California system to aid in communication and multi-agency response, which uses the Incident Command System (ICS) as its basic framework. The ICS is a standardized organized command structure, which allows for a cooperative, multi-agency response, with entities within and outside of government. According to the LAVC ERP the Emergency Coordinator (EC) is the Vice President of Administrative Services or the Senior Administrator in Charge.

The LAVC ERP provides the requirements to activate the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). It also outlines the ICS command structure and provides detailed descriptions of the responsibilities for the following positions:

- + Command Staff
- + Logistics Chief
- + Operations Chief
- + Planning Chief
- + Finance Chief

Each position follows a checklist to ensure everyone understands their duties during an emergency. For emergency involving a criminal incident, such as an active assailant, the LASD CCB is the lead agency and provides emergency notification and information to the EOC.

Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of LAVC emergency preparedness strengths:

- + LAVC has a Crisis Action Team (CAT). The CAT assists with decisions at the beginning of an emergency before the EOC is activated.



- + The LASD CCB is the lead agency during an active assailant attack and other criminal emergencies. When possible, the LASD CCB officers will notify the EOC.
- + LAVC has a detailed ERP with a checklist of responsibilities for LAVC staff and LASD CCB officers. The ERP covers several emergency incidents, such as:
 - Active assailant
 - Bomb threats
 - Civil disturbance
 - Earthquake
 - Flood
 - Hazardous condition
 - Medical emergency
 - Power failure
 - Structural fire
 - Terrorist activity
- + The LAVC ERP includes evacuation maps, assembly areas, rosters and ICS reporting forms. It also includes organizational charts and a description of responsibilities, the chain of command and the span of control.
- + The LAVC website has detailed information that mirrors the LAVC ERP. Students, faculty, staff and the larger community can access the following from the website:
 - A campus emergency evacuation map with the assembly points for each campus building.
 - A downloadable emergency response pamphlet for students that includes guidelines for responding to earthquakes, fires, explosions, hazardous material spills, plane crashes, terrorist attacks and bomb threats.
 - Contact information for emergency services.
 - Detailed information on the LAVC ERP, EOC and ICS framework.
- + Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the LACCD Safety and Emergency Services manager coordinated with LASD CCB to conduct quarterly active assailant, CPR and fire evacuation trainings each semester that students and faculty are invited to attend.

Emergency Preparedness Equipment

Below is a list of LAVC's emergency preparedness-related equipment:

- + The Health Services Building and the Business offices each have a panic button that alerts in the LASD CCB office. However, LASD CCB officers and LAVC administration were unsure if the buttons function.
- + An adequate amount of emergency phones are on campus and in parking lots.



- + Students, faculty and staff can use the LACCD Safety App to contact the LASD CCB officers during an emergency, to request virtual escorts from campus buildings to parking lots, and to access campus emergency plans and guidelines.
- + The LAVC uses the Blackboard mass notification application to disseminate emergency information.

Opportunities for Improvement

Although we noted many strengths of LAVC's emergency management program, we identified some areas for improvement.

- + We found that the LASD CCB officials did not know that the LAVC administration has their own ERP manual. As such, the LASD CCB officers were not aware of where to access a copy of the LAVC ERP manual.
- + The LASD CCB office does not have workstation to monitor the access control systems (ACSs) on campus and to initiate lockdowns.
- + The LASD CCB officers cannot issue emergency notifications through the Blackboard Connect.
- + The LASD CCB officer do not know how many students, faculty and staff are registered to use the Blackboard Connect emergency notification system.
- + The LASD CCB and LAVC administration have separate EOCs.
- + LASD CCB and LAVC administration do not have a formalized schedule for emergency response drills or exercises. These drills and exercises should include verbal debriefs and written after-action reports that the LASD CCB team use to update emergency plans or create training sessions.
- + LAVC and the LASD CCB do not have a formal emergency planning committee to integrate their emergency response plans, annual updates, plan dissemination, drill or exercise after-action reports and to change or upgrade the emergency notification systems and equipment.
- + LASD CCB does not provide formal training for students, faculty and staff on security awareness and emergency response. However, they are invited to active assailant response training each semester.

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers conduct patrols and respond to calls for service, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch



resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires. The LASD CCB current staffing is as follows:

- + **Team Leader:** Flexes his schedule according to operational needs.
- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Two security officers

We noted the following concerns regarding the security force:

- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.
- + The college employs the Student Cadets and assigns them to the station when available.
- + The college employs the Senior Office Assistant (SOA) and assigns them to the station to supervise the Cadets. The SOA also serves as a liaison between administration and the LASD CCB officers.
- + The LASD CCB office does not have a designated dispatcher. The SOA, Cadets and LASD CCB personnel share these responsibilities. During the overnight shift (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.) only two security officers are on patrol, and they forward station calls to their cell phones. However, they cannot forward the alarms from the on-campus emergency phones, which annunciate in the station.
- + Due to the suspension of the HEAT program, which previously responded to mental health concerns on campus. deputies now respond to calls for service for these issues.
- + The campus hosts sporting and special events. The college administration brings in additional security to support some of these events but not all. Therefore, some confusion exists regarding on-duty LASD CCB personnel's responsibility to cover the special event in addition to their regular shift responsibilities.
- + The Ulysses S. Grant and Jack London High Schools are on the east side of the campus. The LASD CCB officers respond to incidents at the schools. The incidents are usually minor and typically include petty theft, fighting and mental health situations. Although minor, the calls add to the demand placed on the LASD CCB personnel.

Physical Security

We noted the following physical security vulnerabilities:



- + LAVC is an open campus and allows the community to use the campus. The sports field is the only area with a perimeter fence.
- + The campus is vulnerable to vehicle-borne attacks. There are several areas on campus that would allow a vehicle to easily access pedestrian areas and buildings.
- + Lighting around campus is poor. We learned that many areas need additional lighting.
- + The LASD CCB station has hard key access to all campus buildings. The LASD CCB officials track the keys issued to them by the Facilities Department but is unaware of who has other keys or how keys are managed at LAVC.




Unfenced Perimeter

Security Technology

Below we summarize the security technology system gaps on the campus:

- + The security technology system is antiquated and does not integrate with LACCD and on-campus systems. For example, the ACS and VSS are not integrated, which means they do not instantly alert the LASD CCB of unwanted or unlawful intrusions in campus buildings.
- + The LASD CCB station does not have a central monitoring station where officers can monitor all ACSs, IDSs and VSSs.
- + The campus needs additional cameras are needed to provide adequate coverage. LAVC added cameras inside buildings, but the LASD CCB station does not have access to all of them. The LASD CCB personnel estimate they can monitor 50 percent of the campus's camera coverage from the station.
- + Some of the campus buildings have an IDS that a third party monitors off site. The third party notifies the LASD CCB if an alarm activates. However, the LASD CCB station does not have an IDS workstation connected to these IDSs.
- + As mentioned, the Health Services building and the Business offices each have one panic alarm that alerts in the LASD CCB station. However, LASD CCB personnel were unsure if the alarms were functional.
- + About 25 percent of campus buildings have electronic ACSs. The LASD CCB station does not have an ACS workstation and cannot lockdown the buildings remotely.



Security Camera Monitor



Fire Panel



- + There is a fire panel in the LASD CCB station for fire alarm notification. The Facilities Department building also has a panel, which a third-party also monitors. In the event of an alarm, the third party notifies the LASD CCB station and dispatches the LAFD.

Community Perspectives

We noted the following perspectives and themes during our interactions with campus stakeholders.

- + Overall, participants are satisfied with and support the LASD CCB. We heard positive comments about the relationships the LASD CCB has built and how officers assimilated into the campus community. However, some noted that students of color may be uncomfortable by the officers' presence.
- + In general, participants prefer officers to be armed.
- + Mental health crisis response is a priority for participants, who also noted that they value the HEAT program but suggest a civilian counterpart assist.
- + Participants want more patrols at all times, particularly during night classes as they do not see as many security personnel patrolling when night classes let out.
- + Homelessness is a concern for participants, who noted that campus facilities staff remove bungalows where the homeless individuals seek shelter.
- + Participants advised that there is no way to close campus.
- + Participants would like an increased focus on emergency response procedures for the campus community.
- + Participants expressed that they would like increased communication from LASD on security-related matters and more clarity about the LASD CCB's roles and responsibilities.
- + Participants reported that the lighting and cameras are getting better and Facilities Department staff have addressed overgrown vegetation.

Recommendations

Los Angeles Valley College	
1.11.1	Ensure the LASD CCB is aware and involved in the LAVC emergency response plans that outline the mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery roles and responsibilities for campus staff and for external law enforcement and fire department agencies.
1.11.2	Ensure the LASD CCB is represented in the LAVC Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Ensure the EOC tracks and records emergency plan and policy dissemination; plan and policy updates; and scheduling of security and emergency response training, drills, and exercises.



- 1.11.3** Integrate the Lenel OnGuard Enterprise and Hirsch access control systems (ACSs) into one system. Install access control readers at all exterior building doors. Connect the campus buildings' exterior doors to an automatic locking system that personnel can activate from workstations in the LASD CCB station or the Facilities Department office.
- 1.11.4** Conduct a VSS audit or blind spot study of the campus. Use the 2019 ELAC Security Assessment and Physical Security Campus Drawings to help inform the study. Identify buildings and other locations that need motion detection video surveillance cameras, including areas with high crime rates, such as the Child Development Center, all parking lots and structures, Media Arts & Performing Arts Center, Theater Arts, Art, Maintenance & Operations, east and south side of the Library, west side of the Student Union, Business Technology, Administration & Career Advancement, Foreign Language, Humanities, Behavioral Science, Emergency Services Training, North Gym, South Gym, Math Science, Business & Journalism, Engineering, Student Services Annex, Sports Fields, and Community Services Center.

During the study, inspect existing cameras to ensure they are not on the NDAA banned video surveillance camera list, which includes the following Chinese companies: Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE and Hytera Communications. If the campus has cameras from these companies, remove and replace them with cameras that are consistent with NDAA requirements.
- 1.11.5** Perform a functionality test on the panic buttons in the Health Services building and the Business offices.
- 1.11.6** Schedule regular joint trainings with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).
- 1.11.7** Install additional lighting throughout the campus in areas of pedestrian travel.
- 1.11.8** Install additional emergency phones throughout the campus, focusing on pedestrian paths of travel.



12. West Los Angeles College

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview¹⁷

West LA College (WLAC) is in Culver City, a suburb of Los Angeles. The residential neighborhood has relatively low crime. The LASD CCB reported that from 2016 to 2020, 118 criminal offenses occurred on the WLAC campus. The LASD CCB categorized these offenses into 18 types of crimes. These crimes represent 4.6 percent of the crimes committed on all nine LACCD campuses. West Los Angeles College had the eighth highest overall crime rate and, along with East Los Angeles College, experienced the most forgeries across all LACCD campuses.

Below, we list the most common crimes committed during the last five years.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant Incident
- + Theft

Table 11: Most Common Crimes between 2016 and 2020 at WLAC

Crime Type	Number of Incidents
Petty Theft	37
Non-Aggravated Assault	20
Vandalism	14
Burglary	5
Grand Theft	5
Vehicle Offenses	5
Narcotics	4
Aggravated Assault	3
Vehicle Burglary	3
Sexual Offense, Misdemeanor	3

¹⁷ Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Community College Bureau All Campus – Total 2016 – 2020 Crime Stats Report



In 2019, larceny, petty theft, vandalism and non-aggravated assault were the most prevalent crimes on campus. In 2020, larcenies decreased by 86 percent (seven instances in 2019 to one instance in 2020); vandalism by 80 percent (five instances in 2019 to one instance in 2020); and non-aggravated assaults by 100 percent (five instances in 2019 to zero in 2020). There was a total of three criminal offenses in 2020, a decrease of 86 percent compared to 2019. It is important to note that during this time, LACCD had suspended nearly all on-campus instruction and services.

Recent Incidents

LASD CCB and campus administrative personnel attributed much of the crime on campus to homeless individuals who trespass on campus, commit thefts and vandalize property. Those we interviewed believe WLAC has a safe campus and noted violent crime is extremely rare.

Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined the crime rate in the neighborhood surrounding the campus is low. There is gang activity near the campus; however, we learned these gangs have not interfered with the campus and have not been a concern. Crimes involving homeless individuals are the campus' biggest concern.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 1.8-mile radius of the WLAC campus is 1.91 times higher than the national average, 1.55 times higher than the state average and 1.18 times higher than the county average. However, the immediate campus area is rated as 0.37 times lower than the national average.

Areas within one to two miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **Southwest:** 0.26 less to 4.44 times the national average
- + **Northwest:** 0.31 less to 5.22 times the national average
- + **Southeast:** Below the national average
- + **Northeast:** Below the national average

CRIMECAST projects the crime rate for this area will drop slightly to 1.82 times higher than the national average by 2026. The most frequent crimes occurring around the campus include the following:

- + Robbery
 - + Motor Vehicle Theft
 - + Homicide
-



- + Larceny
 - + Crimes Against Persons
-

Crime Threat Summary

The neighborhood surrounding the campus is mainly residential. The Las Cienegas Oil Field borders the west and east sides of the campus. The biggest security concerns are thefts and homeless individuals trespassing, interfering with students and damaging property. The LASD CCB conducts regular patrols on campus to act as a visual deterrent and to check known areas where homeless individuals often enter the campus.

WLAC has an open campus overall, but the perimeter has a chain-link fence. Typically, the vehicle and pedestrian gates are unsecured during the day and locked overnight. WLAC has reported incidents involving vandalism, theft and homeless individuals breaking into buildings.

WLAC uses the West College Annex Building at 9700 Sepulveda Boulevard for some Motion Picture & Television Production Crafts (MPTP) courses. The Annex Building is near Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), in a high-crime area with a large population of people experiencing homelessness. It is approximately five miles from the main campus with an approximate drive time of 20 minutes under normal traffic conditions. The Annex Building houses production props and equipment, mostly outside in the parking lot. A wrought iron fence surrounds the parking lot; however, the vehicle gates are open and allow pedestrian entry. LASD CCB personnel patrol the area but is not uncommon for individuals to steal items from the building.

Terrorism

LASD CCB and City College officials' greatest terrorism concern is an active assailant attack or mass attack involving firearms on campus. Based on our assessment and interviews, we believe the terrorism threats that could impact the campus include vehicle-borne improvised explosive device VBIED and IED attacks, CBRNE attacks and hostile vehicles.

Like other colleges, WLAC is susceptible to students making bomb threats for reasons including avoiding an exam or causing a disruption to campus life. However, WLAC has not received a bomb threat.

The WLAC campus may be prone to a terrorist attack because it hosts community events. If these events attract significant media attention, they could entice a lone wolf, domestic extremist group or homegrown violent extremist group supporting a foreign terrorist organization to plot and execute an attack. The threat of such an attack is low but the LASD CCB and WLAC officials should evaluate the risk when hosting external entities on campus.



Community groups and religious organizations could be targets, and an attack could indirectly and negatively impact the campus and its students, faculty and staff. WLAC's proximity to the La Cienegas Oil Field and Southern California Edison (SCE) La Cienega Substation could also negatively impact the campus should these locations be targeted by a terrorist group or individual. As a best practice, the LASD CCB is on the oil field's automated emergency contact list and has a copy of the La Cienegas Oil Field Emergency Response Plan.

Vehicle access to the campus is limited due to its location; however, the lack of physical barriers at entry points into the campus makes the campus vulnerable to VBIED and hostile vehicle attacks.

Based on our discussion with the LASD CCB and our research, we do not consider WLAC to be a terrorist target at this time. The LASD CCB reported no credible terrorism threats against the college, its students, faculty or staff.

As indicated, the LACCD and the LASD CCB do not have a formal insider threat program to identify, assess and mitigate potential terrorist attacks from students, faculty and staff at WLAC.


The suspension of the HEAT Program significantly reduces WLAC's ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats. Neither the LASD CCB nor WLAC engages in general social media research for potential threats to the campus. Because WLAC does not have an insider threat program, students, faculty and staff could use their insider knowledge about which buildings do not have access control systems, functioning video surveillance cameras, the location of toxic chemicals in the Science building's laboratories and flammable and combustible material storage areas on campus. WLAC is vulnerable to an insider attack for the following types of incidents: active assailant, mass attack, IED, sabotage, and kidnapping or hostage events.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

We reviewed available emergency management plans and interviewed LASD CCB and college administrative officials. We reviewed the plans on the WLAC website. The LASD CCB and WLAC officials understand their roles and responsibilities during an emergency or disaster, but they could further integrate their plans, policies and procedures to enhance WLAC's emergency preparedness and response capabilities.

For example, WLAC and the LASD CCB have their own internal emergency response plans. They should develop a customized joint plan that:

- + Incorporates the unique building and design aspects of the campus.
- + Describes how to leverage and coordinate internal (e.g., VSS) and external resources (e.g., LAPD, LAFD).



The La Cienegas Oil Field Emergency Response Plan



- + Details key response actions for all likely threats and hazards.
 - + Provides an intended response timeline and documents the expected flow of communications.
 - + Explains how to send alerts using mediums such as the Blackboard Connect Emergency Notification System, Safety App and phone announcements.
-

Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of WLAC's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + WLAC has an Emergency Management Team (EMT) and the college president or their designee is the lead decision-maker.
 - + The LASD CCB Team Leader is a member of the WLAC EMT
 - + The LASD CCB is designated the lead agency during an active assailant attack and other emergency incidents. The LASD CCB issues emergency notifications, whenever possible, to the WLAC president, EMT and administrative leadership.
 - + The WLAC website has the following resources for students, faculty and the larger community:
 - An evacuation map showing the rally points for the buildings on campus
 - A Campus Safety Guide for fire drill, evacuation and active assailant response.
 - Crime prevention tips related to identifying suspicious activity, personal safety and community programs like the neighborhood watch.
 - + The LACCD Safety and Emergency Services manager worked with LASD CCB to conduct active assailant drills before the COVID-19 pandemic.
 - + WLAC uses the Blackboard mass notification system and a campus-wide public address (PA) system to disseminate emergency information.
-

Emergency Preparedness Equipment

Below is a list of WLAC's emergency preparedness-related equipment:

- + Emergency call boxes are adequately placed around the campus and parking structures.
- + Students, faculty and staff can use the LACCD Safety App to contact the LASD CCB during an emergency, request virtual escorts from campus buildings to parking lots and access campus emergency plans and guidelines.



Opportunities for Improvement

Although we noted many strengths of WLAC's emergency management program, we identified some areas for improvement:

- + WLAC does not have a VSS, limiting the LASD CCB's visibility of the campus during a critical incident.
- + No campus buildings have an access control system (ACS) or the ability to initiate an automatic campus lockdown.
- + The LASD CCB does not have a formal schedule of emergency response drills and security awareness trainings with WLAC students and faculty.
- + The LASD CCB conducts verbal debriefs after drills and exercises but does not issue written after-action reports so they can update their emergency plans or training sessions.
- + The LASD CCB Emergency Procedure Manual is not up to date and personnel do not regularly review its policies.
- + The LASD CCB does not have regularly scheduled joint trainings with the Culver City Police Department.
- + The LASD CCB is unaware of how many students, faculty and staff are registered to use the Blackboard Connect emergency notification system or the WLAC Safety App.
- + WLAC and the LASD CCB do not have a formal emergency planning committee that oversees integration of WLAC and the LASD CCB's emergency plans, annual updates, plan dissemination, after-action reports for drills and exercises, and changes or upgrades to emergency notification systems or equipment.

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers respond to calls for service, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires. Records indicate the staffing at WLAC was not reduced in the curtailment staffing plan. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:

- + **Team Leader:** Flexes their schedule according to operational needs.
- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers



- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** One deputy and two security officers
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** Two security officers

We noted the following concerns regarding the WLAC security force:

- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.
- + WLAC-employed Student Cadets are assigned to the station when available. A WLAC-employed SOA supervises the Student Cadets at the station and serves as a liaison between the station and WLAC. However, the station does not have an SOA or Student Cadets. The Team Leader must contact the SOA at another college when he needs student information available only to college staff.
- + The LASD CCB station does not have an assigned dispatcher. Rather, LASD CCB personnel share dispatching duties as there are no Student Cadets or an SOA. On the overnight shift (10 p.m. – 6 a.m.) when two security officers are on patrol, they forward any station calls to their cell phones. Alarms from the on-campus emergency phones announce in the station and are not forwarded.
- + Deputies must now respond to and try to resolve mental health issues since the suspension of the HEAT program.
- + WLAC routinely leases parking spaces to other organizations. For example, a local church rents a parking lot for outdoor services. A production company rents a parking lot for participant parking for their special events. Sometimes WLAC brings in additional security to support these events; when it does not, there is some confusion regarding LASD CCB's responsibility to cover them.
- + LASD CCB personnel are pulled away from the WLAC main campus to patrol the Annex Building.

Physical Security

We noted the following physical security vulnerabilities:

- + The campus is protected by a chain link fence around the perimeter. The campus is considered open and access is unrestricted through the vehicle and pedestrian gates during the day; however, the gates are locked overnight.
- + The campus is vulnerable to vehicle-borne attacks. Several vehicle entrances would allow a vehicle to access to the campus walkways and buildings.
- + Lighting on the north side of campus is inadequate.



Pedestrian gate perimeter fence



Security Technology

Below we summarize the security technology system gaps on the WLAC campus:

- + LASD CCB personnel are unaware of any video surveillance cameras on the campus and do not have workstations or monitors at the station. However, according to the May 2019 LACCD CCB Security Assessment, the campus has several analog cameras in various buildings.
- + Because none of the buildings have an ACS, many keys are issued and tracked to ensure their accountability. Using keys to manually lock buildings presents a higher likelihood of unsecured buildings on campus due to human error. In addition, faculty, staff or LASD CCB officers may not have time to manually lock multiple doors during an emergency, such as an active assailant attack.
- + We were told there is no IDS on campus; however, the May 2019 LACCD CCB Security Assessment indicates that the A15 Facilities Building has a functioning ICS. The report also indicates the CDC and PEC buildings have an IDS, but they are non-operational.
- + We did not identify any panic alarms on the campus.
- + FireFinder XLS fire panels for fire alarm notification are in the LASD CCB station and the Facilities Department building. An off-campus monitoring company monitors the system and notifies the fire department but does not always contact the LASD CCB station when an alarm activates.



Campus lighting in the parking lot



FireFinder XLS Panel

Community Perspectives

We noted the following perspectives and themes during our interactions with campus stakeholders.

- + Participants were generally satisfied and supportive of the LASD CCB. Some commented on the poor relationships and interaction with a Black student, and further reported alleged gangs within LASD that were involved in violence against a student.
- + Some participants reported the presence of the LASD CCB can be overwhelming for community members of color and undocumented students.
- + Participants desire a more community-oriented policing approach.
- + Participants expressed that mental health crisis and de-escalation training for officers is important.
- + Participants generally felt that armed officers made them feel safer on campus, although there were some isolated comments in opposition. However, some participants expressed



that they would prefer the LASD CCB keep their weapons secured in the LASD CCB station until needed.

- + Participants want more campus patrolling, specifically during night classes. They say they do not see as many security personnel patrolling at this time.
- + Participants are concerned about homeless individuals in the area.
- + Participants would like better communication with the LASD CCB on security matters.
- + Participants reported poor lighting and cameras.
- + Participants noted they have poor cell reception on campus.
- + Participants stated the campus needs a better door-locking system.

Recommendations

West Los Angeles College	
1.12.1	Evaluate the installed cameras. Upgrade and implement a campus-wide video surveillance system with motion detection and object algorithm functionality to monitor exterior access points and campus buildings, especially those that have experienced burglaries or break-ins.
1.12.2	Install a single access control system that integrates with the Lenel OnGuard Enterprise system. Install access control readers on all exterior building doors. Connect all buildings' exterior doors to an automatic locking system that can be activated by the LASD CCB and the Facilities Department.
1.12.3	<p>Conduct a VSS audit or blind spot study of the campus. Use the 2019 ELAC Security Assessment and Physical Security Campus Drawings to help inform the study. Identify buildings and other locations that need motion detection video surveillance cameras, including areas with high crime rates.</p> <p>During the study, inspect existing cameras to ensure they are not on the NDAA banned video surveillance camera list, which includes the following Chinese companies: Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE and Hytera Communications. If the campus has cameras from these companies, remove and replace them with cameras that are consistent with NDAA requirements.</p>
1.12.4	Ensure the LASD CCB and Facilities Department have access to the video surveillance system.
1.12.5	Conduct a functionality test of all IDS devices. Upgrade and add IDS devices to campus buildings so the LASD CCB can actively monitor and be alerted to unauthorized entry or occupation of campus facilities.
1.12.6	Schedule regular joint training with the Culver City Police Department.
1.12.7	Consider relocating courses and equipment at the Annex Building to the WLAC campus.



1.12.8 Staff the SOA position.

1.12.9 Install additional lighting, particularly along pedestrian paths of travel. To address energy savings, take advantage of programming capabilities and timers to reduce lighting levels when appropriate rather than fully turning lighting off.



13. Van de Kamp Innovation Center

Threat Assessment

Crime

Historical Overview

The Van de Kamp Innovation Center (VDK) falls under the jurisdiction of the City College's LASD CCB station.

Because VDK is a satellite facility, the LASD CCB does not record separate crime statistics for the facility. However, we assessed the crime rates in the area surrounding the facility.

TOP THREATS

Based on our assessment, we determined the top threats facing the campus are:

- + Active Assailant Incident
- + Theft

Recent Incidents

LASD CCB and LACCD personnel noted the following recent incidents at the VDK:

- + In February 2020, a fight involving six students broke out on campus. Security officers broke up fight. No one was injured. LACCD disciplined the students.
- + The crime rate in the neighborhood is high. The area has gang activity and a significant population of people experiencing homelessness.
- + During our assessment, the LAPD were pursuing a car stolen from a McDonald's parking lot across from VDK.
- + Homeless individuals encamp in the highway underpass just east of the campus.

Campus Neighborhood

Based on our site assessment and interviews, we determined a high rate of crime occurs in the neighborhood. Like the City College campus, gang activity and crimes involving people experiencing homelessness are the biggest concerns off campus. Gang activity in the neighborhood has not directly impacted VDK.

CAP Index

The CRIMECAST data indicates that the crime rate in a 1.8-mile radius of the VDK is 0.49 times higher than the national average, 1.21 times higher than the state average and 0.92 times higher than the county average.



Areas within 0.07 to 1.8 miles of the campus have the following crime rates:

- + **North:** 0.25 less and 2.22 times the national average
- + **East:** 0.22 less to 2.46 times the national average
- + **South:** 0.67 less to 2.37 times the national average
- + **West:** 0.54 less to 1.543 times the national average

CRIMECAST projects the crime rate for this area will drop slightly to 3.87 times higher than the national average by 2026. The most frequent crimes occurring around the campus include the following:

- + Motor Vehicle Theft
- + Robbery
- + Crimes Against Persons
- + Burglary
- + Larceny

Crime Threat Summary

VDK is approximately 4.5 miles from the City College campus. VDK includes a high school, an administrative building with LACCD offices and a maintenance facility. The neighborhood surrounding VDK is a high crime area with gang activity and a large population of homeless individuals. Although gang activity does not have a large impact VDK, LASD CCB reports that they feel some students are negatively influenced by the gang activity off campus.

Among the most significant security concerns on campus are homeless individuals committing trespass, theft, vandalism and interfering with students. Security officers conduct regular bike and foot patrols on campus to act as a visual deterrent and to check known areas where homeless people enter the campus. Because the perimeter fence is damaged, security officers must conduct continuous patrols to ensure a secure environment. However, the staffing restrictions make it difficult for them to do so.

Terrorism

LASD CCB and VDK officials' greatest terrorism concern is an active assailant attack or mass attack involving firearms on campus. Based on our assessment and interviews, we believe the terrorism threats that could impact the campus include VBIED attacks, IED attacks, CBRNE attacks and hostile vehicles.



Like other colleges, VDK is susceptible to students making bomb threats for reasons including avoiding an exam or causing a disruption to campus life. However, VDK has not received a bomb threat.

VDK may be more prone to a terrorist attack if it hosts community events. If these events attract significant media attention, they could entice a lone wolf, domestic extremist group or homegrown violent extremist group supporting a foreign terrorist organization to plot and execute an attack. This threat of such an attack is low but the LASD CCB and VDK officials should evaluate the risk when hosting external entities. Community groups could be targets, and an attack could indirectly and negatively impact VDK and its students, faculty and staff.

Vehicle access to the campus is limited due to its location; however, the lack of physical barriers at entry points into VDK make it vulnerable to VBIED and hostile vehicle attacks.

Based on our discussion with the LASD CCB and our research, we do not consider VDK to be a terrorist target at this time. The LASD CCB reported no credible terrorism threats against VDK, its students, faculty or staff.

The LACCD and the LASD CCB have passive insider threat systems. The suspension of the HEAT Program significantly reduced the LACCD's ability to prevent and mitigate potential insider threats. No active social media monitoring occurs to identify threats, such as a threatening post from a student or former student. Because VDK does not have an insider threat program, students, faculty or staff could use their insider knowledge about which buildings do not have access control systems or functioning video surveillance cameras, or the location of flammable and combustible material storage on campus, to plot and execute an attack. VDK is vulnerable to an insider attack that involves the following types of incidents: active assailant, mass attack, IED, sabotage, and kidnapping or hostage events.

Emergency Preparedness and Response


We spoke with LASD CCB officers assigned to VDK and reviewed the emergency procedures manual. Officers provided the manual for our review and indicated they understand their roles and responsibilities in an emergency. We encourage LACCD and LASD CCB to provide trainings, drills and exercises to enhance response.



Emergency Preparedness

Below is a summary of VDK's emergency preparedness strengths:

- + The LASD CCB station maintains an emergency procedures manual and security officers know how to respond in an emergency.
- + In an emergency, the security officer on duty would call the high school principal and the LACCD administrative building dean, who are responsible for providing information to staff and students.
- + VDK uses the Blackboard mass notification app to disseminate emergency information.
- + LASD CCB personnel advised that they have engaged in training for emergency response. They have not established routine training, exercises and other emergency drills for students, faculty and staff.



Emergency Procedures Manual

Vulnerability Assessment

Security Force

Based on our interviews and site assessment, we recommend leveraging technology and augmenting staffing beyond current levels. We learned that under the current LASD CCB staffing plan, occasionally, the security officers respond to call for service, leaving the LASD CCB Station unattended with no personnel to take radio and phone requests for assistance, dispatch resources, monitor surveillance cameras and serve as the lead emergency response agency on campus. As indicated, a centralized dispatch center would allow for consistent staffing of personnel to address those tasks, which would more effectively leverage available security officers on campus to perform the services that LACCD requires. Further, if a deputy is needed at VDK they must respond from City College or a roving position. The LASD CCB's current staffing is as follows:

- + **6 a.m. – 2 p.m.:** Two security officers Monday through Friday
- + **2 p.m. – 10 p.m.:** Two security officers Monday through Friday
- + **10 p.m. – 6 a.m.:** VDK is closed and no security is on duty. Officers from City College conduct vehicle patrols and respond to reported incidents.

We noted the following concerns regarding VDK's security force:



- + The LASD CCB staffing curtailment plan does not provide relief coverage if someone is on vacation or gets sick. It relies on designated LASD CCB rovers or supervisors. Future staffing plans must include a relief factor.
- + There is no administrative staff in the LASD CCB station. If both on-duty security officers are patrolling the campus, the phones and the emergency call boxes are unattended. If the security officers respond to a situation that requires sworn law enforcement, they must contact the LAPD or wait until an LASD deputy can respond from City College.
- + Due to the suspension of the HEAT program, security officers must respond to mental health crises and try to resolve these issues.
- + LASD CCB personnel train regularly according to their policies. There is no other regularly scheduled security-related training for students and staff on campus.
- + The Team Leader stated that trespassing is the biggest problem on campus. Individuals have breached the inadequately maintained fence.
- + Security officers do not work on weekends or at night.
- + Security officers reported often finding homeless persons sleeping in and around campus in the mornings, especially on Mondays. Homeless persons have been known to break into buildings and vandalize property and sleep in the bushes in the front of the campus.



Evidence of fire set by homeless persons



Bushes in front of campus

LASD CCB personnel reported they have a good relationship with VDK administration and the LAPD. Considering the high crime rate and the population of people experiencing homeless in the area, the presence of armed law enforcement personnel provides officers who have the training, experience and authority to quickly respond to and resolve incidents. The LASD CCB presence also serves as a deterrent to criminal activity and deputies can also respond outside the campus gate if needed, providing additional security to the campus.

LASD CCB security officers are the backbone of the LASD CCB station. They generally have more experience at VDK and perform much of the work at the station. Security officers are not sworn law enforcement officers, but they are armed and must pass an entrance exam and background investigation and attend a five-week training academy before being assigned to a post. Their job is to assist the deputies in securing VDK. They are able to handle most issues independently but contact the deputy on duty when a crime has been committed. The deputies and security officers work well together to provide security and police services to VDK.



Physical Security

We noted the following physical security vulnerabilities:

- + The campus is protected by perimeter fencing but parts of the fence are not well maintained. Homeless individuals have breached the fence in multiple places.
- + The perimeter fencing has been damaged for some time. It is imperative that the fencing be repaired, as security officers do not work at night or on weekends.
- + The main entrance is not protected by bollards to deter a vehicle assault.



Damaged section of perimeter fence

Security Technology

Below we summarize the security technology system gaps at VDK:

- + Security systems are insufficient and ineffective in some areas. There is no IDS, making it possible to enter and stay inside buildings undetected. Camera coverage is incomplete, making it difficult to assess situational awareness.
- + Cameras cover the exterior of the campus and some interior areas. The coverage is incomplete and additional cameras are needed to cover the entire campus.
- + The campus does not have an electronic ACS. LACCD manages the ACS, and the LASD CCB station does not have a workstation.
- + There is a fire panel in the LASD CCB station. The alarm is monitored by an off-campus monitoring company monitors the alarms and dispatches the fire department upon alarm activation.
- + Additional lighting should be installed in areas of concealment around the buildings and parking areas.
- + The LASD CCB does not have a budget to improve or repair campus systems, and campus staff do not report to the LASD CCB. The LASD CCB is dependent on the LACCD to improve and repair security systems. LASD CCB personnel communicate their concerns to the college administration, but they do not have regularly scheduled meetings.



Emergency call box



Recommendations

Van de Kamp Innovation Center	
1.13.1	Increase staffing to include coverage for personnel who may miss work due to illness or vacation. Consider assigning a deputy during the school day because if a crime or other incident required a deputy's presence, having one on site would significantly reduce response time. If that is impractical, task an administrative assistant with answering the phones and dispatching security officers to calls.
1.13.2	Repair and maintain the perimeter fencing.
1.13.3	Install an IDS with panic alarms to alert the on-duty security guard to any emergencies or intrusions.
1.13.4	Repair and maintain building door hardware throughout the campus to prevent locks from being easily bypassed, allowing unwanted entry into buildings.
1.13.5	Keep landscaping neatly trimmed to reduce hiding places.
1.13.6	Complete the lock upgrade project for all classrooms so the rooms can be locked from the inside in the event of the need to shelter in the room.
1.13.7	Improve security camera coverage. Allow personnel in the LASD CCB station to monitor all cameras.
1.13.8	Schedule regular joint trainings with the LAPD.
1.13.9	Include the LASD CCB Team Leader in the Incident Response and Emergency Response Teams and ensure they meet regularly with the administration to discuss security issues.
1.13.10	Update the emergency procedure manual and require personnel to regularly review the policies. Formalize the emergency notification procedures so personnel know how and who to contact in an emergency.



04 Analysis of the LACCD's Security Posture

District-Level Security Structure

The LACCD and campus administrators have not clearly identified a point of contact or liaison for security concerns and issues. We recommend that campus leadership appoint a security director with support staff and clearly and consistently define their titles and roles, as well as standards for security operations and expectations.

The LACCD has a Manager of Safety and Emergency Services who serves as the liaison in emergencies, but this individual serves the entire District and has been on extended leave since October 2020. In his absence, the deputy chancellor has assumed the responsibilities and is augmented by an interim Emergency Operations Center Safety Officer. This is unrealistic and unsustainable. LASD CCB personnel told us that having a designated Manager of Safety and Emergency Services as their single point of contact for incidents and campus activity, and as a consistent reporting mechanism, was helpful. However, they have experienced challenges with the fragmented communication network at the campus level since he has been on leave. We encourage LASD CCB to work with LACCD to formalize a plan for communicating incidents and activity on campus that addresses contingencies for personnel absence or unavailability.

This long-term void is a lesson in business continuity and security structure. The LACCD operated for decades without a Manager of Safety and Emergency. When they instituted the position three years ago, the LACCD did not sufficiently invest in the concept. It is unreasonable to expect that one person can effectively execute the functions of a safety and emergency services program for 13 facilities and upward to 230,000 students. If simultaneous events occur at multiple campuses, the situations could quickly overwhelm the manager. Additionally, the LACCD did not have a redundancy plan or additional staff to assume the responsibility when the Manager of Safety and Emergency took extended leave.

Another primary deficit in the district-level security structure is the absence of a central operations center, especially a security operations center (SOC). Without a SOC, each campus security team is essentially managed in a vacuum. This is a system that hinders officer safety. Although we acknowledge and respect the individual characteristics of each campus, having a centralized operations center, radio communications center and radio communications platform would exponentially enhance the overall security posture, response and reporting for all of LACCD's campuses and facilities. Such a center would provide district-wide radio communications for increased accountability, transparency and insight for all officers assigned to the LASD CCB and the LACCD, as well as campus personnel. This could also provide the ability to capture the information about calls for service, which we found incomplete and consider critical to a safety operation. Additionally, as we discuss later, this deficit severely impacted our ability to accurately analyze calls for service and determine appropriate security personnel staffing levels.



We also found a lack of standardization in security-related processes disseminated from the LACCD. Many areas could bring significant enhancements to the overall safety and security process, such as a standard emergency response planning procedure. The procedure should include a standardized and comprehensive plan template, a submission and approval process, annual review and revisions, and a central repository for ready access. Although the Manager of Safety and Emergency Services has previously been tasked with this responsibility, the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the progress. Additionally, the individual colleges must adhere to the standardized procedure.

Additionally, LACCD leadership should standardize the security reporting function and procedure across the campuses. The current process of recording the security activity on campus on a daily basis is inadequate to effectively analyze performance metrics. The procedure would require that the LASD CCB more frequently generate a standardized report of those performance metrics that they circulate to campus and LACCD personnel. They should store the report in a central repository.

Such a procedure would support LACCD's performance expectations and provide immediate analysis of the security provider's performance. Additionally, multiple sources told us of inconsistencies in the approach to different elements of the security process among campuses and between faculty and staff on the same campus, such as how to address homeless individuals on campus.

For example, and as previously noted, the response to people on campus who are experiencing homelessness is inconsistent across the campuses. The desired response communicated to LASD CCB officers may differ across the campuses and even among leadership, faculty and staff on the same campus. For example, a campus employee may contact LASD CCB to remove a homeless person sleeping in the library, but another campus employee may instruct the LASD CCB to allow the person to remain. Further, the LACCD must provide shower facilities for LACCD students who are experiencing homelessness. However, LASD CCB reported that homeless individuals who are not students were taking advantage of the service. LACCD has not established a standard response or process for addressing this issue. When considering that officers are taking action specific to a campus that is inconsistent with a standardized LACCD procedure or protocol, it creates disparate treatment and confusion. A clear and concise procedure for addressing issues involving homeless individuals on campus that states the LACCD's expectations that the LASD CCB provide reports about such interactions could significantly improve communication and provide increased consistency in security operations across the district.

Campus-Level Security Structure

Although we describe the details of the campus-level security structure in the individual campus sections contained within this assessment report, each campus follows a standardized structure. The primary campus-level LACCD security representative is the college president. However, at most campus locations the Vice President of Administrative Services is the day-to-day liaison between campus leadership and the LASD. Each college has a Senior Office Assistant (SOA) who works in the LASD CCB station on campus. The SOA oversees the office administration and may provide




dispatching services for the security personnel, greet individuals who visit the station, provide clerical support and supervise the Campus Cadet program.

Overview of the Incident Command System

For decades, public safety agencies and first responders across the country have taken trainings on using and implementing the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage emergency and crisis situations. The private sector, including institutions of higher learning, have recently adapted the ICS to suit their unique circumstances more effectively. Although LACCD does not strictly adhere to the ICS, it has maintained the core principles in instituting a structured emergency response that includes providing training to improve overall responses and address identified security issues. At its core, ICS is an organizational framework that facilitates efficient and effective command, control and coordination of emergency responses to critical incidents. The foundation of ICS is a centralized command to deploy resources and make decisions. In complex or large incidents that involve multiple agencies and varying jurisdictional requirements, it is vital to establish a unified command to ensure all agencies are collaborating to identify and execute the most effective strategies to safely resolve the situation. Below is an example of a typical ICS organizational chart.

Figure 1: ICS Organizational Chart





Although the LACCD embraced the ICS, as we report in the individual campus sections, the level of emergency response knowledge, participation, training, drills and exercises varies widely. Valley College exhibited the most prominent focus on ICS and emergency response. The Valley College IMT has a comprehensive emergency operations plan, clearly defined roles and it participates in routine exercises to evaluate the IMT members' competency. To ensure competency and redundancy, the Valley College President requires IMT members serve in each IMT position one month each. We commend this practice to create exposure and redundancy in the team; however, it requires oversight to ensure accuracy and continuity of operations.

As we explain in the Key Findings, we recommend the LACCD establish a standardized procedure with a framework each campus can use to create sustainable emergency response procedures.

Training and Exercise Evaluation Procedures

When we spoke with the Manager of Safety and Emergency Services, he told us he is somewhat frustrated with the LACCD employees' general lack of interest and participation in emergency response drills. He works closely with the LASD CCB to arrange training events, supported by drills and exercises. He told us that although the events are not typically well attended, the classroom training sessions have been very successful, and we repeatedly heard that the campus community desires more training. Such low participation typically results in reduced feedback and fewer evaluations, diminishing the value of the procedure.

During the pandemic, the LACCD established an EOC and required that each college establish an Incident Command Center (ICC). The respective IMTs conduct their briefings and meetings virtually, and the pandemic created a situation in which the individual colleges have had to sustain a long-term IMT to monitor their campus and provide briefings to the district IMT. These regular meetings and the long-term ERT deployment serve as excellent opportunities to increase members' confidence and competency in the emergency management process.

Recommendations

The LACCD's Security Posture	
4.1	Develop a security operations center (SOC) for centralized dispatching, camera and alarm monitoring, receiving calls and implementing access control capabilities, such as lockdowns, for all LACCD facilities. Additionally, consider integrating a separate but adjacent Emergency Operations Center.
4.2	Establish a director of security to serve as a liaison between LASD CCB, or future provider on day-to-day security operations. As recommendations are addressed additional staff will be required, such as adding a SOC and centralized dispatching.
4.3	Expand the Safety and Emergency Services Department to include support staff, possibly aligned with LACCD campus regions.



4.4	Develop a strategic security plan that includes security technology improvements, performance metric goals and work streams.
4.5	Implement an automated security report management system to complete and distribute the reports to relevant departments and individuals. Include Risk Management and the Office of General Counsel in the distribution.
4.6	Establish a process to evaluate of the LASD CCB's mission, values and performance metrics to determine its effectiveness in each campus environment.
4.7	Develop a standardized emergency communication plan across all LACCD facilities.
4.8	Develop a standard emergency response planning procedure. The procedure should include a standard and comprehensive plan template, a submission and approval process, annual review and revisions, and a central repository that relevant personnel can access as needed.



05 *Campus and Community Perspectives*

Community Forums

We conducted 11 virtual campus community forums on Zoom for students, faculty, staff and administrators at each campus to provide their perspective on LASD CCB personnel, to relate their experiences with those personnel, to describe what makes them feel safe or unsafe on campus, and to describe their ideal security procedures and security personnel characteristics for their campus.

To encourage meaningful and nonbiased engagement, we assembled a diverse group to lead these meetings. The leaders included Black, Hispanic and White men and women with varied professional backgrounds, including current or former law enforcement executives, civil rights attorneys, Human Resources Professionals and project managers.

We started with a group discussion and then separated into breakout rooms where our facilitators engaged participants in meaningful discussions. To ensure transparency, we then reassembled the groups so participants could share what they discussed in their breakout rooms. We present within this report an overview of the discussion in the individual campus assessments.

We also conducted forums for the employees of the Educational Services Center, the District Office and held a student-only forum with opportunities to participate in Spanish. More than 300 students registered for this session and more than 200 joined the opening group session. More than 100 registrants left immediately before the breakout sessions.

The student group shared many of the same concerns as the other groups, as described in detail in the individual site assessment sections above. They raised concerns about poor lighting, lack of working cameras, security understaffing, the need for more blue emergency phones that connect the LASD CCB station and to make sure the existing phones are operational. They also want more security patrols and escorts at night and more foot, bike or golf cart patrols throughout the day and night. They would prefer less vehicle patrols, as they find them less engaging.

The students spent more time discussing the security personnel than the other group. Some expressed that the LASD CCB personnel intimidate them. They would like to have police officers with less formal appearances. Some said they would rather have police nearby versus on campus. Many supported having security officers, who are less intimidating-looking and wear a different uniform, rather than police officers. A few students expressed they felt the LASD CCB officers treated them differently because of their race or ethnicity. They said the unusual treatment included the officers accusing them of wrongdoing more than white students.

Many students said that the LASD CCB officers are slow to respond to calls for service and that they are not as helpful as they should be. Students said that in some cases, the officers were rude. However, other students said they were pleased with the LASD CCB and felt the campuses were safe because of them.



Most constituents want the security personnel to invest in the campus community and engage with the students. In many cases, the students' perception that the LASD CCB officers are intimidating and indifferent creates an uncomfortable situation that has precluded the LASD CCB and students from having a stronger relationship. Better communication would help both groups understand each other's perceptions and help enhance their relationship.

Some students stated they feel safer having armed officers on campus. Others said this makes them feel unsafe. Some of the campus community forum participants expressed interest in establishing a civilian group that could respond to some calls, such as student disturbances in classrooms, fights and arguments with faculty and students experiencing mental health crises, which the LASD CCB currently handles. Some students expressed concerns about the number of homeless individuals on campus. Others felt the LASD CCB should not bother these individuals.

In summary, the students understand the need for a security presence on campus. However, they want security personnel to present as less intimidating in appearance and demeanor. They also want security personnel to be more helpful, friendly and engaged. They requested that the officers act quickly to help when called, rather than ask questions that put students on edge. They also want the security personnel to become part of the campus community.

Focus Groups

We also ran focus groups to ascertain the perspectives of specific groups. The focus groups included the following constituents:

- + American Federation of Teachers (AFT) College Faculty Guild Local 1521 (teachers)
- + American Federation of Teachers College Faculty Guild Local 1521 – Social Justice Committee (teachers)
- + California Teamsters Local 911 (Academic Administrators)
- + Classified Management Association of LACCD (Management)
- + Service Employees International Union Local 99 (Maintenance and Operations)
- + Service Employees International Union Local 721 – Cities Division (Supervisory)
- + Campus Vice Presidents of Administrative Services
- + LASD CCB supervisory staff

We attempted to arrange a focus group with the Building and Construction Trades Council and AFT 1521a, but we were unsuccessful. However, we spoke with some 1521a members separately.



Common Themes

The following are common themes from the campus forums and focus groups.

Community Policing

The most common theme was the desire for the security provider to be part of the campus community. We heard countless examples of how the LASD CCB officers are currently part of the community and how much the students, faculty, staff and administration value these interactions. However, we also heard many requests for more involvement and greater engagement.

Although the community acknowledged the officer's training and responsibilities, they also stressed their desire for the LASD CCB officers to exercise discretion when responding to calls for service, such as parking enforcement, and for the team to embrace community-oriented policing, including building relationships with the campus community.

Some non-white participants feel that their personal interactions with and observations of law enforcement in general may impact their comfort level with the LASD CCB campus personnel. Some people expressed deep and emotional concerns with the broader LASD, including concerns about the LASD leadership and operations off campus. These are concerns about the LASD as a whole and what it represents to the community it serves, as well as the LACCD community.

Some people of color also told us about positive interactions with the LASD CCB personnel that changed their negative perceptions of the LASD and other law enforcement organizations. These success stories, while few, represent an incredible opportunity for law enforcement to invest in their relationships with the diversity represented in their communities.

Armed and Unarmed Officers

The groups focused less on whether officers should be armed than we initially expected. We solicited perspectives on the issue, but the desire for the LASD CCB officers to be part of the community was far more important in most sessions. However, the individuals who did express opinions about the issue were mostly in favor of having armed officers on campus. Those who disagreed were vehemently opposed. Several individuals in multiple sessions expressed concern that our team would allow the "loud" voices that expressed opposition to overshadow the more reserved comments of the masses who supported the current campus security personnel model. Most seem to consider it necessary to arm officers in case of an active assailant on campus.



Support for LASD

We strived to obtain input from as many diverse groups and individuals as possible. Most of the campus community is overwhelmingly in support of having the LASD CCB presence on campus. In fact, many participants said they would like to see more officers on campus. The vast majority were supportive of the LASD CCB and wanted to maintain their contract for security services on campus.

Areas of Improvement

The student-only forum, comprised of just over 100 participants, revealed that more students had a less desirable opinion of the current LASD CCB security model. Most complaints about the campus security presence related to their interactions with people of color, such as officers confronting and questioning students.

A few of the focus group participants were also opposed to having the LASD and law enforcement on campus in general. For example, the ATF 1521 Social Justice Committee presented a petition to defund the LASD.

Interactions with Homeless Individuals

Most constituents had serious concerns about the homeless population on the campuses. While a few said that security should not focus on the homeless individuals, the majority stated that many on-campus security issues involved homeless individuals. They believe these individuals break into buildings; steal or damage property; start fires; commit indecent exposure; and urinate and defecate in elevators, stairwells, rooms and other areas. Many participants claimed that having Metro stops on or near campus often exacerbates the issue, as well as perceived issues from the city's newly constructed village to house 75 homeless individuals directly across the street from Harbor College.

Mental Health Crises

How to address mental health crises came up consistently in many of the groups. The participants believed that a cooperative plan with the LASD CCB and LACCD to deal with these crises should be integrated immediately and permanently. Most individuals expressed that civilian staff with appropriate training should respond to these calls with the LASD CCB personnel. However, some felt that only civilian staff should respond.

The members of the behavioral intervention teams that we spoke with emphatically supported law enforcement involvement, though they acknowledged it can be best if the officers stand back, possibly out of sight, so that the individual in crisis is not alarmed. We also learned from an interviewee about an instance when an LACCD employee approached an individual to address a behavioral issue without an officer present, and the employee was struck in the face and knocked to the ground.



Consistency in the LASD Staffing and Leadership

Many participants raised concerns about the frequent security personnel changes and how they believe the lack of consistency negatively impacts campus security. Specifically, the changes in the leadership of the LASD CCB are of significant concern, though they also laud the performance and attitudes of previous LASD CCB captains.

Although some team leaders are assigned to one campus for years, others change frequently. In some cases, the team leader could change nearly every year. These frequent changes contribute to the LASD CCB's lack of connection with the campus community.

Campus Patrols and Escorts

Many participants expressed concerns about the limited LASD CCB personnel who conduct evening patrols during night classes and when Facilities Department personnel are working. Some said the LASD CCB personnel sit in the station instead of patrolling. Others said the LASD CCB does not have sufficient staff to patrol the campus at night.

Some also said the LASD CCB personnel sit in their patrol vehicles or drive around campus. These participants would prefer to see personnel walking, riding a bike or patrol on golf carts so they could interact with the campus community better. Many also said they felt this would be less intimidating for the students.

Those who requested an LASD CCB escort at night said that the officers were helpful and accommodating. Others expressed frustration that they are often told there are not enough staff to provide an escort, though some of these participants said they see officers sitting in the sheriff's station after they are told no one is available.

Technical Security Measures

Many of the people we heard from expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of security cameras. They also believe that many of the cameras in place are inoperable and monitoring is limited. The LACCD has a camera upgrade in progress through the LACCD Build Bond program. Additionally, some campuses, such as Southwest, have replaced many of the older and inoperable cameras. However, participants expressed frustration with how long it has taken to address the security gap.

Participants in every forum expressed concern about the lack of lighting in certain areas of the campuses. We learned that in some cases security was not using the lights because of the limited on-campus population due to the pandemic. However, most of the complaints predated COVID-19.

Finally, many participants are concerned about the access to the campus, the buildings and the rooms, specifically during a lockdown due to an active assailant or other emergency. Participants acknowledged that LACCD and campus administration want the campus to feel open and welcoming.



However, they are concerned about the number of people who are not part of the campus community who wander the campus and buildings. Some participants recommended that those affiliated with the campus should display ID badges while on campus.

Community Outreach

The Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD) commissioned a survey of the campus community. The goals of the survey were to better understand perceptions of campus safety; to better understand perceptions of and experiences with the current security provider, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) Community College Bureau (CCB); and to gather input on campus safety moving forward. Our survey instrument was developed from publicly available instruments that have been used to measure similar topics. We provide the full survey in **Attachment 5**.

Method

Our survey was built using Qualtrics. The LACCD Office of Institutional Research emailed an unrestricted link (i.e., no validation was required and no identifying information was collected) to the survey to the LACCD community. The survey was available from April 27, 2021 through May 17, 2021. During this period, 7,853 people provided some data, although only 4,362 (55.5 percent) people completed the survey.

The distribution of the completeness of the survey responses is shown in Figure 2. This data shows that most of the attrition in the survey came relatively early, with 28.35 percent of people completing less than 30 percent of the survey. It is unclear why these participants stopped responding. There is no difference in their response patterns compared to those who completed the survey.

To preserve the voices of all persons who participated in this survey, we used pairwise deletion (i.e., cases without a response are omitted from an analysis) rather than listwise deletion (i.e., using only data from those cases with no missing data). Further, we did not use multiple imputation procedures, given the strenuous assumptions and theoretical guidance required for this process to work correctly.¹⁸

We chose not to use sampling weights with the data. Sampling weights are designed to amplify the responses of participants to make them equal to the proportion in the population under study. That is, sampling weights are used when trying to make results representative of a population.¹⁹ There are a multitude of weighting strategies; however recent research calls into question the utility of sampling

18 Solon, G., Haider, S.J., and Wooldridge, J. (2013). What are we weighting for? National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers (No. 18859). Available at: https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w18859/w18859.pdf

19 Valliant, R., Dever, J.A., Kreuter, F. (2013). Practical Tools for Designing and Weighting Survey Samples. Springer: New York.



weights. This is because one must address what they are interested in weighting for before creating the weights.²⁰ That is, the weights are designed to fix a problem in the sampling method.

We chose not to use sampling weights for two reasons. First, preliminary analyses — not shown here — suggested there was no statistical effect in the weighted and unweighted data. This is largely due to the adequate representation for most groups. Second, weighting makes a strong assumption that members of classes on which the weights are built are homogenous²¹, which is not universally true for the topics under study.

We chose to restrict the analyses based on sample size. Generally, each campus provided a sufficient sample size to protect the anonymity of the respondents and to meet the assumptions required for some of the statistical analyses. However, there were instances where the sample size was so low that we omitted the campus from a particular analysis. This was done when there were fewer than 10 respondents. A footnote has been added to the tables and figures to denote which campuses were omitted when such corrections were necessary.

Sample Characteristics

The sample demographics breakdown by campus is presented for racial/ethnic identification in Figure 3, by gender in Figure 4 and by relationship (i.e., administrator, classified staff, faculty, student) in Figure 5. The Office of Institutional Research provided a comparison of these characteristics and values, a preliminary metric of under-representation of particular groups. This is shown in **Attachment 5**.

20 Valliant, R., Dever, J.A., Kreuter, F. (2013). *Practical Tools for Designing and Weighting Survey Samples*. Springer: New York.

21 Ibid.



Figure 2. Distribution of % Completion of Survey Responses








Figure 3. Racial/Ethnic Identity of Respondents by Campus



	LACC	ESC	ELAC	Corp. Center	South Gate	LAHC	LAMC	LAPC	LASC	LATTC	LAVC	VDK	WLAC
Asian	59	14	102	3	2	20	12	65	4	25	23	0	23
Black/AA	39	13	16	0	0	20	6	31	76	83	25	0	69
Decline to Answer	85	20	83	2	2	26	51	108	19	73	69	0	41
Filipino	11	7	11	0	0	11	6	22	1	8	3	0	2
Hispanic/Latino	213	30	521	6	38	118	183	181	51	207	193	1	78
Multi-Racial	17	3	33	0	2	11	6	43	9	14	25	0	17
White Alone	97	32	47	1	0	43	42	320	6	42	171	0	51
AI/AN/Pac Isld.	7	0	4	1	2	5	5	12	0	2	7	0	0




Figure 4. Gender Identity of Respondents by Campus



	LACC	ESC	ELAC	Corp. Center	South Gate	LAHC	LAMC	LAPC	LASC	LATTCC	LAVC	VDK	WLAC
■ Decide not to Answer	53	12	56	0	2	20	32	68	16	48	45	0	30
■ Female	295	63	518	10	33	163	190	462	115	220	309	0	167
■ Male	169	44	224	3	9	68	86	244	31	173	150	1	76
■ Non-Binary	10	0	15	0	1	2	1	8	1	8	7	0	6



Figure 5. Relationship with LACCD by Campus



Analytic Plan

The analyses proceed in three stages. In the first stage, we look at the univariate distribution of each of the variables by campus. There is substantial variation between campuses on many of the items that necessitate always controlling for these effects.

The second stage of the analyses looks at the multivariate effects of race/ethnicity, gender, relationship with the LACCD and the campus on select variables. The variables that were selected are representative of the results but trimmed down for the sake of parsimony. The final stage of the analyses presents information from the qualitative responses provided by participants.



Results

Univariate Results

Perceptions of Safety on Campus and Its Effects

The univariate results for safety on campus are presented in Figure 6, with each bar representing the mean on the four-point Likert scale.

Participants were asked to indicate how safe they felt on their home campus (i.e., the campus the participant identified as being the one they spend the most time at). The mean value by campus is depicted in Figure 6.

Overall, respondents felt safest on campus during the day and less safe at night. In fact, regardless of the campus, participants reported feeling significantly safer during the day than at night. This is consistent with most fear of crime research that uses these items to assess feelings of safety and fear.²² Further, there are significant differences in the perceptions of daytime safety by campus ($F_{(11,6311)} = 11.26, p < .001$), although the effect on campus is quite modest ($\eta^2 = .0196$). Participants at the City campus generally expressed lower levels of safety than members of other campuses, although the effect is not significant with all campuses. Similar trends are seen for feelings of safety at night ($F_{(11,6124)} = 11.33, p < .001; \eta^2 = .0203$), in parking lots ($F_{(11,6223)} = 13.54, p < .001; \eta^2 = .0239$) and in other areas on campus ($F_{(11,6082)} = 8.88, p < .001; \eta^2 = .0161$).

The next set of questions in the survey asked participants to indicate whether fear of crime or victimization has ever interfered with various facets of their experience. Figure 7 shows the percentage of respondents who expressed that their fear had interfered with the campus experience, made them less willing to come to campus or led them to decide to not participate in something that they wanted to. There is a great deal of variation in the number of respondents by campus that reported that fear had an adverse impact on their campus experience, with between 18 percent (Mission, $n = 80$) and 33.8 percent (City, $n = 260$) responding in the affirmative. The number of respondents who reported that fear interfered with their campus experience varies significantly by campus ($\chi^2_{(11)} = 100.91, p < .001$, Cramer's $V = 0.1267$), although the effect is again relatively modest. We see similar trends for being less willing to come to campus ($\chi^2_{(11)} = 69.39, p < .001$, Cramer's $V = 0.1052$) and for making participants abstain from participating in an activity that they were interested in ($\chi^2_{(11)} = 90.36, p < .001$, Cramer's $V = 0.1200$).

The next set of questions asked participants to indicate their level of agreement with three questions about campus safety and security using a standard five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. These results are presented in Figure 8. The data suggests more variation in the attitudes of participants for these questions. Specifically, the average for the LACCD investment in the safety and security of the campus community varies by campus ($F_{(11,5978)} = 6.37, p < .001$), although the size of the effect is again quite modest ($\eta^2 = .0117$). Similarly, results are seen when asking participants about providing for the safety and security of the campus community ($F_{(11,$

22 Hale, C. (1996). Fear of crime: A review of the literature. *International review of Victimology*, 4(2), 79-150.



$t_{(5964)} = 7.47, p < .001; \eta^2 = .0138$). Finally, participants were asked to indicate if there were enough LASD CCB personnel on campus. Again, we see small but significant differences across campuses ($F_{(11, 5965)} = 4.12, p < .001; \eta^2 = .0076$).

This set of questions is particularly interesting because the amount of variation within the campuses is much larger than in other items. There are two plausible explanations for this. First, this could suggest that there are substantial differences in perceptions of the participants on the same campus. That is, participants from the same campus may hold very different expectations or experiences. Second, this could suggest that participants may have been interpreting this question differently (e.g., the interpretation of sufficient may differ). Subsequent questions in the survey shed light on this.


The final set of questions in this section asked participants to rank, from 1 (most concerning) to 10 (least concerning), public safety issues that are typical on urban college campuses.²³ The mean of these 10 items by campus are presented in Figures 9 and 10. These tables are divided based on the LACCD average ranking from all participants.

The results suggest the public safety problems that affect each campus vary to a certain degree. For example, homelessness and transients are quite a serious problem for Educational Services Center (ESC) respondents ($M = 2$), whereas this is much less of a concern for West LA College respondents ($M = 6.96$). In fact, the results suggest that the mean ranking for each problem is significantly different based on campus, although some problems are much less dependent upon campus (e.g., drugs; $\eta^2 = .0087$) than are others (e.g., homelessness; $\eta^2 = .0305$). These differences may reflect the different climates and neighborhoods in which these campuses are located throughout the city of Los Angeles.

²³ Sloan, J. J. (1994). The correlates of campus crime: An analysis of reported crimes on college and university campuses. *Journal of Criminal Justice, 22*(1), 51-61.




Figure 6. Feelings of Safety at Various Times and Locations by Campus.



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)




Figure 7. Percentage of Respondents Reporting that Fear Interfered with Various Experiences by Campus



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)




Figure 8. Feelings of Safety by Campus



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)




Figure 9. Most Serious Public Safety Issues Reported by Campus (Part I)



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)



Figure 10. Most Reported Public Safety Issues Reported by Campus (Part II)



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)

Perceptions of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department

Participants were asked to respond to six questions indicating how effective LASD CCB personnel are at performing various tasks on campus. Respondents were given a five-point Likert scale to respond to these questions. The scale ranged from 1 (very ineffective) to 5 (very effective). For this series of questions, participants were allowed to indicate that they did not know. These opinions were omitted from these analyses. The percentage of respondents across campuses who reported “I don’t know” are shown in Figure 11.

The data suggests that a sizeable portion of the campus community does not feel that they can adequately assess the effectiveness of the LASD CCB’s performance for the LACCD community. The reasons for this may be that people do not interact with LASD CCB personnel enough to feel



confident assessing this. The lack of interaction with the LASD CCB could be because there is little reason to interact with them (i.e., no evidence of crime or victimization for these respondents), or due to a lack of LASD CCB visibility.

The data shown in Figure 12 shows the mean values of the effectiveness rating only for those participants who did not choose the “I don’t know” response. This data shows a few patterns. Again, we see evidence that there are differences across campuses, with the respondents from the Mission campus universally rating the effectiveness of the LASD CCB higher across all six categories. Additionally, the data shows that the LASD CCB is rated significantly higher in preventing violent crime than property crime ($t_{3,861} = -18.46, p < .001, d = 0.168$). Importantly, the facet where the LASD CCB is generally rated lowest across campuses is in their effectiveness to form positive relationships with the campus community.


The next set of questions asked respondents to assess the LASD CCB on several dimensions that tap into respondent’s perceptions of the LASD CCB as a legitimate authority that engages in constitutional policing, specifically their global attitudes toward the LASD CCB. These questions were all asked on a five-point Likert scale that ranged from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The mean value for each campus is shown in Figures 13 through 16.

The results from these analyses show that respondents’ global attitudes towards the LASD CCB are relatively consistent across campuses and attitudinal domains. There is some variation (e.g., Mission campus routinely rates higher than others) in how the campuses respond across the board, but the variation is smaller than on other questions. There are a few interesting variations to the general pattern that should be pointed out. Namely, the students at City College and East LA College are generally the least positive in their global attitudes towards LASD CCB personnel. Notable, in Figure 13, the respondents from East LA College are significantly lower than all other campuses in the mean value for the item asking about seeing LASD CCB personnel on campus making them feel at ease. The reason for this is unclear, given that the respondents from East LA College report similar attitudes on other attitudinal dimensions in this section, apart from their sentiments about the LASD CCB providing a quality service to the community, which again is significantly lower than other campuses.

Finally, we call attention to the final question in this section, presented in Figure 16. This question asks respondents whether there are too many LASD CCB personnel on campus. Recall that earlier, presented in Figure 8, participants were asked about the LASD CCB personnel on campus. The results from the question in Figure 16 give us clarity about the meaning of this question. The data here indicates that this statement is not widely supported by most people across all campuses. However, agreement with this statement is statistically related to the respondent’s home campus ($\chi^2 = 77.30, p < .001, \text{Cramer's } V = 0.0905$), although the effect is quite modest. The distribution of those who disagree (i.e., feel there are not too many LASD CCB personnel on campus), those who are neutral and those who agree that there are too many LASD CCB personnel on campus are shown in Figure 17.




Figure 11. Percentage of Respondents who Indicated “I don’t know” about LASD CCB Effectiveness



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)




Figure 12. Mean Effectiveness Assessments of LASD CCB by Campus



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)



Figure 13. Global Attitudes Assessment of LASD CCB by Campus (Part I)



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)




Figure 14. Global Attitudes Assessment of LASD CCB (Part II)



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)




Figure 15. Global Attitudes Assessment of LASD CCB (Part III)



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)




Figure 16. Global Attitudes Assessment of LASD CCB (Part IV)



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)



Figure 17. Level of Agreement with Statement that “Too Many LASD CCB Personnel on Campus” by Campus



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)

The Future of Campus Safety at LACCD

The earlier sections asked respondents about the current state of campus safety and security, whereas the final portion of the survey asked about the future of public safety at the LACCD. Participants were asked to rank order different choices, identify what should be a priority for campus safety in the future and indicate how much money the LACCD should spend on campus safety in the future. We examine the data for each of these sections in more detail below.

Respondents were asked to indicate their preference for six different options for campus safety and security in the future. Respondents were asked about maintaining the present arrangement with the LASD CCB, incorporating unarmed private security, armed private security, an armed public police department other than the LASD CCB, an unarmed public police department other than the LASD CCB and no campus security or police. The mean level response for each of these choices is presented in Figure 18.



The results show that the LASD CCB is the overwhelming preferred choice for campus safety and security moving forward. In fact, 76.44 percent of all respondents listed the LASD CCB as their top choice, whereas 9.07 percent listed retaining the LASD CCB as their fourth, fifth or sixth preferred choice. Likewise, a small percentage of respondents, 6.39 percent, had no campus police or security as their top three choice, compared to 83.15 percent of respondents listing this choice as their least preferred option. The distribution and selection of other choices seemed much more related to the idiosyncrasies of the respondent rather than any prominent pattern based on campuses.


The next set of questions gave respondents the opportunity to indicate how much focus providers of campus security should give to 10 different tasks. Respondents were asked to indicate how much focus should be given to these on a four-point Likert scale that ranged from none at all (1) to a great deal (4). The data from these questions are presented in Figures 19 and 20.

The responses suggest that the focus of the provider of campus safety is again largely idiosyncratic to the preferences of the individual respondents rather than showing a clear pattern of what things should be done, and perhaps more importantly which should be minimized. The two things that showed marginally greater degree of emphasis from respondents across campuses was the ability to have casual interactions with the provider of campus security and to engage in more traffic enforcement on campus.

The final set of analyses looks at how much respondents feel that the LACCD should spend per student on public safety in the future. The average for all participants was \$603.34, with the median value being \$600 and the maximum value being \$1,000 per student. This data was disaggregated by campus to look fairly similar across campuses. Although there are significant differences ($F_{(11, 2929)} = 4.94, p < .001, \eta^2 = 0.0185$), these differences seem to largely be confined to respondents from the Pierce campus and ESC advocating for lower spending than respondents from other campuses.




Figure 18. Mean Preference for Future Campus Security Options by Campus



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)



Figure 19. Priorities of Campus Security Providers in the Future (Part I)



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)



Figure 20. Average Amount of Money per Student Should be Spent on Public Safety by Campus



NOTES: Van de Kamp omitted from analyses due to small cell size (n=1)

Multivariate Results

The analyses presented above have looked specifically at the overall trends and broken them down by the campus the respondent identifies as their home campus. However, given that the subject is about safety and security, there are reasons to suspect that other variables may exert effects. Specifically, we build a series of multivariate regression models that account for the respondents race/ethnicity, the respondent's gender and the respondent's role on campus (i.e., administrator, classified staff, faculty, or student). We chose not to present the bivariate results comparing each of the variables from the survey because the results often change when incorporated into the multivariate models, which leads to unnecessary confusion for the reader and policy maker.

We are most interested in looking at the differences in the demographic categories while controlling for any remaining effect of the respondent's home campus. This could be accomplished through a multitude of modeling strategies, including the use of mixed-effects models. The mixed-effects (also known as a multilevel model or hierarchical linear model) model would permit us to model the fixed effects of individual differences while simultaneously controlling for the nesting effect of the respondent's campus.²⁴ Additionally, this type of modeling is useful for trying to explain campus level variation.

²⁴ Snijders, T. A., & Bosker, R. J. (2011). *Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and advanced multilevel modeling*. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA.



We chose not to employ this modeling here for two reasons. First, we do not have any random effects to model and looking at the random intercepts (i.e., campus-level differences) is more difficult here. Second, we could get results that are easier to interpret while controlling for the statistical complexities (i.e., over-efficiency of the model) presented by the nested nature of the data (i.e., cluster-adjusted standard errors). All of the regression models were built using the appropriate estimator (i.e., ordered logistic or ordinary least squares).

There are three important things to understand with the results from the regression models. First, we estimated models for all items in the survey, but only present a limited representative set that illustrates the pattern of sentiments. Second, the models are built using reference categories for each of the variables included in the models, which was necessary for model estimation with nominal variables. The specific reference categories were deliberately chosen to highlight differences in the attitudes of members of the campus community relative to the voice of people who have the most power and influence in social situations. The specific coding schemes are shown in the table below, along with a brief explanation for why the reference category was chosen. Finally, instead of presenting tables of coefficients, we present the results visually and describe which results are statistically significant.

Table 12: Coding Schemes

Race/Ethnicity	Gender	Role	Campus
American Indian/Alaska Native	Decline to Answer	Administrator ³	City
Asian	Female	Classified Staff	ESC
Black or African American	Male ²	Faculty	East LA
Decline to Answer	Non-Binary	Student	East LA-Corporate Center ⁴
Fillipino			East LA-South Gate
Hispanic/Latino			Harbor
Multi-Ethnicity/Multi-Racial			Mission



Pacific Islander			Pierce
White, non-Hispanic/Latino ¹			Southwest
			Trace-Tech
			Valley
			Van de Kamp ⁵
			West LA

NOTES:

1. Chosen as the reference because they typically have the most privilege and positive relationship with law enforcement
2. Chosen as the reference because they typically have most privilege
3. Chosen as the reference as they have the most dissimilar working conditions and privilege
4. Chosen as the reference because this is where the LASD CCB office is located
5. Omitted due to low cell size (n = 1)

Perceptions of Current Campus Safety and Security

We present the results from the multivariate regression models that tried to explain the variance in respondents’ attitudes towards current campus safety and security practices at the LACCD. The results are presented graphically to aid in the interpretation of the findings. The graphs show the point estimate for the regression coefficient. The horizontal blue line shows the 95 percent confidence interval that is the standard used in hypothesis testing (i.e., $\alpha = 0.05$). As long as the confidence interval does not touch or cross the vertical red line, which represents a value of zero, one can infer that differences this large would only be expected 5 percent of the time or less. That is, although not technically correct, one could say that if you were to infer a difference, the chances you would be wrong would be less than five percent. This is the standard level used for hypothesis testing in frequentist statistical methods.



Figure 21 shows the results for feelings of safety on campus at night. There are a few colored boxes that have been included in this graphic to aid the readers understanding of how to read subsequent figures in this section. Those items embossed in the blue box represent the racial/ethnic categories that were self-reported by respondents. All of these comparisons are made relative to those respondents who identified as white. Looking at these results we can see that respondents who identify as Asian, those who declined to answer about their race/ethnicity, multi-ethnicity/multi-racial respondents and Pacific Islanders all feel less safe on campus at night that do respondents who identified as white.

The next three items down on the list represent the gender of the respondent, again compared to males. The results here show that all other genders report feeling less safe on campus compared to males, with non-binary respondents expressing the feeling the least safe.

The categories embossed in the green box in Figure 21 represent the respondent's relationship with the LACCD (i.e., administrator, classified staff, faculty, or student) with all comparisons made against administrators. The results here show that classified staff and faculty expressed significantly lower feelings of safety than do administrators, although there is no statistical difference between the levels of fear of administrators and students.

Finally, the last set of items in Figure 21 represent the home campus for respondents. Again, we had to eliminate responses from Van de Kamp because there was a single respondent, and the reference category here is the ESC. The results show the diversity in campuses. Specifically, we see that those at the Corporate Center, Mission and West LA campuses express feeling more safe than those at the ESC. Whereas, those at City College and Trade Tech campuses express feeling less safe than respondents from the ESC. These findings are consistent regardless of the context in which participants were asked about their feelings of safety (i.e., during the day, in the parking lots, or in other locations across campus). We do not present all of these figures for the sake of parsimony.

The results from Figure 22 show the likelihood that fear interfered with a respondents campus experience. The results here show that respondents who are Asian, those who declined to answer and multi-ethnicity/multi-racial respondents were more likely to indicate that there fear interfered with their campus experience than were white respondents. We see that respondents who reported any gender other than male were more likely to report that fear interfered with their campus experience than were males.

When we look at the results for relationship with the LACCD, we see that faculty and classified staff were more likely to report that their campus experience had been adversely affected by fear than were administrators, while students and administrators were statistically indistinguishable.

Finally, when we look at the differences across campus, we see that respondents at the Trade Tech campus were more likely to report that fear had interfered with their campus experience than were respondents from ESC. However, students at East LA College, Mission, Pierce, Southwest and West LA Colleges and respondents at the Corporate Center were less likely to report that fear had interfered with their campus experience.



Next, we look at participants perceptions of LACCD adequately investing in campus security. These results are presented in Figure 23. Here we see that respondents who declined to answer expressed more disagreement with this statement than respondents who were white, although no other racial differences were noted. We also see that females and those who decline to specify their gender express significantly lower levels of agreement than males that the campus adequately invests in security although the effect for non-binary respondents is not significant here.

Next, looking at the respondent's relationship with LACCD, we see the now familiar pattern that classified staff and faculty express significantly lower levels of agreement that the District is investing in security compared to administrators, although interestingly, there is no difference between administrators and students.

Finally, looking at the differences across campuses, we see that some campuses (i.e., Mission and Southwest) express higher levels of agreement than do respondents from ESC, while those at the City College, the Corporate Center, the South Gate Education Center and Trade Tech College all express significantly lower levels of agreement. The reason for these differences is unclear from this data, but may suggest differential needs or responses at these campuses.

Next, we examine the perceptions of one of the primary tools that the LACCD has employed for campus safety and security, namely the LASD CCB. The results in Figure 24 show the respondents level of agreement with the fact there are an adequate number of LASD CCB personnel on campus.

The results suggests that those who declined to answer, multi-ethnicity/multi-racial respondents and Pacific Islanders report lower agreement with the statement that there are adequate LASD CCB personnel on campus relative to whites, although there are no other racial/ethnic differences noted. We also see that females report lower levels of agreement with this statement than do males, and there are no significant differences between other genders.

The results for the relationship to the LACCD show the consistent pattern of no differences between students and administrators, but significant lower agreement for classified staff and faculty. The results seem to suggest that most campuses, apart from Southwest, express lower level of agreement that there are sufficient LASD CCB personnel on campus relative to respondents from ESC. This may reflect that respondents from ESC are more likely to see the LASD CCB personnel on campus because the Division Offices are located there.

We present the results for the statement that there are too many LASD CCB personnel on campus in Figure 25, to try and contextualize these results. These results suggest that Asian and Filipino respondents feel there are too many LASD personnel on campus, relative to whites, but no other racial/ethnic differences are observed. Likewise, we see that only non-binary respondents feel there are too many LASD CCB personnel on campus.

When looking at the effect of the respondent's relationship with LACCD, we see that faculty and students are significantly more likely to agree with this statement than are administrators, but there is no difference between classified staff and administrators.



Finally, looking at campus, we see that respondents from some campuses are more likely to agree with this statement, net of other factors, than are others. Notably, respondents from the Corporate Center and the South Gate Education Center are more likely to agree with this statement than are respondents from ESC. However, with the exception of East LA College, which is borderline significant, respondents from all other campuses are less likely to agree with this statement than are those from ESC.

To look at the stability of these results we performed a sensitivity analysis, shown in Figure 26, which added the perception of an adequate number of LASD CCB personnel and those who had contact with the LASD CCB on campus. These results largely leave the other factors unchanged, but show that those who agree there is an adequate number of LASD CCB personnel on campus are more likely to report there are too many LASD CCB personnel on campus, and those who had contact with LASD CCB personnel are less likely to report there are too many of these personnel on campus. These results suggest that respondents feel as though the LASD CCB presence on LACCD campuses, although adequate, may be more than adequate in their assessment. Additional data would be required to confirm this.



Figure 21. Multivariate Estimates on Fear of Crime/Victimization on Campus at Night






Figure 22. Multivariate Results for Fear Interfering with Campus Experience






Figure 23. Multivariate Results for LACCD Investing in Security






Figure 24. Multivariate Results for Adequate Number of LASD CCB Personnel on Campus






Figure 25. Multivariate Results Too Many LASD CCB Personnel on Campus







Figure 26. Sensitivity Analysis for Too Many LASD CCB Personnel on Campus



Assessment of the LASD CCB

We now take a deeper look at respondent's perceptions of the the LASD CCB, specifically in various domains. These results will be presented in the same manner as those above, with the exception that we included a variable depicting whether the respondent had contact with the LASD CCB on campus, which is likely strongly associated with the global attitudes reported here.

The first assessment of the LASD CCB asked respondents to indicate how effective they felt the LASD was at building relationships with the campus community. These results are presented in Figure 27.

The results indicate that respondents who identify as Black/African American and those who identify as Hispanic/Latino report that the LASD CCB is more effective at building relationships with the campus community than do white participants, although no other racial/ethnic differences are noted. Again, we see that all genders feel that the LASD CCB is less effective in developing effective relationships with the campus community compared to males. There are no significant differences in the relationship that a respondent has with the LACCD and their perception of the effectiveness of the



LASD CCB's relationship building. We see that respondents from Mission and Southwest College feel that the LASD CCB is more effective at building effective relationships than respondents from ESC; however, the inverse is true for all other campuses.

Finally, we see that having contact with the LASD CCB has no significant effect on the perception that the LASD CCB is effectively building relationships with the campus community.

The results presented in Figure 28 show the respondents' level of agreement with the statement that the LASD CCB does the right thing. The results show that Asian and Hispanic/Latino respondents are more likely than whites to agree with this statement. Males are more likely to agree with that statement than any other gender. There are no significant differences in the level of agreement with that statement and a respondent's relationship with the LACCD. There are differences between campus, though, with some (i.e., City, East LA, Corporate Center, South Gate Education Center, Harbor and Valley) campuses being less likely to agree compared to ESC, while those on the Mission campus are more likely than ESC to agree with the statement. Finally, again we see that those people who actually had contact with LASD CCB personnel were more likely to agree with the statement that the LASD CCB does the right thing.

The results in Figure 29 show respondents' assessments about the LASD CCB being a necessary part of the campus community for the LACCD. The results suggest that the only racial/ethnic differences are between Hispanic/Latino respondents and whites, with the former being more likely to say that the LASD CCB is a necessary part of the campus community. Respondents who refused to identify their gender and those who identify as non-binary are less likely than males to see the LASD CCB as a necessary part of the campus community. The size of the effect (i.e., the distance from zero) for non-binary respondents relative to males, is by far the strongest effect seen in this model. That is, these respondents strongly disagree compared to males that the LASD CCB is a necessary part of the campus community.

Campus-level differences with respondents arise from some campuses being more likely to agree that the LASD CCB is a necessary part of the campus community than respondents from ESC, while other respondents are more likely to agree with this statement. Again, we see that having contact with the LASD CCB increases the perception that the LASD CCB is a necessary part of the campus community.

Another important part of the assessment of the LASD CCB is whether their presence makes members of the LACCD campus community feel at ease. These results are shown in Figure 30. The results indicate that respondents who identify as Pacific Islander are more likely to agree with this statement than are whites. Further, we see that males are more likely to agree with this statement than are any other gender, and again there is a large discrepancy between males and those who identify as non-binary. There are no differences in whether the LASD CCB makes respondents feel at ease based on their relationship with the LACCD.

There are a few campus level differences. Respondents from the Corporate Center are significantly less likely to agree with statement that the LASD CCB makes them feel at ease compared to



respondents from the ESC. Similar trends are seen for the South Gate Education Center and the City College, although the magnitude of these effects is much smaller. We also see that respondents from the Mission campus agree with the statement that they feel at ease when seeing LASD CCB personnel on campus than those at the ESC. Finally, again we see that having contact with the LASD CCB actually increases the level of agreement with this statement.

Finally, in Figure 31, we look at respondents' agreement with the statement that the LASD CCB has trustworthy motivations. This statement is part of a larger procedural justice assessment that theoretically feeds perceptions of how legitimate respondents feel the LASD CCB would be.

The results show that Asian and Latino students are more likely to agree that the LASD CCB has trustworthy motives than are white respondents, but no other racial/ethnic differences are noted. Again, we see that males are more likely than other genders to feel that the LASD CCB has trustworthy motives, with a substantial difference between non-binary and male respondents. This finding is interesting because much of the earlier research suggests that females often infer trustworthy motivations of the police more so than males.²⁵

There are no significant differences between relationship with the university and perceptions that the LASD CCB has trustworthy motives. Although faculty are less likely to agree that the LASD CCB has trustworthy motives than are administrators.

When looking at campus-level differences, we see the familiar pattern of results. Those respondents who have actually had contact with LASD CCB personnel are more likely to agree that they have trustworthy motives.

Throughout our assessment, respondents who have had contact with the LASD CCB consistently, although not universally, tended to rate the the LASD CCB more favorably. This may suggest that the LASD CCB is being rated negatively based on experiences outside of the LACCD, based on the national dialogue about policing or some other factor that is not measured in this survey. However, when the LASD CCB has contact with members of the campus community, this tends to improve how they are seen.

²⁵ Kulik, C. T., Lind, E. A., Ambrose, M. L., & MacCoun, R. J. (1996). Understanding gender differences in distributive and procedural justice. *Social Justice Research*, 9(4), 351-369.



Figure 27. Multivariate Results for LASD CCB Building Effective Relationships






Figure 28. Multivariate Results for LASD CCB Doing the Right Thing






Figure 29. Multivariate Results for LASD CCB Being Necessary






Figure 30. Multivariate Results for LASD CCB Making Respondent's Feel at Ease







Figure 31. Multivariate Results for LASD CCB Having Trustworthy Motives



The Future of Public Safety

The final section of results shows the differences associated with respondents regarding the future of LACCD safety and security. The first question asked respondents to rank, from a list of six alternatives, retaining the LASD CCB as the campus security provider. The responses to this question are depicted in Figure 32.

The results essentially show that race/ethnicity did not play a role in rank considering other factors. We see that those who declined to provide their gender and those who identify as non-binary were much less likely to rate retaining the LASD CCB as their preferred security provider.

Reading this and the next two figures is a bit counterintuitive, as higher numbers (i.e., moving to the right on the number line) indicates a lower preference. There are no differences in the choice to retain the LASD CCB based on the respondent's relationship with the LACCD.



There are a number of campus-level differences, although all of the significant differences are in one direction. Specifically, we see that the City, East LA, the Corporate Center, the South Gate Education Center, and West LA College respondents all rated retaining the LASD CCB significantly lower than did the ESC. Interestingly, having contact with the the LASD CCB did not significantly predict the preference for retaining the LASD CCB, despite the consistently higher rating in the section above. In Figure 33, we look at the rank order choice for transitioning to a private, yet still armed, security force. Here we see that Asian, Black/African American, those who declined to answer, Hispanic/Latinos and multi-ethnicity/multi-racial respondents were more likely to rank this choice higher than were white students. When we look at gender, we see that non-binary respondents were less likely to rate this as a high option. Further investigation, corroborated by the next section, suggests that non-binary respondents were least supportive of armed and police (regardless of the provider) on campus relative to other options. However, no other gender differences existed here.

We see no differences in the rank order selection based on the respondent's relationship with the LACCD.

There are some campus-level differences, with the Corporate Center being more likely to rank transitioning to armed security more highly than the ESC, as were respondents from the Harbor, Southwest and Trade Tech campuses. Interestingly, the Corporate Center campus respondents were less likely to rank this as a higher option compared to the ESC.

We see that having contact with LASD CCB personnel on campus tends to make participants rate the transition to armed private security lower than those without such contacts.

In Figure 34, we look at the preferences for moving to no formal safety or security provider on campus. There are no racial/ethnic differences in selecting this choice, but those who declined to identify their gender and those who identify as non-binary were more likely, much more so in the case of non-binary respondents, to chose this option. That is, non-binary respondents and those who did not wish to select an option agreed more strongly that there should be no formalized campus safety or security provider in the future. Similarly, we see that faculty and students were more likely to rate this option highly compared to administrators. There was no difference between classified staff and administrators.

We again see some campus-level differences. All of the significant differences are in the same direction, but differ in magnitude. Specifically, we see that respondents from the City College, Pierce, Valley and West LA campuses show a stronger preference for no formal campus security provider compared to those from the ESC. This magnitude is rather small compared to the difference between those from the Corporate Center and the South Gate Education Center, which is smaller than those from the South Gate Education Center and ESC.

Again, we see that there is no effect between those who have had contact with the LASD CCB personnel and those who have not.



Next, we look at how respondents felt that the future provider of campus safety and security services should prioritize tasks. Given the substantial effect that having contact with LASD CCB personnel had on participants, we show the results for how respondents prioritized the future provider being approachable.

The results here are interesting. We see that some racial/ethnic groups (i.e., Filipino) rate being approachable much lower than whites, while those who declined to provide their race/ethnicity felt this is a significantly higher of a priority than whites. Females tended to believe that being approachable was significantly less of a priority than did males, although there were no differences between other genders.

Interestingly, there is a significant difference between students and administrators in how much of a priority being approachable should be for the future provider, but the same differences were not found between administrators, classified staff or faculty.

We see that many campuses rated this approachability factor significantly lower than respondents from ESC, although those respondents from the Corporate Center campus rated this significantly higher of a priority.

Finally, we look at differences in terms of how much respondents felt that the LACCD should spend on public safety per student per year. These results are shown in Figure 36.

The results show that respondents who identify as American Indian/Alaska Native, Black/African American, those who decline to answer, Hispanic/Latino and multi-ethnicity/multi-racial respondents all thought that more money should be spent on public safety than did white respondents. Likewise, females felt that more should be spent than males, but neither of the other two gender categories showed differences from those who identify as males.

The relationship with the LACCD only matters for classified staff, who feel that more money should be spent than do administrators. There is no differences between administrators and faculty or students. Lastly, we see that respondents from all campuses express the preference for higher per student safety spending than the ESC.



Figure 32. Multivariate Results for Rank Order Choice for Retaining LASD CCB






Figure 33. Multivariate Results for Rank Order Choice for Transitioning to Private Armed Security






Figure 34. Multivariate Results for Rank Order Choice for Transitioning to No Formal Safety or Security Agency






Figure 35. Multivariate Results for Future Security Provider Being Approachable







Figure 36. Multivariate Results for Predicting Per Student Public Safety Spending



Qualitative Responses from LACCD Survey

At the end of the survey, respondents were asked the open-ended question, “Is there anything else that you would like to tell us about your perceptions of campus safety and security that has not been addressed previously? We are especially interested if you have thoughts about what you would like to see in the future.”

Of the 4,362 people who fully responded to the survey, and thus saw this question, 1,944 responded. Of these respondents, 299 could not be classified as they answered something akin to “no,” “N/A” or “I have nothing further to add.” This left 1,645 unique responses.

These responses were coded into representative categories. These categories were developed during review of responses. A second coding scheme was used to verify the initial coding. The reliability in the coding between the first and second review by the same coder was 99.7 percent. The 0.3 percent (n = 49) of entries that did not match the initial coding scheme were further reviewed and were coded into one of the 18 categories. This was simple, as 40 of these entries were mis-keyed during the initial or secondary coding (i.e., 41 instead of 14).



The 18 categories that were captured, and the percentage of responses for each, is shown in the table below. The categories were developed sequentially, as issues were discovered during the initial review of the data. Below, we break down the demographic characteristics classified in a particular category. We then summarize the feedback from respondents using demonstrative quotes.

Table 13: Response Categories for Qualitative Responses

Category Number	Category Title	N	% of Responses
1	Survey Issues	146	8.9
2	Alternative Solutions to Enhance Campus Safety	163	9.9
3	Unknown	86	5.2
4	Need for Mental Health Counselling	29	1.8
5	Supportive of Security/Safety Measures on Campus	67	4.1
6	Critical of the LASD	305	18.5
7	Other Campus Problems	111	6.8
8	Supportive of the LASD	333	20.2
9	Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Issues	33	2.0
10	Homelessness/Transients on Campus	55	3.3
11	Fear of Victimization	41	2.5
12	Need for Better LASD Integration	27	1.6
13	More Security Needed on Campus	131	8.0
14	Aversion to Armed Security/Weapons on Campus	24	1.5
15	Sceptical of Private Security Providers	14	0.9
16	Remove the LASD from LACCD	28	1.7
17	Feel Safe on Campus	45	2.7
18	Transition to Private Security	7	0.4
Total		1,645	100%



Demographic Breakdown of Comment Categories

We begin by looking at the racial/ethnic identity of the respondents whose comments were categorized. These results are showing in Figure 37. Due to the number of categories and the number of race/ethnicities, we present the numbers from the table above in lieu of the titles for the categories.

We do not present the breakdown by campus, as this data is quite difficult to visualize; however, most of the comments illustrated show the inherent differences between campuses.

Results suggest that there are some racial differences in the types of comments. Most notably, aside from Hispanic/Latino and American Indian/Alaska Native respondents, the comments classified as eliminating the LASD CCB from campus (Category 16) are the smallest percentage for whites. However, whites rank lower than many other racial/ethnic groups for their support of the LASD CCB (Category 8) and are among the highest for making comments critical of the LASD CCB.

Figure 38 shows that a greater percentage of the respondents identifying as non-binary favor eliminating the LASD CCB from campus (Category 16) and comments that are critical of the LASD CCB (Category 6). Additionally, non-binary respondents left no comments expressing a desire for additional security on campus compared to a similar number of other genders. Finally, a greater percentage of female respondents expressed feelings of safety on campus compared to other genders.

Finally, in Figure 39, we see a percentage of comments categorized by the respondent's relationship with the LACCD (i.e., administrator, classified staff, faculty, or student). Student's comments were more likely to be classified as relating to another problem on campus or unknown. Most of the comments were from students requesting campus operations (i.e., remain in distance learning, open the campus, allow more registration time, or waive debt).

The percentage of students' comments indicating problems with homelessness or transients on or near campus (Category 10) was much higher than other relational groups. Compared to other relational groups, a smaller percentage of students were support the LASD CCB compared to other relational groups, even though there are still 119 student comments classified in this category. Further, we see that a greater percentage of faculty (n=11) expressed a desire to eliminate the LASD CCB from campus, relative to all other relational groups, although a greater number of students' comments were classified as such (n=14).



Figure 37. Open-Ended Response Categorization by Race/Ethnicity






Figure 38. Open-Ended Response Categorization by Gender







Figure 39. Open-Ended Response Categorization by LACCD Relationship



Description of the Response Categories

Survey Issues

Many respondents took umbrage with the survey question asking them to indicate how much per student the LACCD should spend on safety and security. Many of the respondents felt that they could not give an adequate answer to this question because there was no frame of reference. Other concerns about the survey included reference to the survey being biased in favor of the LASD CCB. For example, one white non-Hispanic/Latino female faculty member indicated, “Survey is poorly constructed and biased in favor of retaining LASD.” Other respondents complained that the survey was biased in favor of eliminating the LASD CCB:

““Even considering unarmed security or, even worse, the elimination of security, is a brainwashed, propagandized, Utopian delusion. This “unbiased” survey itself is loaded with questions that create or encourage that type of decidedly biased input, propagating the image of the police as a biased, oppressive, violent scourge.” (From a faculty member who declined to provide their racial/ethnic identity and their gender)



"I infer an antipathy to police in the very presentation of this questionnaire, and even more in its formulation, and I resent it."- From an Asian male student)

Overall, most complaints in this category were about the survey items or respondents arguing that the types of crimes did not apply to their campus.

Alternative Solutions for Campus Safety

Respondents provided many alternative solutions for enhancing safety and security on campus. Many respondents indicated that there were areas with poor lighting, security breaches and the need for more cameras. There was also a preference for all campus visitors to check in or swipe into campus buildings. For example:

"Never heard anything bad about campus security, however, there is a problem with the lack of lighting during the evening. Lighting would help put a lot of people at ease when it comes to fear of being assaulted and in general of being able to see where they are going." - From a male student who declined to provide his race/ethnicity

"Install Security surveillance, for more control and prevention about something or someone danger." - From a Hispanic/Latino male student

"I THINK THAT ALL PERSONEL (sic), STUDENTS AND EVEN VISITOR (sic) MUST BE IDENTIFIED WITH A VISIBLE IDENTIFICATION OR CARNET. SAFETY IS ALL responsibility (sic)." - From a Hispanic/Latino male student

"Every campus is different, so please consider the specific needs of each campus.

Another way to boost safety awareness on campus is to offer certain trainings to students, staff and faculty, as well. There's significant evidence that comprehensive safety training on campus - such as on Title IX or sexual violence prevention, bystander intervention, drug or alcohol abuse, or mental health or wellness awareness training can alter student, faculty, or staff behavior for the duration of the degree program. Training which can be included as a part of the orientation process, and provide students with the tools needed to look out for their own wellbeing and advocate for the safety of their peers.

Thank you" - From a multi-ethnicity/multi-racial female staff member

Overall, the strategies presented should be relatively easy for the LACCD to identify and consider implementing. Many of the comments reflected student desires to employ crime prevention techniques including access control, natural surveillance, and target hardening.



Unknown Category

This category grouped inappropriate or off-topic comments, and comments that could not be classified because there seemed to be information missing from responses. These are largely not helpful or germane to the topic at hand, and as such we do not cover them in any detail.

Need for Mental Health Counseling

Some respondents indicated that they would like to see a greater focus on mental health counselors who can talk down persons who are in a crisis in lieu of summoning the LASD CCB or another campus security model. Many respondents expressed a desire to reinstate the HEAT/HEART teams that previously worked on the campuses. No noteworthy quotes were given for this topic.

Supportive of Security/Safety Measures on Campus

A fair number of respondents indicated that they think of campus safety and security as something that is particularly important. However, these responses often expressed a lack of specificity about what respondents would like to see happen. Instead, these respondents mused about the need for and importance of campus safety. One comment from a female Hispanic/Latino student succinctly encapsulates the LACCD's challenge in addressing campus safety and security:

"I do think that having some sort of security is a good thing but with all of the police violence we have had in the last 18 months I think it is a triggering presence to a lot of students. I don't have an answer but I would recommend asking mostly those students who identify as black to have their voice heard. As far as the budget is concerned I would not want to see a large portion of that going to this allocation."

Critical of the LASD

Many respondents were critical of the LASD CCB's operational and organizational decisions across campuses. Respondents expressed concerns in several areas. For example:

"Please make sure that the agency who is on campus is visible at all times especially at night. There should be more escorts and presence during night for students and employees walking to their cars or on campus.

Also make sure that the agency is culturally sensitive and not bias. I have experienced an issue where a cadet called the sheriff's on campus to assist with an issue with a white student and the sheriff's all walked and questioned the black student. I had to interrupt them and let them know it was the white student. I should not have to stop trained officers from racially profiling students." - From a Black/African American female staff member



Respondents indicated that the relationship with the LASD CCB to the broader campus community is distant or non-existent. Several respondents from all sectors of the campus community expressed concerns that LASD CCB personnel are rarely visible on campus, and when they were visible, they are unapproachable because they are in patrol vehicles only. Some respondents were concerned about the quality of the security given that the “cadets” are disproportionately responsible for the work on campus yet are the most visible members of the LASD CCB. Others indicated negative interactions with LASD CCB personnel during stops, crime reports or other interactions across campus. One respondent even reported instances of sexual harassment perpetrated by LASD CCB personnel:

“TELL YOUR SECURITY TO STOP USING THEIR POWER TO FORCE WOMEN INTO GIVING OUT THEIR NUMBERS AS A WAY OF GETTING OUT OF A CITATION OR OTHER DISCIPLINARY ACTION. IT’S BLACKMAIL!!!!” - From a faculty member who declined to give their race/ethnicity or gender

Overall, comments suggest that the LASD CCB could better meet the needs of the campus community by being more visible, especially at times and locations where members of the campus community feel most vulnerable. However, some comments suggest that it is unlikely that the LASD CCB could ever do enough to change the opinions formed by previous experience. Those who made these comments did not suggest eliminating the LASD CCB explicitly; however, they often sounded dejected and hopeless about the prospect of a future with the organization.

Other Campus Problems

Respondents addressed many other problems indirectly germane to our survey, especially regarding LACCD operations. A fair number of respondents remarked on the presence of wildlife, especially coyotes, on campus with feelings that the wildlife situation would be worse when students return to campus full time after the COVID-19 pandemic subsides.

A few comments were germane to the topic of the survey. One white non-Hispanic/Latino male faculty member expressed “Security needs to participate in shared governance and committees such as PEPC and IEC”. A similar comment came from another faculty member. The sentiment of some respondents seemed to be that if the LASD CCB were to be a part of the campus community, then they needed to participate in all appropriate facets of the campus community. This is ultimately a decision about shared governance and institutional policies and culture, but there are some members of the campus community that want to see the LASD CCB become more integrated.

Comments Supporting LASD

A number of comments were effusively supportive of the LASD CCB. Others were more measured. For example, a multi-ethnicity/multi-racial female faculty member said:

“The situation is complex. I don't want to see faculty and students triggered by law enforcement. At the same time, what are we going to do in an emergency situation?”



I want to know what is truly safe. How can we possibly have a safe campus with no armed officers? What will happen if there is an active shooter? These are the questions that keep me up at night.”

A fair number of comments reported that the LASD CCB was needed on campus in case there was an active assailant incident. Some respondents indirectly acknowledged this sad reality while others used it as prima facie evidence that the LASD CCB belongs on campus.

Many staff and faculty that were supportive of the LASD CCB had direct experiences with them in resolving a tense issue on campus. For example:

“The LASD assisted me with a student incident (the student told another student he would shoot me and other students). The LASD professionally and sensitively managed the situation all the way through my having to testify in court. They said if I was ever afraid, they would be right there...and they were” - From a female faculty member who declined to provide her race/ethnicity).

Some of the LASD CCB staff at certain campuses have developed such a positive reputation that they have come to be thought of as part of the family. For example:

“The deputy assigned to the ESC, **REDACTED**, had a special quality of being kind and friendly and completely de-escalating any actual situation while making us feel incredibly safe. He made it a point to interact with each of us on a personal level and that was crucial, in my opinion.

I will admit my opinion of the LASD is not very high; their highly publicized incidents of shootings, harassment, and gang-mentality don't inspire faith in the organization as a whole. However, deputies like **REDACTED** reflected a care for the community as a whole and commitment to not only de-escalating situations but creating a personal connection with whomever he interacted with so that the situation was automatically brought down to a calmer, more manageable level.

If LACCD does continue their contract with the LASD, I would hope that it come with a statement on LACCD's commitment to community policing with respect and dignity and that more deputies with the qualities shown by **REDACTED**, though **REDACTED** is one of a kind, are brought in to work on the campuses and at the ESC.” - From a female faculty member who declined to give her race/ethnicity

One faculty Hispanic/Latino female member commented:

“My students are afraid to attend class. They have expressed to me that crime is raising and thugs/homeless are becoming more fearless and willing to rob/fight them. My students are having mental breakdowns and stress because of this movement to remove the Los Angeles sheriff deputies.”



Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Issues

Respondents indicated that the LASD CCB has work to regarding DEI. For example:

“If LACCD wants safety, start with the voices of the LGBTQ Community.” - From a male student who declined to give his race/ethnicity

“Need to improve service for deaf students and deaf staffs. Write a piece paper or get American Sign Language interpreter, allow to text from the police for help in somewhat, and any idea better help way for them.” - From an Asian female faculty member

“I trust non-white security personnel. I prefer black male sheriffs. I am inspired to see young Latino female sheriffs.” - From an Asian female student

“Campus safety and security personnel of different ethnicities who can speak different languages to be able to communicate with students/campus employees. Provide cultural sensitivity training to campus safety and security personnel to help them interact effectively with individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds (e.g., international students).” - From an Asian female faculty member

Overall, respondents identified a number of key areas in which the LASD CCB falls short in their DEI efforts, from dealing with members of the campus community who are disabled (visible and invisible), language barriers, cultural barriers and the racial and ethnic homogeneity of the LASD CCB relative to the diverse campus community at the LACCD.

Homelessness and Transients

Several respondents, students in particular, identified problems with homeless and transient individuals on and around campus making them feel unsafe or uncomfortable participating in campus activities. One respondent expressed:

“It's a great failure that a homeless community is being built across the street from campus. Couldn't they find an industrial complex. Now talk to me about safety? What A DISGRACE!” - From a Hispanic/Latino male student

Overall, the concern seems to be that the homeless interfere with students' ability to learn and comfortably access campus. This problem is especially acute for students who take public transportation to and from campus.

Fear of Victimization

Several respondents indicated that eliminating campus security or using a new campus security provider would substantially increase fears of being victimized. For example,



“I would not feel safe at **REDACTED** if we didn’t have LASD on campus. I’ve interacted with them when I requested escort services, when students have had medical emergencies. and overall general questions. They have been helpful, respectful, and always quick to assist. I understand reimagining public safety, but I sure hope it’s not getting rid of LASD on campus all together. I think having town halls where staff, students and LASD can all come together to discuss concerns would be a great idea, but possibly getting rid of LASD all together, would NOT make me feel safe and a terrible idea all together.” - From a Black or African American female faculty member

Some students indicated that their decision to continue enrollment at the LACCD is contingent upon the presence of the LASD CCB. For example:

“I feel that the district is looking for a reason to get rid of the campus sheriffs. I personally would not feel safe without actual police presence. We have too many issues on campus that private security or unarmed security can’t deal be with. I feel that by just having the police cars parked on campus it tells real violent criminals to stay away. I feel that if the sheriffs are gone it’s a green light for criminals and transients to go crazy on our campus. I don’t think I would return to trade tech if the sheriffs or real police are not in campus.” - From a Hispanic/Latino male student

Some of the respondents classified in this category reported feeling that their risk of victimization would objectively increase without the presence of at least armed security, but more often without the presence of the LASD CCB.

Need for Better Integration of LASD into the Campus Community

Some respondents expressed that if LASD CCB personnel interacted more with members of the campus community, especially in positive and non-punitive ways, it would improve the feeling of safety and security on campus. Further, it would ameliorate the problems between the LASD CCB and the campus community. No noteworthy quotes were given for this topic.

More Security Needed on Campus

Some respondents indicated that there is additional need for campus security at locations or during hours of the day. Many expressed a desire to see more LASD CCB personnel in parking and other outside areas during the evening and nighttime hours when classes were letting out. One male Filipino staff member said:

“**REDACTED** is in a location that is unique in the district and it needs the strong presence of LASD for safety. What we have now is not enough to stop transients from entering the campus, let alone protecting the parking lots that are not inside the campus.”



This is like the overall sentiments expressed. Respondents also identified a few campuses and specific buildings in which the LASD CCB could increase their visibility, including in parking structures.

Aversion to Armed Security/Weapons on Campus

Some respondents indicated that they should be allowed to bring their own firearms on campus or engage in open carry; however, these respondents are not included here. This category represents the larger part of the campus community that expressed genuine concern about the presence of armed officers on LACCD campuses, regardless of who employed them.

For example, one Hispanic/Latino female administrator put it bluntly, “Arm personnel has no place in a educational institution.” Another female staff member who declined to provide her race/ethnicity stated:

“I strongly believe security should not necessarily be focused on being armed but being equipped to respond to the needs of the campus since they all differ on environment and access. However with rising school shootings we also need to acknowledge the need have immediate assistance on campus if the event presents itself.”

A small group of respondents made comments in this vein. However, sentiments were unambiguous regarding feelings that firearms do not belong on LACCD campuses because they are unnecessary and counterproductive.

Skeptical of Private Security Providers

A small number of respondents voiced concerns about private security providers and their feelings were unambiguously clear. Most thought that the unique nature of the LACCD student body and the campus locations were not conducive to retaining private security, regardless of whether security is armed. A multi-ethnicity/multi-racial female student expressed:

“If you're looking for a model of campus security, DO NOT FOLLOW USC'S DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY MODEL! As it is, their patrol area covers the LATTC campus, they physically abuse members of the community and we are overpoliced enough on this campus. They should be unarmed and not in the position to deal with traffic violations and our unhoused community, let alone questioning anyone they deem 'suspicious.' You have to remember that many of our students are also unhoused, so who's to say they wouldn't be 'suspicious' according to the line of thinking of law enforcement and ANY of these hired security goons. If they can't be respectful of our student community, then they have no place on our campus, PERIODT!!!”



Remove LASD from LACCD

Some respondents clearly indicated that the LASD CCB has no place on LACCD campuses. One white non-Hispanic/Latino female faculty member commented:

"I do not believe that the presence of LASD increases safety on our campuses. It is clear that LASD is a racist institution with racist employees that target people of color. You asked me earlier if I thought that gangs were an issue at West LA. Were you including the well-documented white supremacist gangs in LASD? The SD cannot be reformed. It must be abolished. We need a new system.

Public safety is important on our campuses, and that responsibility includes providing services for our community, not criminalizing poverty and mental health crises, not valuing property over people. You asked me earlier if law enforcement should target unhoused people on our campuses, but you did not ask me if we should support our students, more 50% of whom self reported being housing insecure.

Public safety should be a community service, not "enforcement" of laws. I would like to see public safety that serves all people. I think we need to invest in social service providers, basic needs (food, housing assistance), and infrastructure (better lighting, classrooms that lock from the inside, better emergency notification system). Right now, LASD is tasked with dealing with everything from a disruptive student in a classroom to property theft to parking violations to unlocking doors to offices or classrooms. Why? Did someone really think it was a good idea to have people carrying lethal weapons to do all of these things?

I would like to see community care teams develop on our campuses that include students, campus peer navigators, social workers, crisis specialists, mental health providers, immigration support staff, food pantries, housing assistance, restorative justice, and more. If we took that money currently spent on sheriffs, and reallocated it, we could spend more on services. We could train (and pay) student ambassadors (maybe from our Puente program and Black Student Union) to be a visible presence on campus for those needing directions or help. We could provide a different mechanism for unlocking doors (administrative support?). We could provide scholarships for students in need. We can fully fund programs to support undocumented, Indigenous, Black, queer, unhoused, and other vulnerable student groups. We could really build a community.

For further reading, I recommend this:

https://www.bu.edu/afam/files/2020/06/Grow_abolition_on_campus_2020_.pdf

Multiple faculty members expressed similar concerns; however, some students also gave similar responses. For example:



“I would prefer if the District spent money on resources for students. As for safety, the District should spend money on alternatives to police. There are other ways that students can be protected and properly helped” - From a female Hispanic/Latino student

Overall, respondents who expressed a desire to have the LASD CCB removed from campus suggested that the LASD is an institution founded on racial/ethnic inequity. Some comments further suggest that students have had adverse experiences with the LASD, but it is unclear if these were on or off-campus. Further, there were concerns about the ethical nature of persons within the broader LASD.

Feel Safe on Campus

Some respondents, mostly although not exclusively students, expressed how happy and safe they felt on their LACCD campus. No noteworthy quotes were given for this topic.

Transition to Private Security

Some respondents expressed concerns about the safety and security on campus. These respondents shared that campus safety and security could be better addressed through alternative providers. For example, one black or African American female faculty member commented:

“I believe we should have our own public safety, post certified, officers. Santa Monica College has an excellent model where they are employed by the college with a benefits package like every other employee. This situation is more community friendly. The officers are invested in the campus and accountable to the community they serve. Law enforcement policy is a combination of penal codes, city ordinances and campus policy. It’s basically sworn school policing. It should also be a combination of armed uniform and armed plain clothes. Background checks should also include social media to weed out followers of hate speech.”

Similarly, a staff member who declined to indicate their race/ethnicity or gender stated:

“Considering recent events with police brutality and a general lack of trust for state sponsored policing I feel that going with an armed, private security firm would be a logical route to take in securing our campuses and district office. As a result, there would be greater levels of accountability and leverage given to LACCD in creating positive outcomes between security and the overall campus community.”

The respondents who made these comments essentially questioned why the LACCD would not try another security provider, since the LASD CCB has failed the district thus far.



Recommendations

Campus and Community Perspectives	
5.1	Establish the LACCD community-oriented policing model and implement goals and expectations officers should work toward. New policies and procedures should include townhall meetings; safety escorts; increased evening patrols; interactions with night class students, faculty, and staff; and foot, bike, and golf cart patrols. Communicate expectations with the LACCD, campus leadership and the LASD CCB.
5.2	Establish performance metrics that align with community-policing policies and procedures, such as goals for the percentage of completed safety escorts, the number of townhall meetings conducted and the number of assists rendered to students. Ensure the LASD CCB officers have measurable standards to pursue.
5.3	Establish a standard procedure to report the designated performance metrics and to evaluate the LASD CCB. The procedure should include a standard report of those metrics utilized across all college campuses and a standard reporting schedule and communication chain.
5.4	Work with the LASD CCB on a standardized communication plan to provide notifications of incidents across all college campuses and to ensure efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency.
5.5	Initiate a program to test alternative LASD officer uniforms that students might consider less intimidating. The LASD CCB should work with LACCD leadership to market the program and let the campus community know about the testing period and subsequent evaluation.
5.6	Ensure the LASD officers assigned to the CCB receive the mandatory mental health crisis response training and de-escalation training. The LASD CCB should provide training records to LACCD leadership.
5.7	Establish a campus civilian response group that accompanies the LASD CCB on calls for assistance with behavioral issues. Implement policies, procedures, training, reporting and evaluation procedures to expand the program so that civilians can respond in lieu of or with the LASD CCB personnel when practical.
5.8	Establish standard procedures for the LASD CCB response to discretionary calls for service on campuses. Basic responses should have district-wide guidelines that apply to all campuses.
5.9	Establish clear ownership and protocols for the use of security technologies such as cameras, access control, lights and emergency phones. The protocol should include the section responsible for routine use (monitoring) audits, repairs, maintenance and reporting of any inoperable or ineffective technologies.
5.10	Implement a security technology audit report that is part of the standard reporting process and the communication plan. Inform affected parties of the status of their respective campus security technologies.



- 5.11** Evaluate campus access control measures to determine if campuses need increased controls, such as visible ID badges or additional perimeter fencing or barriers.
- 5.12** Establish a training schedule for the LASD CCB to train student, faculty, staff and administrators on relevant security responses.



06 *Assessment of the LASD CCB's Operations*

Organization, Command and Supervision

Mission, Values and Cultural Environment

The mission of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's (LASD) Community College Bureau (CCB) states, "Protecting Our Students: The Community College Bureau takes pride in its abilities to keep our campuses and students safe from crime and increase the quality of life in the educational environment."

However, the LASD CCB has not fully incorporated the mission statement into its policing approach. Mission statements risk becoming empty words when the community fails to understand them or when officers do not fully embrace them. Mission statements should serve as a guiding principle that establishes the LASD CCB's vision and community expectations of officers.

Throughout our assessment and in interviews with LASD personnel and other stakeholders, it became clear that although this mission statement is admirable, it does not lay out a practical or operational model that officers can implement in daily operations.

Some stakeholders believe LASD CCB leadership and some campus team leader deputies are inconsistent in their approach, which impacts the vision and direction of how the LASD CCB polices the campuses. LASD CCB leadership and team leaders indicated they feel their daily responsibilities are disconnected from the expectations of the college faculty, staff administrators and students. The LASD CCB has not clearly communicated its mission statement to LACCD, and LACCD has failed to clearly communicate its expectations of an on-campus policing approach.

Although the LASD CCB has a mission statement, its lack of a vision or strategy to guide officers seems to lead some students, faculty and staff to perceive that the LASD CCB is, at times, heavy-handed in its operations. If the CCB had a strong mission statement and provided ongoing examples of its good work through routine reporting to the colleges, it would more clearly define its role to the campus community. The mission statement should include the CCB's responsibilities and priorities and how it engages campus community members to accomplish its tasks.

Unity of Command

The LASD CCB captain serves as the liaison to LACCD executive leadership and interacts with the campus administration. Lieutenants support the captain by performing administrative and technical support functions for the patrol officers, meeting with campus leadership and attending campus meetings on behalf of the LASD CCB.

The LASD CCB sergeants provide support to, and oversight of the deputies and security officers. Sergeants are assigned to provide this support to multiple campus CCB officers, rather than just one set campus. However, when situations dictate, sergeants remain on individual campuses.



The team leaders are essentially commanders of the LASD CCB at the campus level. They oversee the entirety of campus security operations. Team leaders supervise the security officers and work with the LACCD Senior Office Assistant (SOA) assigned to the LASD CCB station. Although team leaders do not technically supervise the Student Cadets, they oversee their operations as well.

Accountability and Command Effectiveness

Campus leadership repeatedly expressed that the LASD CCB does not work for LACCD. Despite the LACCD working closely with LASD CCB team leaders on campus security procedures and operations and in most cases sharing a great rapport, LACCD leadership said they only have so much influence over the security process.

LACCD leadership feels as though they may request and strongly suggest processes but has no authority over whether LASD CCB personnel implement them. In situations involving a violation of law, this is further exacerbated by the fact that team leaders are sworn law enforcement officers and their actions are guided by their duty to uphold the law, not how LACCD leadership interprets that violation or desires situations to be handled. Officer discretion could be exercised; however, clear expectations from the LACCD are necessary. It must have greater accountability to be effective.

Neither the LASD CCB organizational structure nor its current contract with the LACCD supports assigning a sergeant to each campus. As indicated, the team leader acts as the campus commander until an incident warrants a response by a sergeant or lieutenant. Campus interconnectivity is less than ideal, especially for sergeants on multiple campuses. Without a security operations center and a more robust radio platform, the sergeant cannot hear the patrol radio traffic for all their assigned campuses. Instead, they rely on team leaders or security officers to keep them informed. The LASD CCB captain confirmed a radio upgrade to increase connectivity and awareness across the campuses.

Department Operations

Crime Strategies and Tactics

Team leaders on all campuses are well aware of the criminal and security issues on and just outside their respective campuses. For example, the neighborhood that surrounds the Southwest campus has a significant gang population and experiences associated activities. Fortunately, the LASD CCB team leader at this campus has longstanding neighborhood connections and has worked with the gangs previously as part of his duties. His neighborhood background, coupled with his familiarity with the gangs, has prompted an agreement – the gangs stay off campus and the LASD CCB focuses its efforts on campus property.



Patrol Operations

The LASD CCB is comprised of multiple officers but only one team leader deputy is assigned to each campus. As such, many of the campus community's calls for service and interactions are with the security officers or "white shirts."

Throughout our discussions, many stakeholders used the term "sheriff" universally to refer to the security officer, deputy, sergeant and lieutenant. As indicated in the training section below, there are substantial differences in the uniform, requirements and training between the sworn deputies, commanders and security officers. Below, we outline the job descriptions for the roles that provide campus services.

Security Officers

- + Work fixed and assigned posts and patrols on assigned campuses and special events
- + Primarily focus is on preventing and suppressing crime
- + Use vehicles and bikes, and perform foot patrols
- + Write criminal reports with non-workable suspect information, non-criminal reports, campus incident and injury reports, and traffic collision reports involving only property damage (i.e., no injuries)
- + Assist deputy personnel in apprehending public offenders when necessary
- + Inform members of the public, students, faculty, staff and LACCD administrators of available LASD CCB, college, LACCD and individual campus services

Deputy

- + Provides law enforcement security on all nine college campuses via radio, car and foot patrol
- + Investigates, prevents and suppresses crime
- + Apprehends public offenders
- + Responds to and conducts traffic investigations of injury and non-injury collisions
- + Completes written criminal and traffic collision reports

Sergeant

- + Provides administrative and technical supervision to subordinate personnel
- + Supervises sworn personnel to identify and prevent criminal activity, protect life and property and preserve peace on the college campuses



- + Supervises and directs subordinate personnel in tactical operations involving social media threats, campus assaults, bomb threats, active assailant incidents and barricaded suspects
- + Conducts in-service training for law enforcement personnel on social media threats, campus assaults, bomb threats, active assailant incidents and barricaded suspects
- + Trains college administrators and staff on safety threats and appropriate responses

Lieutenant

- + Provides administration and technical supervision over subordinate law enforcement positions, including coordination of the patrol enforcement efforts of all LACCD colleges
- + Collaborates and meets with LACCD presidents and vice presidents to discuss campus crime prevention and suppression
- + Addresses complaints filed through the LASD or the board of supervisors regarding deputy actions while handling routine and emergency calls for service
- + Oversees and approves operational plans for law enforcement actions
- + Represents the unit commander in county, LACCD and community meetings

Housing and Dorm Security

In some instances, homeless individuals apply to the colleges, receiving financial support toward their education and a student identification card in the process. At Harbor, they may receive access to a mini-house near campus. LASD CCB personnel have learned that in some cases, homeless individuals approved for attendance and provided with support do not attend classes. LASD CCB personnel said these students may be taking advantage of an otherwise admirable process to secure a student identification card and receive access to the campus at large and student amenities.

The increase of people experiencing homelessness throughout Los Angeles County has led to homeless individuals seeking refuge in campus spaces. Many stakeholders, ranging from staff and students to administrators to LASD CCB personnel, shared stories about their early-morning encounters with homeless individuals sleeping in restrooms, offices or stairwells. Generally, these individuals were not students.

The unauthorized use of campuses spurred discussions in our outreach sessions. Some stakeholders criticized the LASD CCB for failing to prevent homeless individuals from loitering on campus, expecting that officers would escort them from the campus. Others, like LASD CCB personnel, expressed frustration that campus technical security measures are inadequate. These stakeholders reported the campuses have insufficient or inoperable cameras, poor access control measures, lack of intrusion detection alarms and easily defeated door hardware. They cited discussions among people experiencing homelessness regarding where, how and when to best



access shelter and refuge. Homeless individuals have ample time to observe and assess campus spaces and determine the best times to gain access, likely when security personnel are elsewhere.

Parking Enforcement

Although the LASD CCB does not focus heavily on parking enforcement, we heard many criticisms on the subject. Executives, employees and students voiced complaints regarding parking citations and disapproved of the process. They noted that LASD CCB officers could spend their time and effort on other duties. In contrast, we heard concerns about parking issues from individuals personally impacted by the problems that they expect the LASD CCB to address, including taking enforcement action.

Investigations

The LASD CCB received investigative support from their detectives and the broader LASD team before the COVID-19 pandemic; however, LACCD assessed that the previous service utilization did not support including detectives in the curtailment staffing plan. The actual number of on-campus crimes is relatively low, and crimes that require investigative resources are even less common. The LACCD and some of the campuses expressed frustration that in some cases there appears to be no desire by LASD CCB to apply investigative resources to crimes like breaking and entering and petty theft.

For example, we learned of an instance in which suspected homeless individuals accessed the maintenance shop and stole power tools. Such an occurrence would typically result in a report, but we learned the LASD CCB engaged in little or no investigative work to identify the suspects.

Community Policing

Community policing is not new to the LASD CCB. For many years, it has actively engaged with campus stakeholders using various methods and has implemented programs that promote community engagement. The LASD CCB has safety programs and presentations that it provides on request; however, LACCD stakeholders expressed their desire for increased training and presentations.



The LASD CCB has struggled with ongoing and effective community engagement as part of its community-oriented policing strategy. LASD CCB officers and commanders acknowledge that aside from a visible presence on campus, officers have minimal daily interaction with students. Although the LASD CCB has recently increased its efforts to address this, the lack of community engagement exacerbates the negative perceptions of some stakeholders regarding the officers' roles and focus. Effective community engagement includes a transparent and continuing dialogue in which community members and officers collaborate to resolve crime and quality-of-life issues that may appear intractable. This dialogue can educate students about their rights in dealing with an officer and the LASD CCB's preferred strategy for addressing security concerns.

During our assessment, the LASD promoted a new CCB commander. This commander stressed that one of his primary focus is enhancing community policing efforts.

We heard from many stakeholders who have no problems with the LASD CCB and stated that its officers are responsive and approachable. Many indicated that officers responded when called and handled presented issues; however, nearly all added that most officers did not seem integrated into the campus community.

Not everyone was neutral or complimentary toward the LASD CCB's approach to campus policing. Some interviewees alleged LASD CCB officers have strained relationships with students of color. Some interviewees reported isolated interactions in which they believed they or someone else was targeted. Other stakeholders are concerned that officers sit "watching" in patrol vehicles when they could be on active patrol, which would make them more accessible to the campus community. This concern negatively impacts many stakeholders' perceptions of the officers, and they could view such an action as intimidation. Some students believe LASD CCB officers should only enforce violations, rather than focus on students' overall campus safety.

Warriors vs. Guardians

In 2015, Seth Stoughton, a former police officer and associate professor, detailed the warrior and guardian mentalities in the *Harvard Review*.

He defined the **warrior mindset** as "the mental tenacity and attitude that officers, like soldiers, are taught to adopt in the face of a life-threatening struggle." According to Stoughton, police officers believe they live in an "increasingly hostile world."

In contrast, the **guardian mindset** "prioritizes service over crimefighting, and it values the dynamics of short-term encounters as a way to create long-term relationships." This mindset sees interactions with community members as not only an inevitable part of the job, but as a way to foster a fair, respectful and considerate environment.

The guardian mindset emphasizes:

- + Communications over commands
- + Cooperation over compliance
- + Legitimacy over authority

Source: <https://harvardlawreview.org/2015/04/law-enforcements-warrior-problem/>



Ultimately, we determined some campus community members view LASD CCB officers as possessing a “warrior” rather than a “guardian” mentality.²⁶ This is a dilemma many departments face when trying to balance their approach to policing and enforcing the laws and using discretion when necessary.

The LASD CCB should weave community policing throughout its daily operations and interactions with campus community members. Police and community interactions can be respectful and positive when officers complete community policing-related training and the LASD CCB’s implementation plan aligns with the LASD CCB’s and the LACCD’s goals.

Response to Mental Health Crisis

The LASD CCB offers training and provides access to coordinated multi-disciplinary response teams. These teams included the Higher Education Assessment Team (HEAT) before the personnel reduction due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The LASD CCB’s Risk Assessment and Management Program (RAMP) is a comprehensive mental health evaluation and referral program. It uses standardized criteria to evaluate individual risk factors to assist in determining the proper course of action.

A Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health clinician assists the LASD CCB’s Behavioral Intervention Teams (BIT) and Mental Evaluation Team (MET). The clinician works in tandem with a deputy trained in mental health crisis response. Additionally, LASD CCB provides analyst support for case work. Many LASD CCB officers involved in these initiatives have completed hundreds of hours of mental health crisis response training.

East LA College’s BIT is unique to the LACCD. With the suspension of the HEAT Program, the BIT now operates independently from the LASD CCB.²⁷

Other campuses have similar on-campus teams under different names, such as Pierce College’s Be Safe Team. These teams are comprised of college administrators and health staff that come together when underlying behavior or performance issues warrant on-campus intervention. The circumstances must not put other students or staff at risk.

²⁶ Rahr, Sue and Stephen K. Rice. From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American Police Culture to Democratic Ideals. New Perspectives in Policing Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2015. NCJ 248654. From Warriors to Guardians: Recommitting American Police Culture to Democratic Ideals Sue Rahr and Stephen K. Rice

²⁷ <https://www.elac.edu/Faculty-Staff/Resources/Behavioral-Intervention-Team>



Personnel Practices

Training

As the LACCD weighs its options for a security provider for the LACCD, we recommend it carefully consider the level of training it desires from law enforcement officers providing services on its campus. The LACCD campus community and society at large recognize the importance of officer training, specifically regarding mental health crisis response and de-escalation.

We reviewed the training records of LASD CCB officers. Consistent with law enforcement agencies across the nation, the LASD CCB covers specific topics on a multi-year training schedule. For example, use of force, firearms qualifications and pursuit driving trainings occur at least once per year; however, the LASD CCB offers first aid and CPR refreshers every other year. Listed below are the trainings for security officers and sworn deputies. **Attachment 3** explains the complete California Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) training requirements for all officers certified in the state.

Training for Lieutenants, Sergeants and Deputies

- + Tactical combat casualty care (active assailant response)
- + Rapid responder (active assailant response)
- + Incident management
- + Operation Lifesaver (search and rescue of Alzheimer's and dementia patients)
- + Policing of Equality
- + County Policy of Equity
- + Sexual harassment
- + Cultural diversity
- + Implicit bias and cultural competency
- + Racial profiling
- + Annual firearms
- + Human trafficking
- + Pursuit driving
- + Narcan for patrol
- + Mental health response
- + First aid and CPR
- + Gang education and tracking system



- + Graffiti investigation and reporting system
- + Security awareness

Training for Security Officers

- + Tactical combat casualty care (active assailant response)
- + Rapid responder (active assailant response)
- + Annual firearms
- + Custody assistant
- + Cultural diversity
- + Operation Lifesaver
- + Respect-based leadership
- + 200-hour security assistant/officer training
- + Workplace harassment
- + Tactical combat casualty care

Mental Health Training for Sworn LASD

- + A minimum of 15 hours of mental health training from a California Law Enforcement academy
- + 40-hour Custody Division DeVRT Class equivalent to a crisis intervention team (CIT) course
- + A minimum of eight hours of refresher mental health update training annually
- + A two-hour refresher training on mental health crisis response for deputies transferring from custody to patrol

In-Service Training Opportunities

- + 32-hour Field Operations Crisis Intervention Skills (FOCIS) Training (equivalent to a CIT course)
- + Eight-hour Mental Health Update & Interactions with Developmentally Disabled training
- + Eight-hour Veterans Cultural Awareness, PTSD and TBI training (Basic)
- + Eight-hour Veterans Cultural Awareness, PTSD and TBI training (Intermediate)
- + Eight-hour ROAR (Respond, Observe, Assess, React) de-escalation training with National Alliance for Mental Health (NAMI) guest speakers (new course for summer 2021)



- + Four-hour Cognitive Impairment Practical Application Training (CIPAT) (on-site simulator training for de-escalation skills)

Campus Employee Training

The Manager of Safety and Emergency Services works with the LASD CCB on training initiatives for students, faculty, staff and administrators. However, the LASD CCB suspended the trainings during the COVID-19 pandemic due to the LACCD suspending nearly all on-campus instruction and services. The LASD CCB did, however, conduct a recent mental health awareness training for their personnel and invited LACCD personnel to attend and observe. The Cognitive Impairment Practical Application Training (CIPAT) occurred on May 5, 2021. It addressed de-escalation versus use of force using a simulated mental health crisis. It is fitting that the LASD provides recurring training to address its response to mental health sufferers, considering the national focus on law enforcement response to mental health crises and the many stakeholders who voiced the importance of training. The training required participants to demonstrate competency in deescalating a situation involving an aggressive mental health sufferer.

Although the CIPAT was intended for LASD CCB personnel, the newly promoted CCB captain encouraged LACCD personnel to attend through his attendance at multiple campus meetings. The opportunity for LACCD personnel to observe how LASD CCB officers performed the training was great; however, only one LACCD employee attended. The LASD CCB reported that LACCD employee who attended was impressed by the training, appreciated the opportunity to attend and indicated she would provide an overview of the training to LACCD personnel. A bulletin for the CIPAT is shown below.



Figure 40: LASD's Cognitive Impairment Practical Application Training (CIPAT) Bulletin

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Mental Evaluation Team Presents:
C.I.P.A.T.
Cognitive Impairment Practical Application Training

What we can do for you

- The Mental Evaluation Team is offering de-escalation training for your Deputies which would include briefings on:
- AB 392 and SB230 Penal code sections, 192 and 835a regarding justifiable homicide by a peace officer and using force while affecting arrest
- FOD 16-003 Calk far Service Involving Alleged Mentally I'D Persons; Newsletter 18-13 Project Lifesaver.
- This training some of the mandates required under AB 392 and SB 230 as well as covering 4 hours of the POST, PSP/CPT bi-annual requirements.

MET Trainers and MILO

- MET Deputies conducting training are Certified Academy Instructors, Certified Force Options Simulator Instructors and Advanced Crisis Negotiators.
- The MILO simulator is an immersive, interactive video which is portable and can be setup at your location. Scenarios involving individuals with mental health issues, developmental disabilities or intellectual disabilities are used to challenge participants to use all their available resources and skills.

Training Day Breakdown

- Instructors conduct a AM/PM shift briefings to discuss force related topics including de-escalation, force related case law, and applicable MMP sections. A period of instruction is conducted regarding the Project Lifesaver Program.
- As calls for service allow, participants will be dispatched from the field to the simulator. Participants will go through a MILO simulator phase and debriefing. The approximate time out of the field will depend on the participants' performance.

MET Training Unit
Office: 626-258-3000
Cell: 323-819-9712
Email: Djcerda@lasd.org
POST# 1820-21065

1441 Santa Anita Avenue, South El Monte, CA 91733



The LACCD developed an annual training schedule for individual campuses in coordination with LASD CCB as depicted below. The schedule includes a range of security topics.

Table 14: LASD Annual Training Schedule

Emergency Preparedness Training and Exercises		
Date	Campus	Activity
July 16, 2019	LATTC	New Emergency Plan /Building Marshall training
July 23, 2019	LAVC	EOC Training Part 1
August 13-14, 2019	LASC	EOC Training and Tabletop Exercise
August 15, 2019	LAVC	EOC Training Part 2
August, 2019	LAVC	Active Shooter Tabletop Exercise
August 24, 2019	LATTC	Emergency Plan Training
September, 2019	LAVC	Emergency Communications Drill
September, 2019	LAMC	Active Shooter Training
September 11, 2019	LACC	Building specific lockdown Drill
September 11, 2019	ELAC	Building specific lockdown Drill
September, 2019	LACC	Active Shooter Training
September, 2019	LAVC	Building Marshall Training
September 25, 2019	LATTC	Building specific lockdown Drill
September 25, 2019	LASC	Building specific lockdown Drill
October 9, 2019	LAHC	Building specific lockdown Drill
October 9, 2019	South Gate	Building specific lockdown Drill
October 9, 2019	WEST	Building specific lockdown Drill
October, 2019	ESC	First Aid/CPR/AED
October, 2019	LAMC	Active Shooter Tabletop Exercise
October 17, 2019	ALL	Great Shakeout Earthquake Drill/Full Campus Building Evacuation
October, 2019	WEST	Active Shooter Training
October, 2019	LASC	Active Shooter Training
October, 2019	LACC	Active Shooter Tabletop Exercise
October, 2019	LAVC	Active Shooter Full Scale Exercise
November 6, 2019	LAMC	Building specific lockdown Drill
November 6, 2019	LAPC	Building specific lockdown Drill
November 6, 2019	LAVC	Building specific lockdown Drill
November, 2019	LAMC	Emergency Communications Drill
November, 2019	LACC	Active Shooter Full Scale
November, 2019	LAVC	De-escalation Training
November, 2019	LAHC	Active Shooter Training
November 13, 2019	ESC	Active Shooter Training
December 18, 2019	ESC	Active Shooter Drill

Team leaders said they provide training to faculty, staff and students throughout the year. Training sessions primarily focus on active assailant response. Participants found the active assailant response training valuable. Many expressed the desire for more training opportunities. **Attachment 4** is a training memorandum for the 2020 spring semester, which was to focus on active assailant response. This training did not occur due to the COVID-19 pandemic.



Building-specific lockdown drills occur recurrently. These drills target a specific building or location to minimize disruptions to the college.

Data Collection and Information Sharing

Recordkeeping

As indicated, aside from the Clery Act and crime reporting, the LASD CCB insufficiently records personnel's daily activities. The newly promoted LASD CCB commander acknowledged that he is dissatisfied with the limited documentation of the LASD CCB's work.

Completing and tracking crime reports data are an absolute necessity and required by the Clery Act; however, we recommend that the LASD engage in more comprehensive reporting of campus activity. Considering the national focus on community-oriented policing, we suggest the LASD CCB document its interactions with the campus communities, including instances of providing safety escorts or information and conducting townhall meetings or training sessions.

Reporting

Dispatch

The absence of an operations center, specifically a dispatch center handling calls for service, significantly detracts from the LACCD's security process and its ability to assess the LASD CCB's activities on campus. A centralized dispatch center is a widely embraced concept and law enforcement best practice.

Computer-aided dispatch (CAD) systems accurately capture the time of a call for service, who dispatched the call and when, the time officers arrive, what actions they take and the disposition of the call. The LASD CCB officers' mobile data terminal may capture some of this information; however, our review of those entries provided limited information to assess officer responses. A traditional centralized dispatching model documents all call and dispatch information in real time. It increases officer safety through increased accountability throughout their shifts and when responding to calls for service. The data a modern CAD system provides is also extremely helpful when conducting a staffing analysis that is based upon calls for service and other police-related activities.

The Clery Act

The federal Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act) requires public and private colleges and universities participating in federal student aid programs to disclose campus safety information, and impose certain basic requirements for handling incidents of sexual violence and emergency situations.

Disclosures about crime statistics and summaries of security policies are made in an Annual Security Report (ASR), and information about specific crimes and emergencies is made publicly available on an ongoing basis throughout the year.

Source: www.cleryact.info



Clery Act Records

The LASD complies with Clery Act reporting. We received reports from 2011 to 2020. We provide these reports in **Attachment 1**.

Liaison with External Entities

One of the inherent benefits of having the LASD serve as the on-campus security provider is its immediate access to and availability of additional resources. The LASD CCB contract includes some of the resources. However, should a situation such as a dignitary visit occur, command staff can quickly assemble the necessary resources, such as explosive detection canine teams, SWAT and intelligence analysts to support a safe and secure response for the event.

In an emergency, the protocols for requesting assistance are second nature to LASD CCB officers, who quickly coordinate their response with incoming agencies. However, one stakeholder shared that routine communication between LASD CCB and other external agencies to support a more seamless response would be beneficial. This stakeholder noted an instance on campus when local police responded to a call. Neither this local department nor the LASD were aware of the other department's actions relevant to the call.

Recommendations

Overview of Security Operations	
6.1	Encourage the LASD CCB to work with LACCD to develop a new mission statement and core values that align with an enhanced community-oriented policing model.
6.2	Task command staff with developing and providing a monthly report to the designated LACCD personnel that describes the LASD CCB's overall performance, including a high-level overview of incidents, challenges, successes, areas of future focus and improvement areas.
6.3	Have the command staff develop a follow-up system to ensure adherence to campus-level performance metrics and associated reporting.
6.4	Ensure immediate accountability for LASD CCB personnel during calls for service and patrol tasks to include real-time data points with dispatching.
6.5	Establish a process for the LASD CCB's management of emergency response plans. The process should require an annual review, revision and approval, training exercise and evaluation.
6.6	Seek opportunities for command staff to attend enhanced community-oriented policing training and exposure for LASD CCB employees.



- | | |
|-------------|--|
| 6.7 | Implement a monthly recognition program for LASD CCB personnel on each campus to further promote its mission and personnel to the campus community. |
| 6.8 | Task the LASD CCB and LACCD district designee with defining each campus' operations at the LASD CCB station, particularly regarding job responsibilities, staffing requirements and redundancy in operations. Provide that information to campus leadership. |
| 6.9 | Take immediate steps to refine and possibly centralize the LASD CCB's dispatching procedures. |
| 6.10 | Evaluate the effectiveness of the LASD CCB's staffing structure and implement appropriate changes to ensure transparency and accountability to LACCD. |
| 6.11 | Ensure command staff use crime and incident reporting to drive personnel assignments across the campuses. |



07 Staffing Analysis

We examined data related to the services the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) provides to the Los Angeles County Community College District (LACCD) under its contract. The LASD is responsible by its charter to provide municipal police services to the one million residents in the unincorporated communities throughout Los Angeles County. In addition, 42 of the county's 88 cities contract the LASD to provide local police protection. These cities, ranging in population from 700 to 200,000 and in size from one to 100 square miles, have diverse communities with equally diverse needs. The LASD also provides contracted services for transit, parks and the LACCD.

Contracting law enforcement services can offer significant advantages regarding staffing and deployment. Significant evidence suggests that in communities that establish contracts for their law enforcement services, the cost of providing those services is less than if they were to staff their own agency.²⁸ Many communities, even some that are quite large, have eliminated their law enforcement department in favor of contracting.²⁹

A broader question is the extent to which contracting meets the needs of the community and the agency providing the service. In most cases, the agency providing the service conducts an assessment to determine the appropriate level of personnel required to ensure public safety. This may be less than the contracting entity's current staffing level because the service provider benefits from economy of scale.

For example, the City of Saugatuck, Michigan recently eliminated its police department in favor of a contract with the Allegan County Sheriff's Office (ACSO). Under the plan, the ACSO assigns deputies to Saugatuck during peak demand hours. During other times, deputies respond from nearby posts. This approach reduced the cost of policing in the city by 38 percent.³⁰ However, on some occasions, contracting is problematic because the provider and the community cannot agree on how many officers the agency assigns. Other contracting communities indicate that while they can realize cost savings for their policing services, they experience a decrease in the amount of community-oriented policing services the contracted law enforcement agency provides, since those officers working in the contracted cities do not necessarily see themselves as members of the communities they are serving. This situation can lead to a decrease in ongoing community engagement and collaborative efforts to address crime and quality of life issues between those officers serving in these communities and those who are being served.

The LASD Community College Bureau (CCB) provides services for LACCD. Figure 41 illustrates the LASD CCB's staffing.


28 Is Contracting Police Services More Cost Effective? A Cost Benefit Analysis of Contracted Police Services Versus Direct Service Deliver. Scarlett Santos Leon. California State Polytechnic, Pomona. 2019.

29 Contracting for Law Enforcement Services: Perspectives from Past Research and Current Practice. Jeremy M. Wilson, Alexander Weiss and Steven Chermak. March 2014. Michigan State University.

30 <https://www.hollandsentinel.com/news/20180313/saugatuck-approves-contract-with-allegan-county-sheriffs-office>



Figure 41: LASD CCB Staffing as of January 25, 2021



Each campus maintains a LASD CCB station to support security services 24 hours per day. A student cadet staffs the office when available; however, a security officer typically staffs the office. It should be noted that currently, during the staffing curtailment plan, there are occasions where officers are on patrol or responding to calls and the stations are not staffed. Table 16 lists the number of deputies and security officers assigned to each campus.

The above listed personnel represent the LASD CCB staffing reduction when nearly all on-campus instruction and services were suspended. Prior to January 25, 2021, the following additional personnel were assigned:



Table 15: Personnel Assignment

Position	Number of Additional Personnel
Lieutenant	1
Sergeant	8
Detective	4*
Deputy	6
Security Officer	18
Analyst	1
Sheriff Station Clerk	2
Civilian Support	2

* Detective Sergeant included

Table 16: Personnel Assignment by Campus

Campus	Deputies	Security Officers
Mission	2	8
West Los Angeles College (WLAC)	2	9
Pierce	2	10
Valley	2	10
Los Angeles City College	2	10
East Los Angeles College (ELAC)	2	10
Trade Tech	2	10
Southwest	2	10
Harbor	2	9

In assessing the services provided by any law enforcement agency, it is instructive to examine data that describes what officers do, when and where, and the extent to which their efforts are successful. We begin by examining reported Part 1 crimes across campuses between 2016 and 2019. The number of reported offenses, particularly violent crime, is remarkably low. Moreover, the number of overall crimes during this period dropped significantly.



Table 17: Part I Crimes on Campus

Part I Crimes	2016	2017	2018	2019
Homicide	0	0	0	0
Rape	2	1	0	5
Robbery	5	4	4	6
Aggravated Assault	16	9	13	2
Total Violent Crime	23	14	17	13
Burglary	31	29	39	43
Locker Burglary	16	10	7	17
Vehicle Burglary	49	27	24	11
Grand Theft	34	43	30	29
Petty Theft	250	201	170	123
Total Larceny Theft	349	281	231	180
Grand Theft Auto	17	17	17	15
Arson	0	7	2	6
Part I Totals	420	348	306	257

We faced significant difficulties in obtaining the data to inform our officer activity analysis. The LASD maintains two types of activity data. The first is data from the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system. CAD systems capture almost all police activity from crime to traffic stops to officers' breaks. Much of the LACCD activity does not appear in the LASD CCB's CAD system. The LASD captures the second type of data through station logs maintained at each campus LASD CCB station.

We asked the LASD for two-years of CAD system data about community-generated calls for service. The data was to include:

- + Nature of call
- + Call priority
- + Time of receipt



- + Time of dispatch
- + Time of arrival
- + Time the last unit clears
- + Geographic unit of call

Most of the data we initially received would not be described as relating to community-generated calls. Rather, these calls were primarily for administrative activities. This data set also omits any information about response time. Table 18 illustrates this initial data.

Table 18: Data Obtained from the First LASD CCB CAD Data Set

Event Type	Number
STATION SERVICE: Administrative	2,215
STATION SERVICE: Appearance, Court	5
STATION SERVICE: Briefing	7,965
STATION SERVICE: Community Relations	18
STATION SERVICE: Equipment Trouble (Veh/Boat/Radio)	4
STATION SERVICE: Messenger	24
STATION SERVICE: Station Service	8,870
STATION SERVICE: Training	98
STATION SERVICE: Transportation-Other	4
STATION SERVICE: Transportation-Prisoner	4
STATION SERVICE: Travel Time	50



We identified events that appeared more like calls for service and later received a second data set that included the arrival and clear time for calls. We matched up the two data sets, hoping to obtain better information about response to calls and average time spent at scenes. Unfortunately, many of the records included vague tasks like “follow-up.” Further, on many records, the officer indicates that they spent eight hours on the call.

After taking these steps to scrub the data, we arrived at the data that we examined. We could label these as calls for service; however, it is more accurate to call them CAD events.

We combined the number of events for 2019 and 2020. Table 19 lists the number of events by campus.

Table 19: LASD CCB CAD Events by Campus

Campus	CAD Events
City	883
ELAC	813
Trade Tech	1,981
Valley	1,075
Pierce	1,567
Mission	1,143
Southwest	173
WLAC	1,419
Harbor	186
Total	9,240 (average 13 per day)

This table illustrates events are relatively infrequent, considering that we combined two years of data. For example, Pierce College only averaged approximately two calls per day, despite having been the campus with the most events. At the Southwest campus, one event occurred every four days. We are uncertain as to whether the variation in activity by campus is due to real differences or to variation in reporting procedures.



We now illustrate the results for each campus including four components:

- + CAD events by month
- + CAD events by day of week
- + CAD events by hour of day
- + Types of CAD events

The following are important factors to consider while examining this data:

- + Because there was little correspondence between the time that event “occurred” and when officers “arrived,” we are using the arrival time as the time that the event started
- + Because the duration of these events is often eight or more hours, we were unable to reliably calculate average call times
- + In the “hour of day” figures, we often see peaks during shift changes. This again suggests that this data may not reflect calls by shift start activity
- + Most campuses see spikes in activity in April and May
- + Relatively few crimes are reported
- + Few events occur after midnight



LA City College

Figure 42: LA City College CAD Events by Month – 2019/2020 Combined




Figure 43: LA City College CAD Events by Day of Week






Figure 44: LA City College CAD Events by Hour




Table 20: LA City College CAD Events

Description Text	Count
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC-VEH OR BOAT: Accident, Traf With Inj (Non-Fatal)	1
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Hands, Feet, Fist, Etc.	3
Assigned Assist	15
Assist CHP	3
Assist Citizen	53
Assist Fire Department	6
Assist Government	1
Assist LASD Transit	3
Assist Other Sheriff's Station	2
Assist Police Department (Not LASD)	1



Assist Station Unit	53
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Night, Entry by Force	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Night, Entry No Force	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Entry by Force	6
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Entry No Force	3
Contact Made: Indication(s) of Homelessness	8
COVID-19 Directed Patrol / Compliance Check / Enforcement	441
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Disturbing the Peace/Court Disturbances	44
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Interfering W/School Activities	27
Escort – Staff	2
FELONIES, MISCELLANEOUS: Embezzlement, Felony	2
GRAND THEFT VEHICLE (GTA): Other Veh (Snowmobile, Golf Cart, Etc)	2
GRAND THEFT: From Bldg (Churches, Schools, Restaurants, Offices, Etc)	3
GRAND THEFT: Other (From Boat, Plane, Prvt Res, Yard, Etc)	2
GRAND THEFT: Shoplifting, From Auto Over \$400	1
Known / Confirmed COVID-19 Related	4
MISCELLANEOUS: Injury to County Employee	1
MISDEMEANORS, MISCELLANEOUS: All Other Misdemeanors	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire Alarm	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire, Non-Criminal	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Follow-Up	3
NON-CRIMINAL: Police Hazard-Other	123
NON-CRIMINAL: Property Lost/Found/Recovered	8



NON-CRIMINAL: Safety Hazard	2
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Circumstances, Possible Criminal Activity	5
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Vehicle	13
Person(s) Mentally Ill - 5150 Hold Placed	2
PERSONS DEAD: Person Dead, Other (Unknown Cause)	1
Predictive Policing Activities	1
ROBBERY, WEAPON: Highway, Etc.	1
SEX MISDEMEANORS: Engage/Solicit Lewd or Obscene Conduct	1
Special Event Duty	8
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Bicycles	5
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): From Buildings (Church, School, Restaurant)	6
Unable to Locate Person(s) With Alleged Mental Illness	1
VANDALISM: Graffiti/Tagging	1
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Felony, or to Church, Synagogue, etc	3
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Misdemeanor	5
VEHICLE BURGLARY: Truck/Cargo Van Burglary	1
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Warning Given	1
Total	883



East LA College

Figure 45: ELAC CAD Events by Month – 2019/2020 Combined




Figure 46: ELAC CAD Events by Day of Week






Figure 47: ELAC CAD Events by Hour




Table 21: ELAC CAD Events

Description Text	Count
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC- VEHICLE OR BOAT: Traffic (Non-Injury)	1
ARSON: All Other Structures (Bldg Under Construction)	1
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Hands, Feet, Fist, Etc.	2
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Spousal Assault	2
Assigned Assist	9
Assist CHP	2
Assist Citizen	44
Assist Fire Department	4
Assist LASD Transit	4
Assist Police Department (Not LASD)	1



Assist Station Unit	13
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Night, Attempt	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Entry by Force	1
BURGLARY, RESIDENCE: Day, Attempt	1
Contact Made: Person(s) With Indication of Mental Illness	1
COVID-19 Directed Patrol / Compliance Check / Enforcement	385
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Disturbing the Peace/Court Disturbances	49
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Interfering W/School Activities	1
FELONIES, MISCELLANEOUS: ALL OTHER FELONIES	1
FELONIES, MISCELLANEOUS: Embezzlement, Felony	1
GRAND THEFT VEHICLE (GTA): Other Veh (Snowmobile, Golf Cart, Etc)	4
GRAND THEFT: Other (From Boat, Plane, Prvt Res, Yard, Etc)	3
IDENTITY THEFT: Attempt/Possession of Profile Info, 530.5(d)PC, Mis.	1
JUVENILE, NON-CRIMINAL: Juvenile Incurrigible, (WIC 601)	1
MISDEMEANORS, MISCELLANEOUS: All Other Misdemeanors	1
MISDEMEANORS, MISCELLANEOUS: Trespassing	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire Alarm	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire, Non-Criminal	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Follow-Up	99
NON-CRIMINAL: Police Hazard-Other	132
NON-CRIMINAL: Property Lost/Found/Recovered	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Safety Hazard	4
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Circumstances, Possible Criminal Activity	3



NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Person	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Vehicle	4
Person(s) Mentally Ill - 5150 Hold Placed	2
PERSONS MISSING or FOUND - Found Adult, Other Agency	1
RAPE, FORCIBLE: Attempt Assault, Rape by Force	1
ROBBERY, STRONG-ARM: Carjacking	2
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Auto Parts and Accessories	4
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): From Buildings (Church, School, Restaurant)	5
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Other (From Private Res, Boat, Plane, Yard)	3
Train Ride	1
VAGRANCY: Illegal Vending (Peddling)	1
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Felony, or to Church, Synagogue, etc.	1
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Misdemeanor	2
VEHICLE AND BOATING LAWS: Hit and Run, Misdemeanor	4
VEHICLE BURGLARY: Truck/Cargo Van Burglary	1
VEHICLE/BOAT, OTHER NON-CRIMINAL: Vehicle/Boat Recovered (Other Juris)	1
VEHICLE/BOAT, OTHER NON-CRIMINAL: Vehicle Red Tagged	1
VEHICLE/BOAT, OTHER NON-CRIMINAL: Vehicle/Boat, Stored/Impounded	1
WORTHLESS DOCUMENTS/FORGERY: Forgery - Checks/Money Orders	1
Total	813



LA Harbor College

Figure 48: LA Harbor CAD Events by Hour




Figure 49: LA Harbor CAD Events by Day of Week






Figure 50: LA Harbor CAD Events by Hour




Table 22: LA Harbor CAD Events

Description Text	Count
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC- VEHICLE OR BOAT: Traffic (Non-Injury)	3
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC-VEH OR BOAT: Accident, Traffic with Injury (Non-Fatal)	2
ARSON: All Others	1
Assigned Assist	5
Assist Citizen	49
Assist Fire Department	3
Assist Other Sheriff's Station	3
Assist Station Unit	2
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Day, Attempt	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Night, Attempt	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Night, Entry by Force	3



BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Night, Entry No Force	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Attempt	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Entry No Force	1
COVID-19 Directed Patrol / Compliance Check / Enforcement	68
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Disturbing the Peace/Court Disturbances	8
DRUNK: Alcohol	1
FEDERAL OFFENSES WITH MONEY: Counterfeiting U.S. Money	2
GRAND THEFT: Auto Parts and Accessories	1
MISCELLANEOUS: Damage to County Property	1
MISCELLANEOUS: Stolen/Lost/Found/License Plates	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Follow-Up	3
NON-CRIMINAL: Property Lost/Found/Recovered	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Person	3
Person(s) Mentally Ill - 5150 Hold Placed	1
ROBBERY, STRONGARM: Other	1
SEX MISDEMEANORS: Engage/Solicit Lewd or Obscene Conduct	1
Special Event Duty	4
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): From Auto (Except Parts/Accessories)	3
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): From Buildings (Church, School, Restaurant)	1
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Other (From Private Res, Boat, Plane, Yard)	1
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Felony, or to Church, Synagogue, etc.	2
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Misdemeanor	1
VEHICLE BURGLARY: Auto/Passenger Van Burglary	1



VEHICLE/BOAT, OTHER NON-CRIMINAL: Vehicle/Boat Recovered (Other Juris)	1
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Warning Given	3
WARRANTS: Misdemeanor	1
Total	186



LA Mission College

Figure 51: LA Mission College CAD Events by Month – 2019/2020 Combined




Figure 52: LA Mission College CAD Events by Day of Week






Figure 53: LA Mission College CAD Events by Hour




Table 23: LA Mission College CAD Events

Description Text	Count
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC- VEHICLE OR BOAT: Traffic (Non-Injury)	1
ARSON: Community/Public (Churches, Jails, Schools, Etc.)	1
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Obstruct/Resist/Battery Peace Officer	1
Assigned Assist	5
Assist Citizen	159
Assist Fire Department	5
Assist Other Sheriff's Station	3
Assist Station Unit	18
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Day, Entry By Force	1
COVID-19 Directed Patrol / Compliance Check / Enforcement	11



DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Disturbing The Peace/Court Disturbances	30
Escort - Money	7
Issuance of restraining orders.	1
LOCKER BURGLARY	4
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire Alarm	4
NON-CRIMINAL: Follow-Up	35
NON-CRIMINAL: Police Hazard-Other	808
NON-CRIMINAL: Property Lost/Found/Recovered	5
NON-CRIMINAL: Rescue	6
NON-CRIMINAL: Safety Hazard	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Circumstances, Possible Criminal Activity	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Vehicle	1
Person(s) Mentally Ill - 5150 Hold Placed	1
Search operations	1
Special Event Duty	4
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): From Buildings (Church, School, Restaurant)	1
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Other (From Private Res, Boat, Plane, Yard)	1
VANDALISM: Graffiti/Tagging	3
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Felony, or to Church, Synagogue, etc.	4
VEHICLE AND BOATING LAWS: Hit And Run, Misdemeanor	1
VEHICLE/BOAT, OTHER NON-CRIMINAL: Traffic Hazard	16
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Parking	3
Total	1,143



Pierce College

Figure 54: Pierce Valley CAD Events by Month – 2019/2020 Combined




Figure 55: Pierce Valley CAD Events by Day of Week






Figure 56: Pierce Valley CAD Events by Hour




Table 24: Pierce Valley CAD Events

Description Text	Count
ACCIDENTS, MISCELLANEOUS: Accident, Traffic (Off Highway)	1
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC- VEHICLE OR BOAT: Traffic (Non-Injury)	1
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC-VEH OR BOAT: Accident, Traffic with Injury (Non-Fatal)	3
ARSON: Community/Public (Churches, Jails, Schools, Etc.)	1
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Hands, Feet, Fist, Etc.	2
Assigned Assist	5
Assist CHP	1
Assist Citizen	268
Assist Fire Department	7
Assist Police Department (Not LASD)	7



Assist Public Utility	1
Assist Station Unit	124
Contact Made: Person(s) With Indication of Mental Illness	1
COVID-19 Directed Patrol / Compliance Check / Enforcement	863
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Disturbing the Peace/Court Disturbances	13
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Peeping and/or Prowling	1
DRUNK: Alcohol	1
Escort - Money	3
Escort - Student	1
FELONIES, MISCELLANEOUS: ALL OTHER FELONIES	3
IDENTITY THEFT: Goods/Services/Credit, 530.5(a)PC, Felony	1
MISCELLANEOUS: Injury To County Employee	1
MISDEMEANORS, MISCELLANEOUS: Trespassing	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Alarm-Burglary	9
NON-CRIMINAL: Domestic Violence	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire Alarm	18
NON-CRIMINAL: Follow-Up	17
NON-CRIMINAL: Police Hazard-Other	18
NON-CRIMINAL: Property Lost/Found/Recovered	2
NON-CRIMINAL: Safety Hazard	6
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Circumstances, Possible Criminal Activity	145
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Person in Vehicle	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Vehicle	9



Person(s) Mentally Ill - 5150 Hold Placed	5
PERSONS MISSING OR FOUND: Adult, Missing, Lost Or Found	1
SEX FELONIES: All Other Sex Felonies	1
SEX MISDEMEANORS: All Other Sex Misdemeanors	1
Special Event Duty	2
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): From Buildings (Church, School, Restaurant)	2
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Other (From Private Res, Boat, Plane, Yard)	2
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Shoplifting (From Dept Store, Mkt, Etc.)	1
VANDALISM: Graffiti/Tagging	3
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Felony, or to Church, Synagogue, etc.	2
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Misdemeanor	1
VEHICLE AND BOATING LAWS: Hit and Run, Misdemeanor	1
VEHICLE AND BOATING LAWS: Misdemeanor	1
VEHICLE/BOAT, OTHER NON-CRIMINAL: Traffic Hazard	1
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Parking	5
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Warning Given	2
Total	1,567



LA Southwest College

Figure 57: LA Southwest College CAD Events by Month – 2019/2020 Combined




Figure 58: LA Southwest College CAD Events by Day of Week






Figure 59: LA Southwest College CAD Events by Hour




Table 25: LA Southwest College CAD Events

Description Text	Count
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Hands, Feet, Fist, Etc.	1
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Spousal Assault	1
Assigned Assist	2
Assist Citizen	9
Assist Fire Department	2
Assist LASD Transit	1
Assist Station Unit	2
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Entry No Force	1
COVID-19 Directed Patrol / Compliance Check / Enforcement	139
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Disturbing The Peace/Court Disturbances	5
Escort - Money	2



FELONIES, MISCELLANEOUS: ALL OTHER FELONIES	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire Alarm	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Property Lost/Found/Recovered	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Vehicle	1
Suspicious Circumstances, Possible Terrorist Related Incident	1
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Bicycles	1
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Felony, or to Church, Synagogue, etc.	2
WARRANTS: Misdemeanor	1
Total	173

West LA College

Figure 60: West LA College CAD Events by Month – 2019/2020 Combined






Figure 61: West LA College CAD Events by Day of Week




Figure 62: West LA College CAD Events by Hour






Table 26: LA Southwest College CAD Events

Description Text	Count
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC- VEHICLE OR BOAT: Traffic (Non-Injury)	3
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC-VEH OR BOAT: Accident, Traffic With Injury (Non-Fatal)	1
ARSON: All Others	1
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Hands, Feet, Fist, Etc.	3
Assigned Assist	4
Assist Citizen	951
Assist Fire Department	15
Assist Other Sheriff's Station	6
Assist Police Department (Not LASD)	3
Assist Station Unit	21
COVID-19 Directed Patrol / Compliance Check / Enforcement	187
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Disturbing the Peace/Court Disturbances	60
Found Narcotics	1
FRAUD: Fraud by Trick or Device - \$400 Or Less	1
Handgun Registration, Voluntary	1
JUVENILE CITATION, Infraction	1
JUVENILE, NON-CRIMINAL: Juvenile School Laws, Habitual Truancy (WIC 601B)	1
MISCELLANEOUS: Hate Incident – Non-Criminal	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Alarm-Burglary	2
NON-CRIMINAL: Alarm-Robbery	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire Alarm	5



NON-CRIMINAL: Fire, Non-Criminal	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Follow-Up	72
NON-CRIMINAL: Police Hazard-Other	46
NON-CRIMINAL: Property Lost/Found/Recovered	3
NON-CRIMINAL: Safety Hazard	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Circumstances, Possible Criminal Activity	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Person	3
Person(s) Mentally Ill - 5150 Hold Placed	2
PERSONS DEAD: Person Dead, Overdose Narcotics/Drugs	1
SEX FELONIES: All Other Sex Felonies	1
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Shoplifting (From Dept Store, Mkt, Etc.)	1
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Misdemeanor	1
VEHICLE/BOAT, OTHER NON-CRIMINAL: Vehicle/Boat Recovered (LASD Juris)	1
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Hazardous Citation	1
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Non-Hazardous Citation	3
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Parking	1
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Warning Given	10
WARRANTS: Misdemeanor	1
Total	1,419



Trade Tech

Figure 63: Trade Tech CAD Events by Month – 2019/2020 Combined




Figure 64: Trade Tech CAD Events by Day of Week






Figure 65: Trade Tech CAD Events by Hour




Table 27: Trade Tech CAD Events

Description Text	Count
ACCIDENTS, MISCELLANEOUS: Accident, Non-Traffic	2
ARSON: Single Occupancy Residential	1
ASSAULT, FELONY: Spousal Assault	1
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Hands, Feet, Fist, Etc.	3
ASSAULT, MISDEMEANOR: Spousal Assault	1
Assigned Assist	4
Assist Citizen	413
Assist Fire Department	33
Assist Government	1
Assist LASD Transit	1



Assist Operation Safe Streets (OSS)	8
Assist Other Sheriff's Station	5
Assist Police Department (Not LASD)	6
Assist Station Unit	130
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Day, Entry No Force	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Night, Entry by Force	4
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Night, Entry No Force	2
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Attempt	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Entry by Force	1
BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Entry No Force	1
BURGLARY, RESIDENCE: Unknown, Entry No Force	1
Contact Made: Indication(s) of Homelessness	3
Contact Made: Person(s) With Indication of Mental Illness	3
COPS Program	1
COVID-19 Directed Patrol / Compliance Check / Enforcement	165
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Disturbing the Peace/Court Disturbances	7
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Interfering W/School Activities	393
Escort - Money	4
Escort - Staff	13
Escort - Student	26
FELONIES, MISCELLANEOUS: ALL OTHER FELONIES	1
Found Narcotics	1
GRAND THEFT VEHICLE (GTA): Automobile/Passenger Van	1



GRAND THEFT VEHICLE (GTA): Motorcycle	1
GRAND THEFT: Bicycles	1
GRAND THEFT: From Bldg (Churches, Schools, Restaurants, Offices, Etc)	9
Handgun Registration, Voluntary	1
LOCKER BURGLARY	3
MISCELLANEOUS: Damage to County Property	1
MISCELLANEOUS: Stolen/Lost/Found/License Plates	1
Misdemeanor Possession of a Controlled Substance (excluding Marijuana)	1
MISDEMEANORS, MISCELLANEOUS: All Other Misdemeanors	4
MISDEMEANORS, MISCELLANEOUS: Trespassing	19
NON-CRIMINAL: Alarm-Burglary	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire Alarm	14
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire, Non-Criminal	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Follow-Up	491
NON-CRIMINAL: Property Lost/Found/Recovered	7
NON-CRIMINAL: Rescue	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Safety Hazard	2
NON-CRIMINAL: Special Investigations	9
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Circumstances, Possible Criminal Activity	52
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Vehicle	16
Person(s) Mentally III - 5150 Hold Placed	2
Person(s) Mentally III - Mental Health Unit Deferral	1
PERSONS MISSING OR FOUND: Adult, Missing, Lost Or Found	2



REASONABLE CAUSE ARRESTS: Rape, Forcible and Statutory	2
ROBBERY, STRONGARM: Other	1
SEX MISDEMEANORS: All Other Sex Misdemeanors	1
SEX MISDEMEANORS: Engage/Solicit Lewd or Obscene Conduct	3
SEX MISDEMEANORS: Indecent Exposure	2
Special Event Duty	7
Suspicious Circumstances, Possible Terrorist Related Incident	1
Suspicious Package	1
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Bicycles	13
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): From Buildings (Church, School, Restaurant)	15
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Other (From Private Res, Boat, Plane, Yard)	2
THEFT, PETTY (\$400 OR LESS): Shoplifting (From Dept Store, Mkt, Etc.)	1
Unable to Locate Person(s) With Alleged Mental Illness	1
Unattended Package	1
Unknown / Possible COVID-19 Related	2
VANDALISM: Graffiti/Tagging	4
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Felony, or to Church, Synagogue, etc.	3
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Misdemeanor	10
VEHICLE AND BOATING LAWS: Hit And Run, Misdemeanor	3
VEHICLE BURGLARY: Auto/Passenger Van Burglary	4
VEHICLE BURGLARY: Truck/Cargo Van Burglary	1
VEHICLE/BOAT, OTHER NON-CRIMINAL: Vehicle/Boat, Stored/Impounded	6
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Non-Hazardous Citation	4



VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Parking	8
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Warning Given	3
WARRANTS: Felony, In County	3
WARRANTS: Misdemeanor	1
Total	1,981



LA Valley College

Figure 66: LA Valley CAD Events by Month – 2019/2020 Combined




Figure 67: LA Valley CAD Events by Day of Week






Figure 68: LA Valley CAD Events by Hour




Table 28: LA Valley CAD Events

Description Text	Count
ACCIDENTS, MISCELLANEOUS: Accident, Non-Traffic	1
ACCIDENTS, TRAFFIC- VEHICLE OR BOAT: Traffic (Non-Injury)	3
Assigned Assist	1
Assist Citizen	696
Assist Contract City	1
Assist Fire Department	4
Assist LASD Transit	1
Assist Other Sheriff's Station	1
Assist Police Department (Not LASD)	5
Assist Station Unit	19



BURGLARY, OTHER STRUCTURE: Unknown, Attempt	2
COVID-19 Directed Patrol / Compliance Check / Enforcement	195
DISORDERLY CONDUCT: Disturbing the Peace/Court Disturbances	13
Escort – Staff	2
GRAND THEFT VEHICLE (GTA): Other Vehicle (Snowmobile, Golf Cart, Etc.)	1
GRAND THEFT: Other (From Boat, Plane, Private Res, Yard, Etc.)	1
Handgun Registration, Voluntary	1
IDENTITY THEFT: Attempt/Possession of Profile Info, 530.5(d)PC, Mis.	1
JUVENILE, NON-CRIMINAL: Juvenile School Laws, Habitual Truancy (WIC 601B)	1
MISCELLANEOUS: Injury to County Employee	2
MISDEMEANORS, MISCELLANEOUS: Trespassing	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Alarm-Burglary	2
NON-CRIMINAL: Fire Alarm	3
NON-CRIMINAL: Follow-Up	12
NON-CRIMINAL: Police Hazard-Other	66
NON-CRIMINAL: Property Lost/Found/Recovered	3
NON-CRIMINAL: Safety Hazard	1
NON-CRIMINAL: Suspicious Circumstances, Possible Criminal Activity	6
Person(s) Mentally Ill - 5150 Hold Placed	3
SEX FELONIES: Sex Crimes Against Children (Under 14 Years)	1
SEX MISDEMEANORS: All Other Sex Misdemeanors	1
Special Event Duty	1
STATION SERVICE: Appearance, Other	1



SUICIDE AND ATTEMPT: Attempt Suicide, Adult	1
Unattended Package	7
Unknown / Possible COVID-19 Related	2
VANDALISM: Graffiti/Tagging	4
VANDALISM: Vandalism, Misdemeanor	1
VEHICLE AND BOATING LAWS: Hit And Run, Misdemeanor	2
VEHICLE AND BOATING LAWS: Misdemeanor	2
VEHICLE/BOAT, OTHER NON-CRIMINAL: Vehicle/Boat, Stored/Impounded	1
VEHICLE/BOATING LAWS, CITATIONS: Non-Hazardous Citation	1
WARRANTS: Felony, In County	2
Total	1,075



Station Logs

The other sources of activity data are station logs maintained at each campus security office. We obtained samples station logs from several campuses in hopes that they might provide greater insight; unfortunately, they do not.

Table 29 is a daily log for East LA College. It primarily serves as a running log of station activity. For example, the first row indicated the EM shift has begun at 2200 hours, and that the EM arrived at 2200 and cleared at 0600. Rows 11 through 17 appear to reflect staff coming on duty. Not until row 18 do we see an event resembling a call. It is, of course, difficult to analyze this information because it is largely textual. It is also unclear how these events with reports link to CAD data.



Table 29: Example of Daily Call Log from East LA College

ID	Time Rec.	OBS	Call	Radio Code	Reporting Party & Call Back Number	Location and Narrative	Unit Assigned	Time		
								En Route	97	98
1	2200	x		10-8	MORENO	START OF EM SHIFT	872D	2200	2200	0600
2	2218	X		924P	DEPUTY DE LEON	CONDUCTED A 924P OF S2 ALL LEVELS CHECKED CODE 4 LOCKED AND SECURED CUSTODIAN STILL INSIDE	872A1	2218	2218	2248
3	0001	X		925	CUSTODIAN MARTIN 3233184489	POSSIBLE TRANSIENT, NORTH OF F5, UNDERNEATH BLANKET. RP COULD NOT GIVE A DESCRPTION OF DP DUE TO BEING UNDERNEATH A BLANKET. DP BEING ESCORTED OFF CAMPUS CODE 4	872O1 872X2	0001	0005	0007
4	0042	X		924P	SO SHIOZAKI SO RUANO	CONDUCTED A 924P OF ENTIRE CAMPUS CODE 4 PS3 LEVELS 4-5 SECURED FOR FILM CREW	872O1 872X2	0042	0042	0042
5	0111	X		924P	SO SHIOZAKI SO RUANO	CONDUCTED A 924P OF S2 COURTYARD CODE 4	872O1 872X2	0111	0111	0111
6	0200	X				NO CALLS	872D			
7	0300	X				NO CALLS	872D			
8	0400	X				NO CALLS	872D			
9	0515	X		924P	SO SHIOZAKI SO RUANO	CONDUCTED A 924P OF ENTIRE CAPMUS, PS3 PS4, MADE CONTACT WITH SERGIO AT PS3 REA FILMING CODE 4	872O1 872Z2	0515	0515	0515
10										



(Campus Safety Security Assessment)

Conducted on Behalf of the Los Angeles Community College District

11	0600	X		10-8		START OF AM SHIFT	872D	0600	06 00	14 00
12	0800		X	10-41	JENNIFER	CDT ALAMO CONDUCTED A 10-41 AT E1 176, CODE 4.	872Z3	0800	08 05	08 05
13	0804		X	10-41	OMAR	CDT ALAMO CONDUCTED A 10-41 AT E7 210, CODE 4.	872Z3	0804	08 10	08 10
14	0817			924P	ALAMO	CDT ALAMO CONDUCTED A 924P OF S2 P2 COURTYARD CODE 4.	872Z3	0817	08 20	08 20
15	0820		X	10-41	ALAMO	CDT ALAMO CONDUCTED A 10-41 FOR RP STEVEN ADAM AT E7 ROOM 303, CODE 4.	872Z3	0820	08 20	08 20
16	0822		X	10-41	ALAMO	CDT ALAMO CONDUCTED A 10-41 FOR RP MARMOLEJO AT F5 STUDENT HEALTH CENTER CDE 4.	872Z3	0822	08 24	08 26
17	0912		X	10-41	MECHADO	CDT MECHADO CONDUCTED A 10-41 AT E7 ROOM 403, CODE 4.	872Z5	0912	09 12	09 12
18	0936		X	REPO RT	ROSA	RP ROSA CALLED AND ADVISED THAT A CHILD HAD BEEN RUNNING AND BUMPED HIS HEAD AND CDC HAD REQUESTED AN OFFICER TO CONDUCT A CHILD INJURY REPORT, SO GUILLEN GIVEN THE HANDLE ON THE CHILD INJURY REPORT, CODE 4.	872O1	0936	09 36	10 05
19	1058		X	INJUR Y REPO RT	VANESSA	RP VANESSA CALLED AND ADVISED THAT A CHILD FELL FACE FORWARD ONTO THE GROUND AND CAUSED BLEEDING FROM THE MOUTH, STAFF WERE WIPING BLOOD OFF OF THE CHILDS MOUTH, S/O GUILLEN DISPATCHED TO HANDLE CALL, 902R REFUSED CODE 4.	872O1	1058	11 10	11 25
	1113		X	PANIC BUTT ON ACTIV	MARIA	DISPATCHED S/O ROBLES AND GAVE THE ASSIST TO SO SILVAS REA PANIC BUTTON	872O3 , O4	1113	11 20	11 20



			ATION			ACTIVATION, MADE CONTACT WITH GABINO ADVISED ACCIDENTAL, SO SILVAS ADVISED CODE 4.				
	1209		X	415V		FISCAL OFFICE CALLED AND ADVISED OF A 415V THAT OCCURED AT THE FISCAL OFFICE BETWEEN STAFF AND STUDENT, DP WAS DESCRIBED WEARING A BLK BEANIE WITH A BLK SHIRT, NFD. DEPUTY PESTRANO AND GUILLEN GIVEN THE HANDLE, DP'S NAME IS ARTHUR RAMIREZ, DOB: 4/8/80, (323)926-7368, HAVING HULLICINATIONS, 918, DP WARNED AND ADVISED, ESCORTED OFF CAMPUS, CODE 4.	872A1, O1	1209	12 14	12 36
	1230	X		924P	MACHADO	CDT MACHADO CONDUCTED A 924P OF F3, F5, E7, AND E9 CODE 4.	872Z5	1230	12 30	12 30
	1242	X		924P	MACHADO	CDT MACHADO CONDUCTED A 924P OF K5, K7, G5 INT, G7, AND G8 ALL CHECKS CODE 4.	872Z5	1242	12 42	12 42
	1256	X		924P	MACHADO	CDT MACHADO CONDUCTED A 924P OF E3 COURTYARD, CODE 4.	872Z5	1256	12 56	12 56
	1400			10-8	CABRALES	START OF PM SHIFT	872D		14 00	22 00
	.1500				CABRALES	NO CALLS 1400-1500	872D			
	1600				CABRALES	NO CALLS 1500-1600	872D			
	1700				CABRALES	NO CALLS 1600-1700	872D			
	2100				CABRALES	NO CALLS 1700-2100	872D			
	2105		X	10-42	CABRALES	CDT SANDOVAL CONDUCTED A 10-42 AT CC	872Z 1			



Table 30 illustrates a log for one shift at Mission College. Once again, the call information is hard to capture, and most entries are administrative in nature.

Table 30: Daily Call Log from LA Mission College

Time Rec.	OBS	Call	Radio Code	Reporting Party & Call Back Number	Location and Narrative	Unit Assigned	Time		
							En Route	97	98
0700	X		924	STATION	UNLOCK CAMPUS	876Z1	0700	07 25	07 25
0700	X		924	STATOIN	FLAG DETAIL	876Z1	0700	07 25	07 25
0825		X	10-44	STUDENT STORE	MONEY ESCORT FROM STUDENT STORE TO BUSINESS AND ESCORT FROM KITCHEN TO BUSINESS AND BACK TO KITCHEN	876O1	0825	08 50	09 00
0902		X	10-41	JOANNA	UNLOCK IA FACULTY OFFICE 21 IN THE IA BUILDING	876Z1	0902	09 07	09 07
0910		X	10-41	JOSE	UNLOCK ROOM 1527 IN THE CAMPUS CENTER	876Z1	0910	09 15	09 15
0946		X	927C	DARRELL.	DARRELL CALLED THE STATION TO INFORM THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF ONE VEHICLE, DESCRIBED AS A CHEVY AVALANCHE PARKED TOO CLOSE TO ANOTHER KIA. THE TWO OWNERS OF THE VEHICLE EXCHANGED INFORMATION. CODE 4.	876Z1	0946	09 46	10 04
1144		X	10-44		MONEY ESCORT FROM BOOKSTORE TO C-STORE	876O1	1146	11 58	11 58
1120		X	902	JASMIN BRIANA (818) 807-0704	JASMIN BRIANA DE LA ROSA CAME INTO THE STATION TO INFORM SHE HAD BURNED HER LEFT HAND PALM AREA. SHE DECLINED	876O2	1120	11 22	11 30



					RESCUE SHE STATED SHE WAS GOING TO CONTINUE ATTENDING HER CLASS. OFC. ESPINOLA SUGGESTED SHE GO TO THE STUDENT HEALTH CENTER.				
1251		X	10-41	ELIZABETH	UNLOCK CC STUDENT SUCCESS	876Z5	1251	12 54	12 58
1330	X		10-44	AL	MONEY ESCORT FROM C-STORE TO BOOKSTORE	876O2	1330	13 33	13 50
1653	X		924	STAFF	DROPPED OF VAN KEYS	876Z5	1653	16 53	16 53

Conclusions

A rigorous study of law enforcement staffing must include the analysis of data. We intended to identify the data sets to support our study; however, despite hundreds of hours of effort, we found very little information upon which to develop a cogent set of recommendations. Nevertheless, we can offer several important findings and recommendations.

Providing safety and security to college and university campuses is complex. There are an estimated 15 million students, and millions more faculty and staff, at American institutions. “Campus Public Safety services vary greatly on the nation’s college and university campuses. Campus law enforcement agencies include full-service police departments (both armed and unarmed), private security operations, contractual services, and more. Campus police departments also vary greatly in how they relate to and share information with local and state public safety agencies.”³¹

Our work with LACCD suggests that there are relatively few reported crimes and calls for service that require the skills of a trained police officer. One could argue that the low levels of crime are reflective of the work of the LASD CCB. One could also argue that similar levels of crime and disorder could be achieved by a well-trained security force, enhanced technology or some combination of the two.

We are skeptical of the LASD CCB’s staffing plan that results in nominally equal staffing on a 24-hour basis daily. This is inconsistent with campus activity, particularly on non-residential campuses. Across the nine campuses, there are on average 13 CAD events per day. Each campus staffs nine officers, including one deputy and two security officers per shift, equating to approximately 81 LASD CCB members on duty each day. Thus, each member handles, on average, 0.2 CAD events daily. At this rate, one LASD member will handle only one call every five days.

31 <https://bja.ojp.gov/program/enhancing-campus-safety-and-security/overview>



The most critical issue with respect to deployment is the lack of a unified central dispatch system for the LACCD. Such a system would standardize communication protocols and provide more consistent data and staffing methods. For example, if there were a central dispatch, the campus offices could close after regular hours, releasing staff for other activities. Technology such as phones or cameras installed outside stations could assist anyone who visits after hours. Finally, a centralized dispatch center could help to introduce a LACCD emergency phone number.

At minimum, any agency that provides law enforcement services to the LACCD should also provide data on dispatched calls for service that includes:

- + Nature of call
- + Call priority
- + Time of receipt
- + Time created in CAD
- + Time of dispatch
- + Time of arrival
- + Time the last unit clears
- + Geographic unit of call
- + Whether a report was prepared

Recommendations

Staffing Analysis	
7.1	Establish a program for the use of campus-level civilian response groups to accompany LASD CCB to calls for service reported as behavioral issues. The program must include a policy, procedures, training, reporting and evaluation with intent to expand the program to respond when practicable instead of LASD CCB personnel.
7.2	Establish a program for a similar campus-level civilian response group for low-level security-related calls for service, such as unlocking doors. Consider enhancing the Student Cadet program as a sustainable solution.
7.3	Require the LASD CCB command staff to use crime and incident reporting to drive personnel assignments across the campuses.
7.4	Engage with LASD CCB to develop a centralized dispatch program



08 Comparative Review

We have worked with the law enforcement and security services departments at institutions of higher learning across the nation. In addition to the knowledge that we gained in those engagements; we researched the processes at several comparable campuses to learn more about their security processes. **Attachment 2** details data points for each college or university that we researched.

LACCD is unique. It is one of the largest community college districts in the world and many of its campuses are in Los Angeles, the second largest city in the U.S. LACCD serves a diverse student population that includes recent high school graduates and adult learners with varied backgrounds.

Crime rates on the campuses are exceptionally lower than the crime rates in the immediate areas surrounding the properties. Some of these areas experience crime rates as much as 11 times higher than the national average, nine times higher than the state average and seven times higher than the county average.

Crime is just one of the many variables to take into consideration when the LACCD adopts a security plan for a campus and determines the appropriate officer staffing level. Unfortunately, few guidelines are available for campus leadership to reference. The Department of Justice (DOJ) published its report, “Establishing Appropriate Staffing Levels for Campus Public Safety Departments” a decade ago and updated it in 2013.³² Although the report is older, much of the content, particularly that concerning the approach to staffing, remains pertinent. The report highlights how the many variables influence the overall security plan and staffing levels. In **Attachment 2**, we provide comparable institutions for reference. The DOJ report describes using comparable practices as:

“Identifying ‘similar’ institutions can be a difficult task depending upon the variables one chooses to examine. These are likely to include total student enrollment, the number of resident students, and urban or rural location. However, as suggested by Sammons,³³ they might also include the proportion of male to female students, and commuters who will be on campus during the business day, as well as departmental structure—i.e., sworn or non-sworn officers. The greater the number of variables examined, the more difficult it is to find similar institutions. Benchmarking also suffers from the fact that, having completed the exercise, all it will show is whether one’s staffing levels are less than, comparable with, or exceed other similarly structured institutions. It will not determine the appropriateness of the staffing levels of any of the institutions examined.”

The report notes that fewer than two percent of campus leadership use a staffing formula to determine their staffing levels. The simplest but least accurate method of determining an appropriate staffing level is applying a ratio of students to officers. When the DOJ published its report, the

³² U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services. *Establishing Appropriate Staffing Levels for Campus Public Safety Departments* (2013)

³³ Sammons, G. Do You Need More Officers? *Campus Law Enforcement Journal* 38 (2): 22–25. (2008)



average ratio was between 1.8 and three officers per 1,000 students. However, we stress that this method is identified as the least accurate in the report.³⁴

As requested, we conducted a staffing study of the LASD CCB based on the workload. The DOJ report refers to such a study as a workload analysis and states that they are widely accepted as a fundamental determinant of the staffing required for a police patrol function. An important element in building an effective staffing plan is having a detailed understanding of the underlying workload factors that impact staffing needs. A strong staffing plan establishes a connection between the types and levels of a workload and determines the staffing levels needed to meet performance expectations.³⁵

We note that the LASD CCB's workload (i.e., calls for service) does not account for the percentage of time LACCD expects the LASD CCB officers to spend engaging with the campus community. Although our workload analysis provides some insight to the nature of the calls for service, we could not accurately determine the time associated with those calls, which negatively impacted our ability to establish a staffing level.

However, broadly, standard security protocols at educational facilities include:

- + Exterior and common-area lighting
- + Access control measures that restrict access to the campus such as fencing, gates, natural and man-made barriers
- + Access control measures that restrict access to buildings such as keys to key card readers
- + Surveillance cameras
- + Emergency response plans and communication platforms
- + Security personnel

Colleges have struggled to determine the best security personnel model for their campuses. Some colleges that we reviewed have a proprietary police department, while others contract the services, like LACCD, or engage private security and civilian support groups.

At Northern California's Peralta Community College, the board voted in June 2020 to cancel their contract with the Alameda County Sheriff's Department that had provided armed deputies across the four college campuses. The board instead contracted multiple private security firms to provide unarmed security officers. However, as the contracts transitioned in December 2020, information surfaced regarding licensing issues and that security officers have not completed training in mental health crisis response.

³⁴ Reaves, Brian A. 2008. Campus Law Enforcement 2004-05, Special Report. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 219374.

³⁵ DuBois, Liz. 2009. An Overview of Staffing Analysis. *Journal of Local Government Auditors* 22 (3) (Spring): 14–16.



The University of Minnesota cancelled its contract with the Minneapolis Police Department just days after George Floyd's death. The Department had previously provided extra-duty police services at large events, such as football games and concerts.

George Floyd's death and the surrounding circumstances sparked discussions, movements and actions across the nation. Law enforcement agencies across the country scrambled to review their policies and procedures to ensure they addressed risks during an officer-involved use of force. As massive protests swept the nation, the public questioned the role of law enforcement officers, use of force and called for examinations of whether officers needed firearms in all facets of their work.

Similar conversations have occurred at LACCD. We frequently discussed the question regarding if armed officers should be on campus in our stakeholder outreach with the campus community. During our assessment, a woman asked if we could tell her which college or university has the best security plan in the nation. Our response continues to be that the days, weeks and months that followed George Floyd's death are reshaping law enforcement, and to a large extent, security providers. Some best practices for a campus environment as of early May 2020 may have changed. However, community engagement will always remain a best practice. By increasing the level of transparency and accountability with the public they serve, law enforcement agencies can create a foundation of trust between the department and the community.

The vast majority of LACCD stakeholders acknowledged the campuses' crime rates and the risk of an armed encounter and expressed being comfortable with having armed law enforcement officers on campus. However, as indicated throughout our report, not all participants agreed.

The LASD CCB and campus community frequently discussed the impact of people experiencing homelessness as being undeniable and overwhelming. Stakeholders said personnel may escort such individuals off property, but they return minutes or hours later. Those stakeholders expressed concern that without the level of authority provided by law enforcement officers on campus, the issues impacting the campuses due to people experiencing homelessness would be exponentially greater.

Although our comparison provides information about how other colleges address security, we urge LACCD to focus on our assessment's findings and leverage our recommendations to shape their strategic security vision and plan and build their internal infrastructure and structure to support that plan. In turn, LACCD can create a nimble environment in which it can adapt and adjust elements of its security plan with greater ease.



Appendix: The Hillard Heintze Project Team

Internal Project Oversight

Robert L. Davis, Senior Vice President and Practice Lead, Law Enforcement Consulting



Rob is a highly regarded and innovative national leader in policing and public safety with extensive experience assessing federal, state and local law enforcement agencies across the U.S. Rob served in a variety of capacities during his 30 years' career with the San Jose Police Department, including as the Chief of Police for seven years. During his time as chief, Rob also served as the President of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. He provided consulting services for the U.S. State Department, traveling on numerous occasions to Central and South America to provide training in community policing methods addressing gang prevention, intervention and suppression. Since retiring from San Jose, Rob has been involved in numerous assessments of police departments across the nation, including serving as the Project Director for Hillard Heintze's Department of Justice Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance contract.

Project Management

Chad M. McGinty, Senior Director



Chad brings nearly three decades of law enforcement, public safety, emergency preparedness and security leadership experience to his role as Senior Director at Hillard Heintze. Chad served in the Ohio State Highway Patrol for nearly 28 years, starting as a Trooper in 1989 and later serving as Sergeant, Lieutenant and Captain before joining the Senior Staff as Major, Commander of Field Operations in 2014. His oversight included patrol operations statewide, Aviation, Special Response Team, Explosive Detection Canine Teams, security operations at the Ohio Statehouse and government complexes and Executive Protection. Chad has extensive experience planning and commanding large-scale law enforcement operations, including coordinating and leading the crowd control/field force response for the 2016 Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio.



Subject-Matter Expertise

Marcia K. Thompson, Esq., Vice President



Marcia is an attorney and law enforcement practitioner with over 20 years working in the criminal justice field. As a Vice President within our Law Enforcement Consulting practice, she provides oversight, management and technical assistance on various law enforcement assessments, trainings and reviews. Marcia has served as a law enforcement administrator within the Department of Safety at the University of Chicago Police Department, where she oversaw professional standards, accreditation, compliance, training, records management, recruitment, field training, in-service training, leadership development, succession planning, community engagement, youth outreach and the community advisory committee in support of the University's transparency and inclusion initiative. Marcia is a Virginia Supreme Court certified mediator as well as a collaborative problem-solver, change management facilitator, and equal employment opportunity (EEO) and civil rights professional. For many years, Marcia has served as a federal fact finder, EEO counselor, trained EEO investigator and hearing officer, providing neutral hearings and drafting administrative appellate determinations.

Robert Boehmer, Esq., Vice President



Robert is an experienced facilitator, trainer and public speaker, with expertise in collaborative problem solving, community policing, partnership development and information sharing. For the past several years, he has been facilitating sessions for the Department of Homeland Security's Building Communities of Trust Initiative, focusing on developing trust among law enforcement, fusion centers and the communities they serve. As a Vice President in the Law Enforcement Consulting practice at Hillard Heintze, Robert manages complex law enforcement assessments and helps police agencies transform their organizations and adopt national best practices and industry standards central to improving accountability, transparency and community trust.

Dan Walsh, Director



Since joining Hillard Heintze in 2015, Dan has aligned his more than 17 years of experience in homeland security, preparedness and resilience with his work helping private and public organizations to enhance their security operations and emergency response capabilities. Before joining the firm, Dan worked at Argonne National Laboratory, as an infrastructure analyst in the Global Security Services' Risk and Infrastructure Sciences Division. He served as the resiliency assessment lead for six U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP) projects. He served as an instructor for risk courses sponsored by DHS's Office and Intelligence and Analysis and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to integrate and strengthen the risk assessment capabilities of fusion center analysts. He also served as the director of planning for the Chicago Department of Public Health's Bioterrorism Preparedness Program.



Wes Stought, Associate Director, Private Client and Family Office Services



Wes brings to Hillard Heintze's private clients more than two decades of strategic leadership, security and project management experience. Before joining Hillard Heintze and supporting the firm's private clients on matters ranging from residential security to cyber and information security best practices, Wes served in the Ohio State Highway Patrol for more than 20 years. In this role, he rose in the ranks to sergeant, serving as an assistance post commander at three different post assignments before transferring to the training academy. Wes served as an instructor and a course director in multiple training disciplines, training several hundred officers from agencies across Ohio and neighboring states.

Kenton W. Rainey, Senior Subject Matter Expert



Kenton brings to the Hillard Heintze team substantial leadership experience bridging criminal justice education and law enforcement acumen, providing expert knowledge of building trust between departments and the communities they serve. With over 40 years of law enforcement experience spanning seven different agencies in four states, Kenton presently serves as the University of Chicago Police Department's Chief of Police. Prior to this role, he was the Chief of Police for the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) and the City of Fairfield, working, among other areas of focus, to restore community trust following a high-profile officer-involved shooting. Kenton is a recognized expert on many law enforcement subjects, including Community Oriented Problem Solving (COPPS) and Crisis Intervention Training (CIT). Among other honors, he was asked in 2015 to testify before President Obama's 21st Century Policing Task Force on the implementation of body cameras.

Rick Tanksley, Senior Subject Matter Expert



As a former vice president of Law Enforcement Consulting at Hillard Heintze, Rick brought to the firm's clients an exceptionally broad base of knowledge and experience in building collaborative relationships at the state and local level in law enforcement. Rick began his policing career with the Oak Park, Illinois Police Department in 1984, and after serving in a number of positions, including Patrol Commander and Deputy Chief, he was appointed Chief in 2001. As Chief of Police of the Department from 2001 to 2016, and while serving concurrently as Director of Emergency Preparedness for the city, he changed the department culture to one that is transparent, professional, courteous and respectful toward the diverse community it serves. This valuable change resulted in single-digit citizen complaints regarding officer conduct. Additionally, he led efforts as one of the first village departments to institute performance measures to monitor department operations, promote adherence to policies and strategic plans, and create measurable evidence to justify budget requests. He currently serves as the Chief of Police for the Occidental College Police Department in Los Angeles County, joining the Department in January 2018.




Jon Maskaly, Ph.D., Senior Subject-Matter Expert



Jon is an advanced expert in data collection, analysis and management. He has served at U.S. academic institutions including the University of Texas at Dallas, the University of Illinois at Chicago and East Carolina University. In his role at Hillard Heintze, Jon has worked on several police reform projects through the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA). He was responsible for analyzing data related to fair-and-impartial policing; vulnerable victims; recruitment, hiring and retention; use of force cases; and traffic and pedestrian stops. In addition, Jon worked with agencies to develop the mentality and capacity to become organizations that are data-driven in their decision-making. He assisted in the development of strategic plans for transparent data and data management plans. He also offered training and assistance in accessing, auditing and querying data. Jon helped agencies develop systems, policies and audit plans for the effective maintenance of training records. He also assisted Professional Standards Units in developing abilities to look at data and understand the trends in the data.

Dr. Alexander Weiss, Senior Staffing Expert



Alexander is a nationally prominent expert and specialist in public safety, law enforcement and police department operational analysis. For nine years, he was Director of the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety and Professor of Management and Strategy at the J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management. In addition, he has 12 years of experience with law enforcement agencies in Colorado. He has written and lectured widely on topics such as resource allocation and work scheduling, police innovation, highway safety, program evaluation and racial profiling.

John Torres, Subject-Matter Expert



John is an executive leader and strategist experienced in federal law enforcement, law enforcement oversight and workplace and administrative investigations. As the Systemwide Director of Investigations for the University of California's Office of the President, John was responsible for coordinating, tracking, managing and conducting investigations at the Office of the President, 10 campuses, five medical centers and the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. John has an extensive background in sensitive and complex investigative methods and troubleshooting operational issues related to investigations. He has extensive experience in civil rights and anti-racism policy development. John is an FBI National Academy graduate and former Senior Executive Service (SES).



(Campus Safety Security Assessment)

Conducted on Behalf of the Los Angeles Community College District

Attachments

Attachment 1: Clery Act Statistics for All Campuses

Attachment 2: Comparison Chart of U.S. Colleges

Attachment 3: California Peace Officer Standards and Training

Attachment 4: LACCD Emergency Response Training Memo

Attachment 5: Campus Safety and Security Survey